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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MEXICANIZATION OF THE COMPAÑÍA
MINERA DE CANANEA, 1971 TO 1989
by
Doyle L. Perdue
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Victor Uribe, Major Professor
This dissertation argues that the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera
de Cananea in 1971 represented the strongest assertion of national sovereignty
over Mexican mineral resources after more than 400 years of foreign control. In
contrast to the nationalization of oil in 1938, however, this emerged as a
conservative and moderate effort. The U.S.-based Anaconda Copper Company
retained 49% of the company's ownership after selling 51% of the company to a
combination of public and private interests in Mexico. This strategy represented
the triumph of conservative forces, whose legitimacy rested on popular appeals
to the Mexican Revolution, except transforming it into an instrument to achieve
the goals of the new post-revolutionary elite.
The study uses the approach of cultural history to examine the contours of
economic life. As such, the concept of national sovereignty illuminates changing
discourses regarding the character of work, nature, and the organization of
Mexican society and politics. In its original version, national sovereignty was
integral to an economic paradigm whereby the possession, control, and
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exploitation of natural resources by the Mexican nation were to benefit the
Mexican people. The revolutionary Constitution of 1917 divided labor and natural
resources and made it so that the working class could be controlled and
deployed according to national interests defined by elites.
Originating in a major strike in 1906, the myth of Cananea created an
association between the working class, the Mexican nation, and the Mexican
Revolution, which later provided legitimacy to the elite project of economic
nationalism. After 1938, nationalist policy no longer advanced the social and
economic well-being of the Mexican people overall but rather the private interests
of elites. Mexicanization reduced the foreign control of mineral resources and
introduced the private sector into the industry, but its failure to improve outcomes
for Cananea's mineworkers frayed the bonds of the working class and the
Mexican nation. The efforts of the Carlos Salinas administration to privatize the
company in August 1989, further weakened such bonds. Salinas renegotiated
the meanings of national sovereignty, deconstructing the broad framework of
labor, the nation, and the Mexican Revolution established in the myth of
Cananea.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................1
CHAPTER I. The Myths of Cananea: Labor, Nation, and the Mexican
Revolution ………………………………………………………………………………26
CHAPTER II. The Mexicanization of Mining Law, 1961.......................................59
CHAPTER III. The Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea, 1971
...........................................................................................................................104
CHAPTER IV. The Compañía Minera de Cananea, 1971-1989........................143
CHAPTER V. The Privatization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea,1989
...........................................................................................................................189
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................233
REFERENCES..................................................................................................244
VITA……………………………………………………..………………………………273

viii

INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de
Cananea in 1971. According to its promoters, this policy and its implementation
represented the strongest effort in the history of Mexico to assert national
sovereignty over its mineral resources. This had been an effort five hundred
years in the making. Since the arrival of Spanish conquistadors, the history of
Mexico has been synonymous with the exploitation of its mineral resources by
foreign powers. Neither the achievement of independence in 1821 nor the
Mexican Revolution in 1910 succeeded at changing this situation. It was not until
President Adolfo López Mateos signed the policy of Mexicanization into law in
1961 that Mexico begun to gain control of its mineral resources.
A fair number of Mexicans celebrated the process of Mexicanization of the
Compañía Minera de Cananea in 1971 as an achievement of national
sovereignty and a fulfillment of the Mexican Revolution. The revolution had
established an ideology that legitimized a strong interventionist role by the state
in the Mexican economy, for the purpose of advancing the social well-being of
the Mexican people. This aspiration had its clearest expression when President
Lázaro Cárdenas nationalized the oil industry in 1938. After decades of foreign
ownership, this act eliminated all foreign participation and brought the industry
under the direct management and administration by the Mexican state. The
Mexicanization of the mining industry differed in significant ways.
While the nationalization of the oil industry represented the apex of the
Mexican Revolution, it also signaled its decline. This revolutionary act unleashed
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a conservative reaction that fundamentally altered the nature of Mexico’s political
culture, bringing the end of the revolution according to several observers.
Nonetheless, thereafter the Revolution remained the basis for a series of
institutional changes aimed at achieving political legitimacy, economic
development, and social cohesion. Yet, at the same time it was being
institutionalized the Mexican Revolution became increasingly superficial. Instead
of a motivating force for the social development and popular aspirations of the
Mexican people, the Revolution became an instrument to achieve the goals
envisioned by a new post-revolutionary elite. The Mexicanization of the mining
industry, then, emerges within this context of revolutionary continuity and
reactionary change. No case epitomizes this paradox more than the
Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea.
The history of the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea
provides an ideal case to examine the negotiation of revolutionary ideals and to
show the reality behind them. Located in the northwestern state of Sonora,
Cananea gained historical relevance after American soldiers repressed a labor
strike in 1906. This event became the foundational myth that joined the labor
movement to both the Mexican nation and the Mexican Revolution. Over six
decades later, the Compañía Minera de Cananea underwent the process of
Mexicanization when the American-owned Anaconda Copper Company sold
51% of its shares to public and private Mexican interests. This process
represented a rather moderate and conservative measure, yet its promoters
presented it as an achievement of total national sovereignty.
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As this dissertation will establish, this maneuver ultimately represented the
triumph, after 1938, of conservative forces whose legitimacy rested on popular
appeals to the Mexican Revolution. Instead of advancing the well-being of the
Mexican people, state intervention had become an instrument to advance elite
interests by ending the monopoliziation of mineral resources in the hands of
foreign owners and permitting the capital accumulation of mineral resources.
Since the nationalization of the oil industry by President Lázaro Cárdenas, the
achievement of sovereignty over natural resources was presented as a popular
cause of the working class. The Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de
Cananea, however, demonstrated this to be a fiction. The optimism of
government officials throughout the 1970s contrasted sharply with the enduring
grievances experienced by the mineworkers who felt nothing had changed.
Clearly, national sovereignty possessed different meanings and implications
depending on one’s social class and occupation. Cananea’s mineworkers
believed that national sovereignty meant their sovereignty and that it would bring
them direct benefits through greater control of their financial resources and their
work activities. When these expectations failed to materialize, workers’
identification with the Mexican nation weakened and they began to take matters
into their own hands, reversing the decades-long pact between labor and the
Mexican state.
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Historiography
The Mexicanization of the mining industry has received limited attention
from scholars. Works dedicated to this topic include one article, “Mexicanization,
Privatization, and Large Mining Capital in Mexico” by Raúl Delgado Wise and
Rubén Del Pozo Mendoza,1 and a collection of essays, Cananea: tradición y
modernidad en una mina histórica, edited by Oscar F. Contreras Montellano.2 The
most prolific author has been Juan Luis Sariego who has authored and coauthored the most useful works on the subject, including El estado y la minería
mexicana: política, trabajo y sociedad durante el siglo xx (1988)3 and Enclaves y
minerales en el norte de México. Historia social de los mineros de Cananea y
Nueva Rosita, 1900-1970 (1988).4
Overall, these works present the Mexicanization of the mining industry as
an achievement of national sovereignty with respect to mineral resources.5 On
the nature of this policy, Delgado Wise and Mendoza have argued that the policy

1

Raúl Delgado Wise and Rubén Del Pozo Mendoza, “Mexicanization, Privatization, and Large
Mining Capital in Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives 32, no 4. (July 2005): 65-86.
2

Oscar F, Contreras Montellano, ed. Cananea: tradición y modernidad en una mina histórica
(México, D.F.: Colegio de Sonora, 1998).
3

Juan Luis Sariego, Luis Reygadas, Miguel Ángel Gómez, and Javier Farrera, El estado y la
minería mexicana: política, trabajo y sociedad durante el siglo xx (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura
Económica, 1988).
4

Juan Luis Sariego, Enclaves y minerales en el norte de México: historia social de los mineros
de Cananea y Nueva Rosita, 1900-1970 (México, D.F.: Ediciones de la Casa Chata, 1988).
5

Theodore B. Borek, "Evaluating a Developing Institution: Mexicanization of Mining," Arizona
Law Review 13, no. 3 (1971), 685; David S. Browning, “Historic Basis of Mining Law,” InterAmerican Law Review 7, no. 1 (January – July 1965): 3-4; Francisco Arellano Rendón, El
subsuelo mexicano: patrimonio nacional (México: [s.n.], 1970), 107; Sariego, El estado, 368;
María Becerra González, Derecho minero de méxico y vocabulario con definición de conceptos
jurídicos-mineros (México, D.F.: Editorial Limusa-Wiley, 1963), 69; Robert B. Wallace Hall, La
dinámica del sector minero en México, 1877-1970 (México: El Colegio de México, 1972), 126.

4

of Mexicanization was a “radical measure.”6 Sariego and others, however, have
emphasized its moderate and pragmatic character. The latter contend that
Mexicanization was a nationalist policy intended to assert greater control of the
industry without alienating foreign investors and governments. Together, these
works focus mainly on the relationships between the state, the private sector,
and foreign investors in parastate enterprises.7
Mexicanization introduced the Mexican state into the mining industry and
extended its role in the governance of Mexico. According to Sariego,
Mexicanization ended the “imperial economic arrangement” known as the
enclave. Since the beginning of its mining operations in 1899, Cananea had
been owned by American companies and was “characterized by a close and tight
relationship between the mining company and labor, with the state almost
completely absent.”8 After Mexicanization, the Mexican state took on a greater
role in municipal and administrative functions and advanced public projects such
as housing, education, infrastructure, which had formerly been the domain of the
mining company. As a consequence, the state’s increased role in the
governance of Cananea diminished the influence of the local mining union which,
for decades, had served as the “natural representative” of the workers,

6

Mendoza and Delgado Wise, “Mexicanization,” 69.

7

Sariego, Enclaves, 291; Sariego, El estado, 362; Oscar F. Contreras Montellano, La minería en
Sonora: modernización industrial y fuerza de trabajo (México, D.F.: Área de Estudios sobre
Historia y Sociedad-El Colegio de Sonora, 1986), 15, 17.

8

Sariego, Enclaves, 287; Sariego, El estado, 16, 248.
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responsible for protecting and advancing their interests against the unilateral
influence of the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company.9
While the Mexican state increased its role in the mining industry, the
Mexicanization policy also introduced an entirely new group to the industry –
domestic private interests. Mexicanization transformed the monopoly character
of the mining industry formerly dominated by foreign interests and permitted the
entry of Mexican investors.10 Delgado Wise and Mendoza have argued that
Mexicanization constituted a “political strategy for the formation and consolidation
of large mining capital."11 This policy successfully channeled public resources
into the industry, permitting expansion and modernization projects, which were
then transferred to private ownership in the late 1980s. They point out that this
strategy did not create a new group of the Mexican bourgeoisie but permitted the
growth and consolidation of an existing group associated with industrial and
financial capital.12
Mexicanization also transformed the nature of foreign participation in the
mining industry. In contrast to policies of direct nationalization, Mexicanization

9

Sariego, El estado, 16.

10

Oscar F. Contreras and Miguel Angel Ramirez, “Cananea: el largo camino de la
modernización,” in Cananea: tradición y modernidad en una mina histórica, eds. Oscar F.
Contreras, Alejandro Covarrubias, Miguel Angel Ramírez, and Juan Luis Sariego Rodríguez
(Hermosillo: Colegio de Sonora, 1998), 58; Contreras Montellanos, Mineria en Sonora, 16;
Sariego, El estado, 12, 299, 310, 363-364; Browning, “Historical Basis of Mining Law,” 25;
Sariego, Enclaves, 299, 310; Delgado Wise and Mendoza, “Mexicanization,” 66.

11

Delgado Wise and Mendoza, 65-66.

12

Delgado Wise and Mendoza, 72-73; Sariego, Enclaves, 293, 297; Sariego, El estado, 12.
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preserved foreign participation and even created new forms of dependence on
foreign capital.13 The predominance of a single industrial corporation directly
involved in production yielded to the indirect involvement of multiple transnational
financial institutions. In this way, foreign interests became even more integrated
into the workings of parastate enterprises such as the Compañía Minera de
Cananea while obscuring their participation.14 According to Juan Luis Sariego
and Raúl Santana Paucar, “[t]his new strategy permits transnational companies
to control in a more effective manner the production and commercialization of
minerals without eliminating. . . the participation of social capital of Mexicanized
companies.”15 The theme of Mexicanization appears throughout the previous
works as a transformation of social relationships among state and domestic and
foreign investors, but no real change in regarding dynamics of power.
With respect to labor, the scholarly treatment of Cananea's copper mine
workers provides a valuable cultural perspective. The authors of Cananea:
tradición y modernidad en una mina histórica have studied the challenges
Mexicanization, and later, privatization, represented for Cananea’s labor
movement. In these analyses, Section 65, the local branch of the national mining
union, served as an expression of union culture. This union emphasized work as
a source of both individual self-realization and social identity since it defined

13

Sariego, Enclaves, 299, 313-316.

14

Sariego, Enclaves, 299, 287-288, 304-305, 313-316.

15

Juan Luis Sariego and Raúl Santana Paucar, "Transición tecnológica y resistencia obrera en la
minería mexicana," Cuadernos Políticos 31 (January - March 1982): 23.
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one’s place in the local community and the Mexican nation. The studies have
shown how Mexicanization transformed the traditional working lives of copper
miners through technological innovation and structural reorganization. Efforts to
privatize the company in the late 1980s, to be discussed in the final chapter of
this dissertation, represent a continuation of this process. Juan Manuel Silva
Rodríguez argues that privatization constituted an existential threat to the
revolutionary worker. Others have argued that privatization was an effort to
dismantle a labor tradition that had transformed workers from a source of state
legitimacy into a source of opposition to the state.16
These works demonstrate that the achievement of national sovereignty in
the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea was problematic, to say
the least. On the one hand, the transformation of the company into a parastate
enterprise entailed an actual change in the company’s ownership, transitioning
from exclusive foreign proprietorship to majority Mexican control. On the other
hand, the continued participation of foreign investors and the emergence of new

16

Oscar F. Contreras, Alejandro Covarrubias, Miguel Angel Ramírez, and Juan Luis Sariego
Rodríguez, “Introducción general: lecciones de una tradición sindical,” in Cananea: tradición y
modernidad en una mina histórica, eds. Oscar F. Contreras, Alejandro Covarrubias, Miguel Angel
Ramírez, and Juan Luis Sariego Rodríguez (Hermosillo: Colegio de Sonora, 1998), 22-24, 31;
Miguel Angel Ramírez and Alejandro Covarrubia, “Cultura sindical y flexibilidad laboral,” in
Cananea: tradición y modernidad en una mina histórica, eds. Oscar F. Contreras, Alejandro
Covarrubias, Miguel Angel Ramírez, and Juan Luis Sariego Rodríguez (Hermosillo: Colegio de
Sonora, 1998), 167; Contreras Montellanos, Mineria en Sonora, 36, 38; Oscar F. Contreras and
Miguel Angel Ramírez, “Mercado de trabajo y relaciones laborales,” in Cananea: tradición y
modernidad en una mina histórica, eds. Oscar F. Contreras, Alejandro Covarrubias, Miguel Angel
Ramírez, and Juan Luis Sariego Rodríguez (Hermosillo: Colegio de Sonora, 1998), 164; Miguel
Ángel Ramírez Sánchez, Trabajo y relaciones laborales en una transición prolongada el caso de
Mexicana de Cananea, antes Compañia Minera de Cananea (Hermosillo: M. Á. Ramírez
Sánchez, 1996), 15; Juan Manuel Silva Rodriguez, “Mineros y minerales en crisis: la lucha
continúa. miradas al sujeto histórico en las huelgas de Cananea, Sonora, 1906-2007,” (Ph.D.
dissertation, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2011), 16,
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forms of dependence, and the changes experienced by workers, indicate
discrepancies in the actual achievement of national sovereignty. These works
suggest that parastate enterprises such as the Compañía Minera de Cananea
projected a façade of nationalist control while obscuring a more complex reality.
The primary objective of this dissertation then, is to study how the narrative and
perception of nationalist control and the complex reality behind them were
negotiated through official and popular discourses about national sovereignty.

Key Terms, Theory, Approach
In its examination of the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de
Cananea, this dissertation adopts an interdisciplinary approach to study the
relationship between politics, economics, and culture. In the process, it
encounters a number of historiographical sub-themes namely state formation,
political economy, labor, nationalism, class relations, and myth. These multiple
strands of analysis converge in the concept of national sovereignty.
The achievement of national sovereignty is a key process in state
formation. National sovereignty refers to the authority which resides within a
nation defined by the geographical and political boundaries of a state. This
authority implies both a negative meaning – freedom from external domination
and interference – and a positive one – the freedom of a country to determine its
own goals.17 In the nineteenth century, the pursuit of national sovereignty in
17

Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner, “Introduction,” in Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past,
Present and Future of a Contested Concept, eds. Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2-3; Martti Koskenniemi, "Conclusion: Vocabularies of

9

Mexico meant the pursuit of national independence from Spanish rule. In the
twentieth century, the desire for national sovereignty implied, in particular,
greater control of natural resources and their use for internal economic
development. According to Oscar Oslak, state formation involves imposing a
mode of dominance through politics and a capitalistic mode of production.18
Efforts to achieve national sovereignty entailed both – the consolidation of state
power and the accumulation of capital.
In part, I use national sovereignty to distinguish it from the related concept
of nationalism. Nationalism refers broadly to an ideology or worldview that
organizes perceptions and meanings around the exaltation of the idea of
nation.19 Within the context of Latin American history, Alan Knight has identified
five types of nationalism: “political nationalism, cultural nationalism, economic
nationalism, xenophobia, and nation-building.”20 Although these forms of
nationalism often overlap, economic nationalism provides the greatest
conceptual utility in the current study. According to Winthrop Wright, economic
nationalism emerged as a rejection of foreign companies operating in Latin

Sovereignty – Powers of a Paradox," in Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future
of a Contested Concept, eds. Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 239.
18

Oscar Oszlak, "The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some Theoretical and
Methodological Guidelines for Its Study," Latin American Research Review 16, no. 2. (1981): 6-7

19

Don H. Doyle, “Introduction: Americanizing the Conversation on Nationalism,” in Nationalism in
the New World, eds. Don H. Doyle and Marco Antonio Pamplona (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 2006), 27-28.

20

Alan Knight, "Peasants into Patriots: Thoughts on the Making of the Mexican Nation," Mexican
Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 10, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 138.
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America by countries seeking economic development and political
independence.21 Conceptually, economic nationalism provides the ideological
basis for pursuing concrete economic objectives in the name of national
sovereignty.
The form of nationalism that took hold in Mexico during the twentieth
century was known as revolutionary nationalism. Initially, nationalism became a
strategy used during the Mexican Revolution to mobilize armies and build a mass
following among the various belligerent factions.22 Afterwards, it became the
foundational ideology of the new state – a means to foster political legitimacy,
economic growth, and social cohesion.23 Siginificantly, the ideology of
revolutionary nationalism provided, among others, the underpinnings of a political
economy that incorporated socially progressive measures and the strong
intervention of the state. Their consecration in the 1917 Constitution arranged
the factors of production through the protection of labor and natural resources
solidly “within the framework of modern industrial capitalism.”24 Carlos Salas
identifies revolutionary nationalism as “a social structure of accumulation: an
articulated, historically specific set of institutions that organizes the process of

21

Winthrop R. Wright, British-owned Railways in Argentina: Their Effect on Economic
Nationalism, 1854-1948 (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1974), 7.

22

Frederick C. Turner, The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism, (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1968), 311.

23

Roger Bartra, Blood, Ink, and Culture: Miseries and Splendors of the Post-Mexican Condition,
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 2; Turner, Dynamic, 6, 163-166, 308; Alan Knight, "The
Myth of the Mexican Revolution," Past and Present, no. 209 (Nov. 2010): 229.

24

Doyle, “Introduction,” 27-28, fn. 29.
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capital accumulation in different ways, in different locations and historical
periods."25 Within this social structure, the state plays a predominant role in the
accumulation of capital and is legitimized by the pursuit of social well-being.
Adam Morton argues that in the Mexican Revolution, “state intervention and
mass mobilization were conjoined to ensure processes of primitive accumulation
and the creation of modern capitalism."26
Critical to solidifying these processes has been the control of labor by the
Mexican state. Numerous scholars have pointed to the role of President Lázaro
Cárdenas (1934-1940) who integrated labor into the Mexican state by
reorganizing the political structure along corporatist lines in the Partido
Revolucionario Mexicano, the predecessor of the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional. By incorporating labor into the ruling party, this reorganization
eliminated the vestiges of “a politically and organizationally independent labor
movement”27 and transformed it into “a union bureaucracy, representing the
State within the labor movement.”28 Government unions engaged in strikes and
rewrote collective contracts with the approval of the state, which served to

25

Carlos Salas, "Social Structures of Accumulation and the Condition of the Working Class in
Mexico," in Contemporary Capitalism and Its Crises: Social Structure of Accumulation Theory for
the 21st Century, ed. Terrence McDonough, Michal Reich, and David M. Kotz (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 286.

26

Adam D. Morton, Revolution and State in Modern Mexico: The Political Economy of Uneven
Development (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 24-25.

27

Dan La Botz, The Crisis of Mexican Labor (New York: Praeger, 1992), xiv.

28

Juan Felipe Leal, “The Mexican State: 1915-1973, A Historical Interpretation,” Latin American
Perspectives 2, no. 2, (Summer, 1975), 56.
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appease the labor movement without upsetting industrial relations, and
institutionalizing a degree of control that permitted continuous economic growth
from the 1940s to the late 1960s known as the Mexican Miracle.29
Processes of state-formation also require a cultural element. And so,
added to the institutional mechanisms mentioned above, the ideology of
revolutionary nationalism functioned as the symbolic means of labor’s control.
Roger Bartra has described nationalism, generally, as "a body of political theory
that expresses the hegemonic vocation of the ruling class in the form of a
multiclass alliance.”30 The popular character of revolutionary nationalism,
however, effectively concealed its elite designs. Frederick Turner suggests that
revolutionary nationalism imposes “one group’s particular interests as the
interests of the nation.”31 The problem then becomes one of identifying whose
interests are included and whose are excluded from being defined as national
interests. According to Thomas O’Brien, the Mexican Revolution expanded the
scope of nationalism, formerly the exclusive domain of elites, to include peasants
and workers.32 Irene O’Malley notes, though, that nationalism served as a
progressive force but gradually became a repressive one: “It increasingly

29

La Botz, 1, 6; Raúl Trejo Delarbe, and Aníbal Yanez, “The Mexican Labor Movement: 19171975.” Latin American Perspectives 3, no. 1, Imperialism and the Working Class in Latin America
(Winter, 1976): 133.

30

Roger Bartra, Blood, Ink, and Culture: Miseries and Splendors of the Post-Mexican Condition
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 13.

31

Turner, Dynamic, 5.

32

Thomas O’Brien, The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900-1945
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5; Turner, Dynamic, 56.
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became a force to dull political criticism and to detain the advance of the laboring
classes by disguising middle-class interests as national interests."33 Even the
most progressive of constitutional measures, Articles 27 and 123, have been
shown by Alan Knight to be a means to serve “elite economic nationalism.”34 So,
despite its radical and social character, the Mexican Revolution gave rise to a
new elite and reestablished class relations under the banner of revolution.35
These analyses present a fundamental interrogation. How do the popular
elements of revolutionary nationalism harmonize with its elite facets? How is
legitimacy sustained when the ideals of an ideology diverge from its political and
economic realities? The pragmatic resolution of this dilemma resides in the
historical uses of myth. In Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories, Emilia Viotti da
Costa argues that sometimes social myths conceal a “real rupture with the past”
following a historical event.36 In her work, though, historical continuity is more
enduring than historical change. In her analysis of Brazilian history, the myth of
racial democracy disguised the endurance of the patronage system and
institutionalized racism. Disguising these continuities was critical to the
maintenance of elite hegemonic control: while providing opportunities for the

33

Irene V. O’Malley, The Myth of the Revolution: Hero Cults and the Institutionalization of the
Mexican State, 1920-1940 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 123, fn 20.

34

Alan Knight, "Peasants into Patriots,” 151.

35

Morton, Revolution and State, 18; James M. Cypher, State and Capital in Mexico: Development
Policy Since 1940 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 19.

36

Emília Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1985), 235.
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individual advancement of black Brazilians, the myth of racial democracy
inhibited collective empowerment and group identity.37
The most prevalent myths in modern times are those associated with the
nation according to Eric Hobsbawm. He uses the term “invented traditions” to
refer to the nation and “its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state,
national symbols, histories and the rest.”38 These traditions needed to be
invented because there was no intrinsic relationship of a group of people to the
nation-state they resided in, and so national myths became critical to establishing
an organic connection between the two. In the nineteenth century, national
myths were particularly useful in breaking down the identification of workers with
labor and socialist movements, cultivating, instead, their attachments to a nation
whose interests could be defined by powerful elites.39
In Latin America and Mexico, labor became associated with the nation as
a result of struggles against foreign exploitation in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. According to Norman Girvan, conflicts between foreign
investors and host countries “often become identified in the eyes of the
government with the issue of national sovereignty, and [this is] why policies of
nationalization of foreign industries have become so widespread in the Third
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World.”40 Charles Bergquist has argued that the most radical workers in Latin
America were those employed by foreign companies in the primary sector, such
as mining, and, as a result, labor struggles became associated with nationalist
struggles and viceversa.41 Julie Erfani indicates that elite support for nationalist
causes came to be construed as support for labor’s causes. She argues that the
Mexican Revolution gave rise to a myth related to national sovereignty, in which
“[t]he "popular sovereignty" of the Mexican people supposedly guaranteed that
the new state would and could use its presumed powers to protect the socioeconomic well-being of all Mexican citizens."42
Because of the centrality of myths to the historical process under
examinationthis study engages with the theoretical approaches offered by
cultural history. Typically, cultural history often brings to mind three different
spheres: “general human development (intellectual, spiritual or aesthetic),
particular ways of life (of a people, or period), and the works and practices of art
and intellect (music, literature, painting, theatre, film and so forth)."43 In The
Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology, and the Mexican Struggle for
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Independence, 1810-1821, Eric Van Young critiques the traditional approaches
of cultural history, which present culture as a specialized sphere of human
activity. Arguing for a more expansive approach, he defines culture as the
codes and symbols by which groups of people impute meanings to the
world of humans, things, and forces around them, and by which they
convey that information to each other; by which they understand,
represent, reinforce, or contest relations of power and domination; and
above all through which they define their own identities by the stories they
tell about themselves.44
From this perspective, culture resides within all spheres of human activity. He
adds,
If people really live suspended in webs of meaning, then culture must be
in many places where we cannot see it, or where it does not occur to us to
look, or where it might appear as background to the central social action,
as well as at those social loci and in those material objects to which
convention directs our gaze.45
The current study, then, focuses less on the representations of symbolic meaning
often prioritized in cultural history and rather looks at the meanings embedded in
the concept of national sovereignty.
I analyze national sovereignty as a cultural concept in order to examine
the fundamental, often unspoken, assumptions by which Mexican workers
perceived and understood the world around them, and which guided their
actions, behavior, and thought, particularly in their engagement with nature and
work. Workers, however, often did not return home to write about such
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engagements. After a long day of work, mineworkers most likely spent their time
relaxing, doing household chores, raising children, drinking, or any number of
other activities. Works of cultural history often presented symbolic meaning as
residing within human narratives and artifacts such as novels, paintings, or
music. Scholars in the field of economic sociology, however, have suggested
that economic practice itself conveys symbolic meaning.46
Much of the work of economic sociology emanates from Karl Polanyi’s
The Great Transformation (1949).47 Polanyi argued that the success of Western
industrial societies depended on the transformation of nature, work, and money
into natural resources, wage labor, and capital through a process of
commodification. This transformation permitted their exchange and purchase in
the marketplace, allowing the aspiring entrepreneur to produce goods, services,
and profits. Because they were not originally produced to be sold or exchanged,
he called these creations fictional commodities. In the process, nature, labor,
and money are reduced to abstractions and subordinated to the market.48
Similarly, he criticized, in its search for immutable laws, economics reduced the
complexity of human societies to economic models and subordinated them to the
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market. In this way, the economic sphere ended up imposing itself as the main
determinant of social life.49
Polanyi’s work offers two valuable insights for understanding economic
phenomena. First, he suggests that work and the appropriation of nature through
work emerge as constants in human societies but come in a multitude of forms.
Second, Polanyi argued that economies are not autonomous but interwoven with
the politics, culture, and other factors within a given society.”50
Economic sociologists have shown that economic practices are conjoined
with cultural practices in processes of commodification. Often isolated as an
economic practice, commodification is a process that includes social, political,
historical, and cultural elements. Commodification is a cultural process because
it involves “changing ways of valuing, classifying, and representing earlier forms
of wealth and work.”51 This process takes the qualitative aspects of a good or
service and reduces it “to a single standard of pecuniary value.”52 As market
practices have normalized over time, lost is the understanding that such
practices did not arise naturally or spontaneously but required active effort and
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intervention through "social habits, cultural logics, and the conditions of systembuilding."53
Polanyi’s insights and those of economic sociology are useful when
thinking about national sovereignty as a discourse that normalizes economic
practices and behaviors. In this respect, national sovereignty emerges as one of
the cultural codes by which humans impart meaning to the world around them.
As a discourse, national sovereignty provides insight into the “ways of thinking
and behaving which are formed within a particular context."54 Discourses are
particularly important for understanding historical change in how they “constrain
and enable the possibility for innovation."55 Some studies, such as those
pursued by Theodor Adorno and the Frankfurt School, have investigated the
intersection of culture and economics but have positioned culture as an
externalized product of industrial society. The current study is more interested in
the meaning of economic policies and practices in themselves. While
commodification expresses meanings in relation to markets, discourses related
to Mexican national sovereignty problematize these constructions. I present
national sovereignty as a discourse that emerges as a way of thinking about
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economic practices, distinct from processes of commodification but constrained
by them at the same time.
My study of national sovereignty as a discourse engages a number of
fundamental questions: What is the social character of natural resources? Who
owns, controls, and determines the uses of natural resources? What are the
social purposes of work? Who owns, controls, and determines the products of
work? How is exploitation legitimized and how is society organized?
What else does it mean for this dissertation to examine national
sovereignty as a discursive ordering of nature and work in Mexican society? I
study how the perception of nationalist control over natural resources (and the
complex reality ‘matching’ it) was negotiated through official and popular
discourses of national sovereignty. To understand the nuances of these
competing and complementary discourses, I examine the entanglements of
meaning associated with national sovereignty and how they evolved throughout
the twentieth century. In the next five chapters, this dissertation examines the
connotative meanings of national sovereignty as they surfaced through historical,
social, and political processes; how these were engaged in the Mexicanization of
the Compañía Minera de Cananea; and, how they opened up some opportunities
for social action while foreclosing others.
I analyze national sovereignty along four categories of inquiry. First, I
investigate the nature of Mexicanization and ask to what degree did this policy
help achieve national sovereignty in Mexico? Second, I interrogate national
sovereignty for insight into fundamental cultural assumptions related to nature,
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work, and the political organization of the world. Third, I consider how these
perceptions are shaped by class, looking particularly at the bifurcation of national
sovereignty into popular and elite forms. Finally, I examine national sovereignty
as a paradigm that is, at once, opposed and complementary to the hegemony of
global capitalism and the organization of the world around market culture.

Sources
This dissertation employed a wide variety of sources to examine the
discourse of national sovereignty. The first chapter analyzes seventeen official
histories and memoirs, published between 1936 and 1989, related to the strike of
1906 in Cananea. I demonstrate how these texts emphasize and connect those
portions of Cananea’s history related to myth into a coherent narrative about the
labor movement, the nation, and the Mexican Revolution. Beginning in the
second chapter, laws and congressional debates concerning mining, oil, and
bureaucracies supply critical information. They reveal how discourses of elite and
popular national sovereignty emerged in relation to the Mexicanization law in
1961, and the law’s implementation in the particular case of the Compañía
Minera de Cananea, in 1971.
A variety of periodical sources appear throughout this dissertation.
Editorials regional and national newspapers provide diverse perspectives on
national sovereignty. The source that offers the most direct perspective of
copper mine workers themselves is the weekly newspaper published by the local
section of the national mining union: 1906 Semanario: órgano oficial de la Sec.
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65 del S.I.T.M.M.S.R.M. Cananea, Sonora.56 This periodical began its
publication in 1943 when the business elites of Mexico began reasserting their
power after the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938. The Mexican
government had also begun imposing tighter restrictions on labor with the
beginning of Mexican involvement in the Second World War.57 This publication
has an been essential source for transmitting union culture and historical
memory, highlighting company violations and labor abuses, promoting worker
and community solidarity, organizing and sustaining strikes, and connecting local
concerns to national issues.
Archival sources related to the business history of the Compañía Minera
de Cananea were also valuable. These included documents produced by
Nacional Financiera, a development bank which owned the Compañía Minera de
Cananea. Most abundant from 1985 to 1990, this collection includes company
reports, internal correspondence, and loan agreements. I used these and other
archival collections to examine the material and empirical implications of national
sovereignty.
A number of important sources were inaccessible and unavailable. The
presidential papers of Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) and the Archivos del Estado
de Sonora in Hermosillo remained inaccessible due to disorganization and a lack

56

Out of a thirty-year span from December 1960 to December 1990, seven and a half years were
missing from the available collection at the Colegio de Sonora. Four years, from 1963 to 1967,
were missing entirely. Three and a half years of issues were missing from mid-1985 to 1990.
57
Sariego, Enclaves, 261-262.

23

of funding. Two of the most promising collections, The Archivo Laboral de la
Compañía Minera de Cananea and the Archivo Legal de la Compañía Minera de
Cananea were destroyed in a fire during a labor strike in 2007.

Organization
This dissertation is divided into five, largely chronological chapters.
Chapter one examines the outbreak of a strike in Cananea in 1906 and
Cananea’s role in the Mexican Revolution from 1910 to 1920. It argues that the
myth of Cananea created an association between the working class, the Mexican
nation, and the Mexican Revolution. This fusion provided legitimacy to the elite
project of economic nationalism, the rise of the Mexican state, and later to the
Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea in 1971.
The second chapter focuses on the passage of the Mexicanization of
Mining Law in 1961. It argues that the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938
became the dominant expression of national sovereignty, associated with
ownership and management by the Mexican state and the exclusion of foreign
participation. The conservative reaction that followed forced a change in
nationalist policy and a change in the meaning of national sovereignty, leading to
the policy of Mexicanization. As a result, state intervention became oriented
toward serving private interests.
While Mexicanization emerged as a policy that appealed to conservatives,
the ownership change to the Compañía Minera de Cananea in 1971 retained
popular appeal, which is the subject of chapter three. Although the process of
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Mexicanization differed from nationalization, it was presented as an equivalent
form of national sovereignty. Natural resources were to be controlled by Mexican
nationals for the sake of ensuring economic and social development. While
preserving the participation of foreign investors, Mexicanization also implied the
continued subservience of the working class to the Mexican state.
The fourth chapter examines the fate of Compañía Minera de Cananea
from 1971 to 1989 and demonstrates the weaknesses of Mexicanization in terms
of the self-proclaimed national sovereignty attached to it. While reducing foreign
control of mineral resources and introducing the private sector into the industry,
forms of dependence were preserved. The process also failed to improve social
and economic outcomes for Cananea’s mining workers. As Mexicanization failed
to improve the well-being of workers, they increasingly questioned their ties to
the Mexican nation.
Chapter five demonstrates how the experiment of Mexicanization came to
an end on August 20, 1989 when the company was declared bankrupt and its
facilities occupied by the Mexican army. These violent efforts toward the
company’s ultimate privatization were considered across the country as signaling
the end of the Mexican Revolution. These events were accompanied by the
efforts of the Carlos Salinas administration to renegotiate the meanings of
national sovereignty, and deconstruct the broad framework of labor, the nation,
and the Mexican Revolution established in the myth of Cananea.
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CHAPTER I
The Myths of Cananea: Labor, the Nation, and the Mexican Revolution
The legitimacy for the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de
Cananea in 1971 resided in a series of events that occurred at the beginning of
the twentieth century. In June 1906, mine workers in Cananea went on strike
against an American company, the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company.
The event turned violent and led to the intervention of American soldiers at the
invitation of the Mexican government. Soon after, what had begun as an isolated
labor action in a remote part of the country erupted into a national controversy as
a violation of Mexican sovereignty. As a result, the labor strike became
interpreted as a struggle against American imperialism and became the basis for
a myth that promoted the identification of the working class with the Mexican
nation. Later, this myth also became associated with the outbreak of the
Mexican Revolution, and Cananea became known as “the cradle of the
revolution.”

With respect to myths, the precision of historical fact emerges as a
secondary concern. More important is how myths function as hegemonic
discourses about, for instance, alleged historical change as opposed to actual
continuity. According to Emilia Viotti da Costa, historical continuity is often more
enduring than historical change, so myths emerge to conceal the lack of “real
rupture with the past.”1 During the Mexican Revolution from 1910 to 1920, the
1

Emília Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1985), 235, 240.

26

continuity ultimately concealed was the enduring domination of Mexican elites
both before and after the conflict. Popular struggles transformed the conflict from
a political revolution into a social one that promised to bring fundamental change
to Mexican society. As the conflict wore on, the middle-class nationalist faction
known as the Constitutionalists managed to take control and impose their own
vision on Mexican society. According to Thomas Benjamin, the myth of the
Mexican Revolution “reinforce[d] elite and thus national political unity, to establish
a solid historical foundation upon which to unify all revolutionary factions past
and present.”2 Alan Knight argued that in addition to its symbols and
iconography, the myth of the Revolution included policies such as “land and
labour reform, indigenismo, education, and economic nationalism” which formed
the “project of the revolution.”3 Such policies enhanced elite control over the
process as a whole, which became a nationalist crusade. This chapter shows
how elite rule endured after the revolution and became channeled into the new
project of economic nationalism, legitimized by the myth of Cananea.
This chapter argues that the events of Cananea gave rise to a myth
composed of three elements. The first posits Cananea as the birthplace of the
modern labor movement in Mexico and ascribes the workers in 1906 with political
and revolutionary motivations. The second element of myth attributes an antiimperialist and nationalist sentiment to the labor struggles in 1906. The final
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element of myth identifies Cananea as “the cradle of the Mexican Revolution,”
connecting the strike in 1906 to the conflict that began in 1910. In the myth of
Cananea, labor and the nation come together through the Mexican Revolution.
The myth of Cananea emerged to mobilize the support of labor and
generate legitimacy for the post-revolutionary state. According to Eric
Hobsbawm, national traditions were invented to, among others, establish a
(manufactured) connection between the working class and the nation.4 In the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the working class in Mexico overall
possessed no discernible relation to the Mexican nation. Also, unlike the
grassroots agrarian movement, the working class possessed no organic relation
to the beginnings of the Mexican Revolution. Where previously labor consisted
of incoherent groups of labor affiliated to small local political groups, the myth of
Cananea brought labor squarely within the domain of the nation. This maneuver
advanced the successes of labor but also quite critically, became a means to
control labor. In the process, the myth ascribed popular legitimacy to that part of
the revolutionary project, most closely aligned with the aspirations of the elite –
economic nationalism.
This chapter studies the entanglement of labor, the nation, and the
Mexican Revolution in official histories published between 1936 and 1990 related
to the 1906 strike in Cananea. These provide essential context for
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understanding the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea in 1971.
In addition to providing background, this chapter analyzes the events of the 1906
strike, and analyzes the three elements of myth that became associated with it:
the beginning of the modern labor movement in Mexico, anti-imperialist and
nationalist struggles, and the cradle of the Mexican Revolution.

Background
In contrast to the long history of mining in Mexico, the emergence of
Cananea as an important mining center was a late development. Jesuit
missionaries had begun mining silver as early as 1760, but these efforts were
terminated when King Charles III ordered their expulsion from Spanish America
in 1767.5 The development of mining in Sonora was further delayed by the wars
of independence in the early nineteenth century and only began to revive in the
second half of the nineteenth century after the appointment of General Ignacio
Pesquiera as the state’s governor. A hero of the Reforma and the wars against
French intervention, Pesquiera pacified indigenous peoples in the region and
soon after, he claimed titles to seven mines in Cananea, built a smelter, and
began producing copper until his death in 1886.6
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Critically, Pesquiera’s intervention was accompanied by technological and
political change. Advancements in electricity and the growth of modern industry
in Europe and the United States created a new demand for copper, which
previously had been limited to the production of tools, currency, architecture, and
cultural artifacts. These global developments transformed Cananea from an
isolated settlement on the Mexican frontier into an important resource for the
modern world.7
Just as important as technological change were the political developments
in the final quarter of the nineteenth century. Since 1820, Mexico’s experience
as an independent nation had been marked by political instability, economic
stagnation, and territorial loss. The election of General Porfirio Díaz in 1876
initiated a period known as the Pax Porfiriana marked by stability and
pacification. Upon this foundation, President Díaz initiated policies that
encouraged economic and industrial development by attracting foreign
investment in the form of “generous tax breaks, concessions, and favorable
mining laws.”8 This policy hastened economic development, particularly through
7
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the construction of railroads and the subsequent development of export
agriculture, livestock, petroleum, and mining. In Cananea: Las garras del
Imperialismo en las entrañas de México, Manuel J. Aguirre emphasizes that this
process introduced a subtler form of imperialism.9 Mexico suffered no more
territorial losses but persisted as a coveted prize to foreign investors who
became the new agents of imperialism. The rise of Cananea as an important
mining center in the early twentieth century represented the extension of
American imperial ambitions.10
The encroachment of American imperialism into northern Mexico is
attributed, in particular, to the efforts of William C. Greene.11 Early works by
American historians presented Greene as a romantic personification of the
American West, “the most swashbuckling figure in the history of the Mexican
mining industry.”12 American newspapers praised “his resourcefulness, his
foresight, his great dream of opening the Mexican wilds to industry and
agriculture, his energy, his success.”13
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Mexican historians offered a different perspective. Juan Manuel Romero
Gil described Greene as “a human archetype of the history of capitalism and of
the West of the United States,” a man who mixed the conduct of business with
personal vice and lawlessness.14 Manuel J. Aguirre condemned the selfdescribed colonel as a criminal and a murderer who “author[ed]…the massacre
of Mexicans.”15 Armando Rubio Cubillas described Greene and his American
employees as “corrupt Americans, a conglomerate of human garbage, composed
of criminals pursued by the laws of their country, whose apprehension offers a
monetary reward, of fugitives from their prisons, of defeated Ku Klux Klan,
conceited and accustomed to subjugate black slaves.”16 Outcast in their own
country, they took their beliefs and practices to neighboring Mexico where the
lingering memory of American aggression in the mid-nineteenth century
exacerbated the impression of Greene as an imperialist.
After he arrived in Cananea in the late nineteenth century, William Greene
established an array of companies to mine copper and exploit the natural
resources of the area. As the foundation of this enterprise, he formed an
operating company based in Mexico, the Cananea Consolidated Copper
Company in September 1899, and then created a holding company based in
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West Virgina, the Greene Consolidated Copper Company, in February 1900. In
addition, he founded a network of subsidiaries related to lumber, railroads,
communications, and cattle to facilitate his mining operations.17
Greene needed people to work the mines and, toward this effort, he
became responsible for creating modern day Cananea. After acquiring titles to
the mines, he purchased nearly 3 million acres of land from a group of American
businessmen. After Cananea became a municipality on October 13, 1901,
Greene acquired 90 out of 150 “manzanas,” more than half of total municipal
property.18 To support a working population he then established public services,
industries, markets, and infrastructure. Churches, schools, and hospitals
materialized as social outgrowths of imperial investments. In this way, according
to Eugenia Meyer, “the dominion of foreign capital in Cananea penetrated the
daily life of the community.”19 Population and economic growth quickly
transformed Cananea from an isolated outpost into the most important city in the
state. Before long, it became the district seat. These changes encouraged the
acquiescence of Porfirian officials in Mexico City to Greene’s activities in far off
Sonora. The payment of salaries and bonuses to municipal officials extended
the company’s political control and allowed it to “influence the appointment of the
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President and the other members of the city council, assuring the submission of
the authorities to the interests of the company.”20

1906 and the heroic Mexican workers
By 1906, Greene’s entrepreneurship had transformed Cananea from an
isolated frontier outpost into a booming mining town. Almost inevitably, this
generated problems among the workforce, including a major strike at the
beginning of the 20th century. The strike that occurred in June 1906 has been
interpreted in two ways. In the secondary literature, Alan Knight and Michael
Gonzales have argued that the events were largely spontaneous and motivated
by the pragmatic, economistic concerns of the workers.21 The official histories of
Cananea assert that the workers’ actions were planned and motivated by political
and revolutionary objectives. These sources impart a pro-worker and antiimperialist character to the events in Cananea.
The official histories present Cananea as the birthplace of the modern
labor movement in Mexico. According to Jorge Sayeg Helú, the strike of 1906
signaled the end of workers’ complacency and resignation, and the beginning of
a “sporadic, naive, and natural” class consciousness among Mexican workers.22
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Esteban Baca Calderón, one of the strike’s primary leaders, noted that the
struggle in Cananea contained “the germ of all future struggles of Mexican
workers.”23
In these texts an important role is ascribed to the Partido Liberal
Mexicano. The PLM formed at the beginning the twentieth century in response
to the political, economic, and social problems caused by the Porfirian elite in
Mexico City.24 The same policies which contributed to the Pax Porfiriana,
political stability and economic growth, also contributed to economic disparities
and social unrest. In their journal Regeneración, first published in 1900, Ricardo
and Enrique Flores Magón castigated Porfirian officials for exploiting Mexicans
and suppressing “all labor organization…[and] all political rights” for the
enhancement of foreigners’ wealth, oligarchical government, and bureaucratic
patronage.25 Of the two brothers, Ricardo emerges as the most prominent
historical figure in commemorations of Cananea. He has been described as “one
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of the most forgotten men in the national politics of our Republic”26 and as the
real ideologue of the Mexican Revolution and the 1917 Constitution.27
Among the readership of Regeneración were the future leaders of the
Cananea strike. Esteban Baca Calderón and Manuel M. Diéguez founded the
Unión Liberal Humanidad on January 16, 1906. Several months later, Lázaro
Gutiérrez de Lara formed the Club Liberal de Cananea. The early concerns of
these clandestine groups were focused on long-term organization and
preparation: “to propagate the ideas of liberty and. . .to build up a solid base of
support before taking dramatic direct action.”28 Although formed separately, the
leaders eventually sought to join the two clubs into the Unión Minera de Cananea
to increase their chances of success against the company. While these efforts
were being made, interactions between Mexican workers and American workers
who belonged to the Western Federation of Miners prepared the ideological
ground among ordinary workers by providing “the bases for the construction of a
class consciousness, organization, and strategy.”29 Apart from the activities of
the liberal clubs, these influences shaped and helped workers articulate their
demands. On May 5, 1906, a month before the strike, Baca Calderón gave a
speech that called for preparation. But for the remainder of the month, “in small
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groups and private meetings, heated commentaries. . . [awoke] the impatience of
all Mexicans who suffered humiliations by racial discrimination.”30 The leaders
had begun preparing the ground, but the workers moved on their own.31
The strike began during the early morning hours on June 1, 1906. The
previous night, the management of the Oversight mine announced a change in
the payment of wages, primarily affecting the lowest paid workers who received
three pesos a day. The company wanted to increase productivity and output, but
these changes also increased competition, intensity, and the insecurity of work.
Hours after the announcement, four hundred workers walked out of the Oversight
mine in a spontaneous protest. Only after the strike began were the eventual
leaders woken and asked to lead the movement. Baca Calderón later wrote that
he and the other leaders felt the timing was inopportune but nonetheless agreed
to lead the strike. Early planning and influences provided the foundation, but it
was the immediacy of outrage that prompted workers to take action. By noon, all
mining operations had ceased, and the number of demonstrators exceeded two
thousand workers.32
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The workers’ committee presented two main grievances to the company’s
management. The first centered on the ethnic division of labor, “an internal
regimen of work based on the discrimination between North American workers
on one side and Mexican workers on the other.”33 American workers
monopolized positions such as foremen, engineers, and accountants, which were
considered the best jobs in terms of responsibility, skill, and salary. According to
José Luis Trueba Lara, the exclusion of Mexicans from such positions proceeded
from an “analogous division between material and intellectual labor,” in which
Mexican workers were “considered. . . a simple beast of burden” who deserved
an occupation and wage “equal to his race.”34
The second grievance focused on the dual wage scale. In this
arrangement, Mexican laborers were paid less than their American counterparts
holding the same job. In general, American workers received good wages and
experienced a comfortable standard of living; Mexican workers and their families,
in contrast, remained in poverty. According to Romero Gil, this imparted workers
“a painful and denigrating impression of inferiority, of pariahs and of strangers in
their own country.”35 Greene exacerbated these grievances when he tried to
pass off three silver pesos as equivalent to three gold dollars. When confronted
about these disparities, Greene claimed that the necessities of business
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determined wages. His opponents, according to the official histories of Cananea,
countered that American capitalist practices were inseparable from racial
discrimination.36
Workers subsequently demanded the firing of an abusive manager, a
minimum wage of five pesos for eight hours of work, a minimum employment of
Mexican nationals, and the opportunity for advancement. These demands for
economic restitution were interwoven with demands related to racial justice,
dignity, respect, fairness, and equality.37
Greene responded by arguing that the workers’ grievances and demands
were baseless, exaggerated, and the work of agitators. According to León Díaz
Cárdenas, Greene’s uncompromising posture and threats emanated from a
“capitalist logic” meant to deter further demands or actions by workers.38 At the
same time, Greene felt that he had bestowed a service to Mexico by providing
jobs, wages, public services, and other amenities to its people. He presented
himself as an imperial benefactor who paid wages so high that he was siphoning
off workers from other enterprises. His magnanimity left room for no further
increases. To do otherwise, he claimed, would lead to closures. Yet, while
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mineworkers may have received some of the highest wages in Mexico, the high
cost of living and the high cost of goods at the company store barely permitted
survival.39 Greene’s rejection angered the demonstrators who resumed their
march, “silent and ordered, [a] tactic adopted to avoid all provocation that would
permit the authorities, servants of capitalism, to argue with their guns.”40
In contrast to the Mexican protestors who demonstrated peacefully,
Greene prepared for violence. The night before, he had traveled to Arizona
where he amassed a small arsenal, returned to Cananea the next morning, and
distributed the arms to his “trusted employees.”41 Before the first meeting
between company managers and workers had even taken place, Greene had
already raised the possibility of violence, sending Sonoran governor Rafael
Izábal warnings that the peaceful crowds were becoming an imminent threat. His
warnings soon became reality, not because of the actions of Mexican workers,
but rather those of Greene’s American employees. When the protestors arrived
at the lumberyard during their march, they were met by George and William
Metcalf who trained industrial firehoses on them. Surprised and unarmed, the
workers retaliated by stoning the two brothers – one of whom shot into the
rushing crowd, killing and wounding several Mexicans before the survivors killed
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the remaining brother. They set fire to the lumberyard and fled. During their
escape, they encountered Greene and his armed employees who fired on the
demonstrators from rooftops, automobiles, and horseback, killing and wounding
men, women, and children.42
Later that night, the night of June 1, 1906, Greene sent more telegrams,
over a dozen, to Governor Izábal with the purpose of inciting alarm. He also sent
exaggerated reports of violence to the American press warning of an impending
race war and the annihilation of all “American men, women, and children.”43
Under pressure to quell the protests, Governor Izábal made an ill-fated decision
by requesting help from the United States military. Vice President Ramón Corral
tried to intervene, prohibiting the request, but his telegram arrived too late. On
the morning of June 2, 1906, Colonel Thomas Rynning and almost three hundred
Arizona Rangers crossed the border. When they reached Cananea, the soldiers
took up positions guarding “the company store, the bank, the general office, the
foundry, the new concentrator, and the wood deposit.”44 Emilio Kosterlisky,
commander of the Rurales, arrived in the afternoon and found everything under
control. He dispersed the remaining groups of Mexican workers, who had
resumed their peaceful protest, declared martial law, imposed a curfew, and
persuaded Greene to send the Rangers back to the United States. The

42

Díaz Cárdenas, 31, 50; Medina Hoyos, 66, 68, 98; Aguirre, 74, 142; Arrellano Z., 11; Maycotte
Perez, “La huelga de Cananea,” 31; Meyer et al., Lucha obrera, 77-78.

43

Arrellano Z., 13; Baca Calderón, Cananea, 27-30.

44

Baca Calderón, Juicio, 104; Baca Calderón, Cananea, 32; Díaz Cárdenas, 62.

41

American soldiers spent only twelve hours in Cananea, patrolling the streets and
intimidating passersby, but otherwise perpetrated no violence.45
The next day, General Luis E. Torres and the Federal Army arrived and
issued an ultimatum: Return to work or be conscripted to fight the Yaqui Indians
in southern Sonora. The strike’s leaders were arrested along with nearly one
hundred protesters. The remainder returned to work while others migrated to the
United States. By June 5th the strike was over.46
These events have given rise to Cananea’s association as the birthplace
of the progressive labor movement in Mexico. Yet, the workers’ primary
motivations for the strike were not driven by the desire for political or
revolutionary change but were related to immediate bread-and-butter concerns
with the conditions of work and the pragmatic needs of everyday life.47 Alan
Knight contends that the influence of the PLM “appears to be doubtful, and at
best inconclusive.”48 Workers questioned management and operations, but
never the capitalist system, foreign investment, or the prevailing political system.
They sought to defend their material interests and gain dignity in their work, but
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had no interest in an “armed revolutionary commitment.”49 Violence by industrial
workers, such as occurred in Cananea, did not indicate a larger revolt but an
isolated event, a last resort “to correct specific abuses and settle specific
scores.”50 The myths of Cananea, however, emphasized the political and radical
character of labor thus manufacturing a rather artificial link between labor and
the Mexican Revolution. A similar and related link was crafted concerning
nationalism.
The second element of myth related to Cananea involves the joining of
labor’s struggles with nationalist ones. The central thesis in E. J. Hobsbawm’s
Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, contends that a
population residing within the borders of a political state bears no intrinsic relation
to this political entity, but had to be cultivated through the development of
nationalism. Before a narrative posing this association surfaced, the allegiance
of workers rested primarily with labor unions and socialist parties.51 The events
in Cananea provided the foundation for an “invented tradition” which connected
labor to the Mexican nation while imparting an anti-imperialist character to labor
struggles.52
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By June 5th the strike had ended, but its effects reverberated and
intensified as the event became a national scandal. On June 2, the Los Angeles
Times reported that American officials inside the State Department expressed
their bewilderment that “a governor of a foreign state. . . ask[ed] for help to
suffocate an interior movement.”53 Porfirian officials had wanted “to establish
order at whatever price,”54 but instead of reestablishing order, Governor Izábal
exacerbated problems by “wounding. . . the nationalist sentiment of our
compatriots.”55 The violence against the Mexican workers came at the hands of
Greene’s employees, but it was the entry of the Arizona Rangers into Mexico that
generated outrage. According to Baca Calderón, the trespass of American
soldiers achieved what no political leader could accomplish – the unification of
liberals and conservatives in Mexico. Political leaders and newspapers vilified
the governor and demanded Izábal’s punishment for violating national
sovereignty. General Torres castigated him for allowing foreign troops to enter
national territory without congressional authorization. Vice President Corral tried
to protect Izábal by altering the governor’s reports, but the backlash eventually
forced the governor before the Grand Jury of the Chamber of Deputies. The
official was acquitted, though, through the intervention of Corral and President
Díaz.56
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Although labor problems initiated the strike in Cananea, it was the
violation of sovereignty that turned the event into a national issue. Without the
entry of American soldiers, Cananea may easily have been forgotten. Several
historians noted the silence regarding the actual violence against workers.
According to Begoña Hernández y Lazo, “in no moment was the stance of the
government authorities and the company against the workers on strike
questioned.”57 León Díaz Cárdenas stated, “[n]othing was said about the
workers massacre. . . [nor the] bloody repressions from the authorities and the
company. . . in the capital, they spoke of international codes, and of national
sovereignty.”58 Manuel Aguirre wrote that the elites of the country, conservative
and liberal alike, had come together but “[i]t certainly was not [due to]
compassion [or] noble sentiment” for the plight of the worker.59 These authors
reveal that the perceived violation of national sovereignty by American troops
emerged primarily as an elite concern while those of labor remained peripheral.
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Revolution
So far, the elements of myth surrounding Cananea involve the alleged
political and nationalist aspirations of workers during the events of 1906.
Cananea’s ascription as the “cradle” of Mexican Revolution is a third component.
Similar to the ones above, this has also been shown to be tenuous. Several
problems followed after the strike, but they did not give rise to militancy nor
radicalism among Cananea’s workers. Financial difficulties in the second half of
1906 led to a takeover of Greene’s companies and his removal from the board of
directors in mid-February 1907. Later that year, an economic crisis in the United
States led to the shutdown of operations and to a modernization project that kept
mining operations closed until 1911.60 The size of the workforce and its wages
were subsequently reduced, anti-unionization efforts strengthened, and a
permanent army garrison built to suppress future disturbances. Overall, the
period following the strike until the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution, from
June 1906 to November 1910, was one of “quiescence rather than militancy.” 61
The concerns of workers in Cananea and workers in general remained
peripheral at the beginning of the Mexican Revolution. In his book, La sucesión
presidencial published two years before the revolution, Francisco I. Madero
harangued Porfirian crimes in Cananea but only in reference to the violation of
national sovereignty. Cananea became a tool for propaganda against the
administration of Díaz rather than an expression of real concern for workers’
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rights. No mention was made of the strike itself nor the problems of workers.
Madero’s leadership also signified the eclipse of the social liberalism of the PLM,
“the most radical current of the Mexican Revolution” and the working class’s only
identifiable advocate.62 The radicalization of the conflict was the work of the
agrarian and campesino struggles led by Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa
respectively. It was these leaders who were responsible for transforming
Madero’s political revolution into a social one. Their efforts were essential not
only to the military outcomes of the conflict, but also to injecting agrarian and
other social issues into the revolutionary project.63
Cananea’s importance and main role throughout the conflict centered on
its being a source of financing for the various revolutionary factions. After
restructuring and installing new facilities, the Cananea Consolidated Copper
Company reopened in 1911 and resumed production levels achieved before the
strike. Maderista revolutionaries largely continued the policies instituted by the
Díaz administration, particularly those favoring foreign investors with concessions
and tax exemptions. Toward labor, their attitude was one of appeasement. But
appeasement quickly transformed into repression after workers resumed their
antagonistic stance and engaged in a series of strikes in November 1911,
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February 1912, and December 1912. Such actions, among others, revealed the
limited nature of Madero’s revolution. “On its labor record, the Madero regime
proved more conservative than revolutionary. . . The defense of traditional
interests, juxtaposed with a fear of radical change, dictated a quixotic stance at
odds with the aspirations of the industrial worker.”64 With the antagonism
between workers and the Maderistas growing, the American owners of the 4C’s
threatened to shut down the mines again.65
After Madero’s assassination in 1913, the Constitutionalists emerged as a
new revolutionary force and positioned themselves as mediators between the
company and labor in the hopes of securing greater control of vital financial
resources. To finance the revolution, they needed operational mines and a
reliable labor force, which meant asserting authority over both Mexican workers
and the American company. To assert greater control of the company, the
Constitutionalists nullified the privileges and concessions acquired during the
Porfiriato. The company’s executives, already upset by the cancellation of
contracts and double taxation by competing revolutionary factions, considered
these revocations a direct attack. They wanted “a return to prerevolutionary
business practices” but indicated their willingness to settle for “compensation for
the lost revenues and higher taxes.”66 When it became apparent that the
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Constitutionalists represented their best chances in Mexico, foreign investors
followed along. Indeed, the Constitutionalists wanted the mines to remain in
American hands but wanted to extract more taxes from them. When the
Constitutionalists, led by Carrancista General Alvaro Obregón, secured Cananea
on March 24, 1915, they secured both the recognition by the United States on
October 1915 and a steady stream of revenue for the remainder of the
revolution.67
While presented as the cradle of the revolution, Cananea and its workers
played only a peripheral role at the beginning of the Mexican Revolution. The
causal link from the 1906 strike to the outbreak of the revolution in 1910 remains
weak.68 The myth ascribed to Cananea a more revolutionary pedigree than was
warranted, since its workers really did not start the revolution.

Revolutionary Nationalism
So far, this chapter has examined three elements of myth associated with
Cananea – its association with the modern labor movement, the nation, and the
Mexican Revolution. The ideology of revolutionary nationalism linked these three
components of myth, eventually consecrated in the 1917 Constitution.
The most significant participation of labor in the military aspect of the
revolution consisted of the Red Battalions formed in 1915. Until this point, the
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involvement of labor had been limited to “individual, not group or organizational
decisions.”69 This changed when the Constitutionalists searched for military and
political allies and found them among the urban industrial workers associated
with the Casa del Obrero Mundial. In mid-February 1915, the two sides signed a
pact in which “the Casa promised to recruit workers for his armies and to win
over labor to the Constitutionalists” in return for legislative guarantees that
favored labor.70 Excluding the more radical workers in the railroad and mining
industries, the Red Battalions consisted of about five thousand urban workers
from Mexico City and Veracruz sent to fight for the Constitutionalists against Villa
and Zapata. The battalions comprised between nine to twelve percent of the
total Constitutionalist forces and played only an auxiliary role in the fighting.71
The Constitutionalists also wanted to control the working class. The
Constitutionalist leader, Venustiano Carranza, was “a landlord who distrusted all
labor unions”72 and he “wanted no rivals, left-wingers or revolutionaries heading
labor groups.”73 His allies watched out for any attempts to create labor unions
that sought any position independent from the Constitutionalists. For the most
part, the Casa served as a faithful ally of the Constitutionalists, recruiting soldiers
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and propagating Carrancismo but in some areas such as Orizaba (Veracruz), its
leaders worked to create “an independent proletarian base.”74 In fall 1915,
months after the pact had been signed, the Carrancistas began closing the
Casa’s offices, confiscating radical propaganda, and arresting its authors. The
battalions were disbanded in early 1916 and strikers were increasingly met with
repression. In July, Carranza renewed a law from the Reforma era, which
decreed the death penalty for any act of sabotage related to property or
production such as strikes or work stoppages. Unlike the agrarians who had
Zapata, the campesinos who had Villa, and the middle-class who had the
Constitutionalists, the dissolution of the Casa del Obrero Mundial entailed the
loss of labor’s singular representative in the Mexican Revolution.75
The long-term strategy of the Constitutionalists went beyond the
suppression of labor organizations, however. The governments of Porfirio Díaz
and Francisco Madero each had made initial moves toward a settlement with
labor and each had succumbed to his prejudices and used violence against
workers. Unlike the regimes before him, “Carranza and his administration had
bowed to the inevitability of labor unions. . . But, in the course of Carranza’s
revolution and that of his successor’s, government won control of labor.”76 This
was achieved by adding workers’ grievances to the agenda of revolutionary
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nationalism, addressing their short-term needs with long-term consequences.
This maneuver provided an institutional connection to the revolutionary state,
simultaneously securing labor’s loyalty and subordination to the Mexican nation.
In contrast to the supporters of Villa and Zapata, the Constitutionalists were the
only belligerents who “thought of their struggles as a contention for national
hegemony.”77 Labor’s alliance with the Constitutionalists reinforced the
association of its struggles, especially those directed against foreign-owned
companies, with nationalist struggles.78 However, Cananea’s mineworkers were
rather removed from the central stage.
The ultimate rapprochement between labor and the Constitutionalists
resided in the guarantees provided by Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution.
Article 123 established a maximum workday, weekly rest, minimum wage, profitsharing, guarantees to safe working conditions, and the responsibility of
companies for workplace accidents, injuries, and sickness. These guarantees
supported the claims later made by historians who emphasized the radical nature
of the Mexican Revolution. Preceding the Russian Revolution, the 1917
Constitution emerged as the most progressive social document of its time, whose
guarantees for workers no other constitution provided. Integrating workers’
protections into the juridical and constitutional makeup of the Mexican nation
strengthened labor’s bond to the nation, which before the revolution had
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remained the sole domain of the elites. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
“the Mexican working class was socially a very narrow group, without cohesion or
consciousness of its interests.”79 Its first ideological influences were from “Italian
and Spanish anarcho-syndicalists, and. . . by the radical slogans of the Mexican
Liberal Party and the Flores Magón brothers.”80 In Cananea, before the 1906
strike, associations between Mexican workers and American workers were
stronger than any patriotic or nationalist feeling toward Mexico but weakened
after the promulgation of the 1917 Constitution.
Article 123 was not just a response to labor’s demands, but an essential
component in the political economy of revolutionary nationalism. Critically,
economic nationalism was not an original revolutionary aspiration: “It did not
represent the culmination of revolutionary aims, or of popular demands (for ‘the
people’ adhered to no abstract economic nationalism and generally favored the
presence of foreign business, which fostered jobs and trade).”81 Instead, it was
the “response of a new elite to particular circumstances” and emerged for
“strategic than for any long-term ideological reasons.”82 This was the work of a
small group of intellectuals and politicians who wanted “to establish an
equilibrium between the bargaining power of labor and capital.”83 Article 123,
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together with article 27, emerged as the two pillars of revolutionary economic
nationalism, as a mode of equilibrium between landed and labor interests. As
progressive as the 1917 Constitution may have been, “Even a total commitment
to uphold Article 123 kept intact the economic status quo. . .The implementation
of labor's platform simply updated Mexican capitalism by introducing forms of
capital-labor relations increasingly common in Western European countries.”84
The myths of Cananea, emphasizing the role of labor, added popular legitimacy
to the program of revolutionary economic nationalism, a program that emerged
not from popular revolutionary demands but rather from the demands of a
middle-class, formerly denied political power who now had elite aspirations. Still,
the various myths continued and grew, becoming the raw material behind various
commemorations.

Commemorations
The strike of Cananea has been incorporated into the narrative of Mexican
history through official histories, songs, movies, and folklore. According to José
Luis Trueba Lara, Cananea has become “a point of obligated reference”85 and
“the cornerstone of all literature that has been written about the working class
and the Mexican Revolution.”86 While commemorations of the 1906 strike
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occurred in a variety of forms, the event lacked the official treatment of
revolutionary heroes such as Pancho Villa, Emiliano Zapata, and Francisco
Madero.87
Official commemorations sanctioned by the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional began in 1956 on the fiftieth anniversary of the strike, continued
regularly throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and declined in the 1980s.88 An
attempt by the national mining union to create June 1st into a national holiday
was made in October 1957, but never came up for vote.89 More often, the strike
of 1906 was commemorated indirectly. Lawmakers and government officials
mentioned Cananea during remembrances of the Mexican Revolution, the
Constitution of 1917, the nationalization of the petroleum industry in 1938, and
celebrations of May 1.90 The events of 1906 Cananea were also invoked in
homage to historical figures including Francisco I. Madero, Pancho Villa,
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Venustiano Carranza, , and Ricardo Flores Magón as well as common
politicians, teachers, and union leaders.91 Lawmakers also mentioned Cananea
and its associations with the Mexican Revolution to generate support for
proposed legislation.92
In Cananea, memorials took on a variety of forms. These included street
names, buildings, clubs, and baseball fields named after distinguished miners
and employees,93 monuments such as the mausoleum “Martyrs of 1906”, the
house of William C. Greene,94 and the Cananea jail, declared a national
monument on July 14, 1981.95 The union weekly, the 1906 Semanario: Organo
oficial de la Sección 65 del Sindicato Industrial Trabajadora Mineros
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Metalúrgicos y Siderúrgica Mexicano, has perpetuated the social memory of the
strike since 1950.96

Conclusion
In the official histories, Cananea is presented as the birthplace of the
modern worker’s movement, and as a movement inspired by nationalist and
revolutionary ideals. Together, the myth of Cananea fundamentally brought labor
within the domain of the Mexican nation and the Mexican Revolution. This
multifold myth, though, obscures the continuity of Mexican society that persisted
after the Mexican Revolution. During the course of the Revolution, the
radicalization of the conflict promised to bring not only political change but to
restructure Mexican society as well in fundamental ways. Yet, as the
Constitutionalists became predominant, they were increasingly able to impose
their interests as though they were true national interests, and thus ultimately
shaped the final outcome of the revolution. While helping to reshape Mexican
society in significant ways, the ideology of revolutionary nationalism also helped
reestablish class relations, permitting the dominance of a new elite legitimized by
the social promises of the revolution. The popular base that gave legitimacy to
the Constitutionalists, however, resided not among the agrarian and campesino
forces that radicalized the revolution but within the ranks of the labor movement.
Through the myth of Cananea, labor emerged as a popular base, revolutionary in
96
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its own right, rather than as a member of an alliance merely serving elite
interests. Subsequently, this myth imparted a popular façade to that part of the
revolutionary project most aligned with elite interests – economic nationalism.
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CHAPTER II
The Mexicanization of Mining Law, 1961

More than four decades after the revolution, and more than four centuries
since the arrival of Spanish conquistadors, the Mexican government made its
strongest efforts to assert sovereign control of its mineral resources. Before
1961, nationalist policies had been implemented in a number of industries, but it
was the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938 which has stood out the most in
the history of Mexico, and which Alan Knight called “the apotheosis of
revolutionary nationalism.”1 Where the myth of Cananea had tied together labor,
the nation, and the Mexican Revolution, the 1938 event added another layer of
cultural meaning. The dominant expression of national sovereignty became
associated with nationalization as the direct ownership and management of an
industry by the Mexican state, foreign participation being excluded thereafter.
The conservative reaction that followed the nationalization, however, transformed
how the Mexican state asserted control over its mineral resources more than two
decades later.
When President Adolfo López Mateos signed the Mexicanization of Mining
Law in 1961, it represented the clash of nationalist impulses and reactionary
forces. Raúl Delgado Wise and Rubén del Pozo Mendoza considered the policy
of Mexicanization a radical measure because, through state intervention, it
successfully overturned the structure of mining property, formerly monopolized
1
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by foreign ownership.2 The scholarly consensus, however, points toward the
policy’s moderation: Mexicanization steered a middle path between the aspiration
to assert nationalist control over mineral resources and the need to
accommodate private and foreign interests. It was a strategic effort, mindful of
the difficulties faced after the oil nationalization in 1938, to produce change while
minimizing negative effects; and, was a relatively successful venture. It was a
less intense and less remarkable effort than nationalization but was strong
enough to satisfy nationalistic demands without alienating a majority of the
Mexican and foreign business community.3
The Mexicanization of mining has received considerably less attention
from scholars than the nationalization of oil.4 One noticeable gap in the existing
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literature involves the lack of clarity regarding Mexicanization as a nationalist
process. While Mexican scholars on the topic provide a clear analysis of it,
American contributions often present Mexicanization as equivalent to
nationalization.5 Clear empirical information is critical to revealing the cultural
shift that took place in the meanings of national sovereignty from nationalization
to Mexicanization. Without precise information, the study of cultural meanings
affirms Stephen Haber’s critique of the new cultural history as “ontologically and
epistemically subjective.”6 Subsequently, this chapter offers a comparative
analysis of the nationalization of Mexico’s oil industry and the Mexicanization of
its mining industry in order to provide a clear understanding of their differences.
In this chapter, I argue that Mexicanization changed the significance of
national sovereignty so that state intervention could be conceived of as acting for
the benefit of private interests. This differed significantly from the discourse
established by the oil nationalization, in which state intervention occurred on
behalf of the public interest. The economic backlash and the conservative
reaction that followed nationalization, however, changed the process by which
the Mexican state asserted its control over mineral resources. When the
administration of President Adolfo López Mateos began using the language of
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Mexicanization in 1960, it did so primarily to assuage the fears of private
interests. The measure was presented as a nationalist maneuver that employed
state intervention without being a direct form of nationalization. The
Mexicanization Law signed by the president in 1961 modified the existing
concessionary regime so that the ownership of mining companies had to consist
of majority Mexican control. This requirement comprised the key innovation of
Mexicanization and the key difference with its predecessor, which set it apart
from nationalization. In contrast to direct ownership and management by the
state, this policy led to the creation of parastate mining enterprises that permitted
the involvement of the state, preserved the participation of foreign capital, and
introduced the Mexican private sector into the mining industry.
This chapter focuses primarily on the passage of the Mexicanization Law
in 1961. It begins by examining the legal basis of national sovereignty in article
27 of the 1917 Constitution and the concession theory of property. Then, the
chapter looks at the application of article 27 during the nationalization of the oil
industry in 1938, which became an exemplary assertion of national sovereignty.
Next, the chapter examines how the conservative reaction came to influence the
future process of Mexicanization. The remainder of the chapter, its final section,
evaluates the causes, contexts, debates, and details of the Mexicanization Law
of 1961 to ascertain how it reshaped the discourses related to national
sovereignty, so that state intervention turned into a positive tool for private
interests.
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Article 27: Concession Theory of Property
The 1917 Constitution was one of the most significant accomplishments of
the Mexican Revolution. It contained a series of articles emblematic of the social
character of the new regime and the newly asserted sovereignty of the Mexican
nation. Article 27 is representative of such aspects. Although legitimized by
myths related to labor’s combativeness, the control of mineral resources was
ultimately resolved through the state’s assertion of national sovereignty over key
natural resources in the new charter. Although the 1917 Constitution has been
lauded for its progressive character, it also possessed a subtle conservative
quality: by dealing with land and labor through two separate constitutional
articles, the 1917 Constitution brought labor within the domain of the Mexican
nation.
Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution provided the legal basis for asserting
national sovereignty over mineral resources and embodied the “concession
theory of property.”7 Paragraph four, for instance, established that the nation
possesses “the direct dominion of all minerals or substances” residing in the
subsoil.8 It further elaborated that “the direct dominion of the Nation is
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inalienable and imprescriptible.”9 The acquisition of mineral property for
exploitation, then, occurred solely through the granting of temporary concessions
by the state. These concessions were characterized by the “partial, limited, and
revocable dispossession of things and rights belonging to the public domain for
specific uses that are subordinated to the ends of general interest and are
submitted to inspection by authorities.”10 When President Cárdenas announced
the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938, the measure nullified the
conscessionary regime with respect to the nation’s petroleum resources. The
policy of Mexicanization in the 1960s represented a more accurate and direct
application of article 27, preserving the concessionary regime despite significant
modifications.11

The Nationalization of the Oil Industry
Early post-revolutionary governments focused their efforts on the control
of Mexico’s hydrocarbon resources. After two decades of failure, the
nationalization of the oil industry on March 18, 1938, by President Lázaro
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Cárdenas, became the fundamental expression of economic nationalism and the
material culmination of the ideals of the Mexican Revolution and the 1917
Constitution. The nationalization was a strong unilateral state action, a political
and economic maneuver to regain control of its resources that represented the
end of a long struggle against colonialism and imperialism. In this context, an
analysis of the process of nationalization reveals the unique contours of
Mexicanization as a nationalist process.
Despite the proclamation of national sovereignty in the 1917 Constitution,
early post-revolutionary governments were unable to take control of the oil
industry. American and British companies began production in 1901 and
controlled more than 90% of the industry until 1938. Private Mexican capital
“never accounted for more than 3 percent of the total.”12 At their peak, American
and British companies “pushed production to 193 million barrels annually by
1921, second only to…[production in] the United States.”13 But, export-oriented
production meant the benefits for Mexico were “limited exclusively to the
payment of taxes, salaries, and lease rents.”14 When the revolutionaries
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advanced the 1917 Constitution, article 27 provided the legal basis for
nationalizing petroleum sources. In the words of a highly regarded historian, the
Constitution thus became “the most important weapon used by the post-1917
administrations to challenge the hegemony of direct foreign investment.”15
Nonetheless, in the next two decades Mexico remained unable to assert its own
nationalist policies, and “foreign control of the oil industry. . . [remained] one of
the most contentious issues in foreign affairs.”16
When the Constitution was proclaimed, the inclusion of article 27
heightened the oil companies’ concerns about property rights. In the years
immediately after the revolution, American Senator Albert Fall extended the
promise of recognition to the new Mexican regime in order to seek
guarantees against nationalization, a ban on the retroactive application of
the measures established in the 1917 Constitution, recognition of the
mining and oil rights acquired by U.S. citizens according to the laws of
1884, 1892, and 1909, as well as the payment or retribution for all U.S.
properties taken over after 1910.17
President Obregón rejected the proposal, but Mexico’s decline as an oil exporter
after 1921 and the shift of investment to Venezuela and the Middle East,
weakened the antagonism between the two countries. Consequently, the
Bucareli Agreements of 1923 guaranteed the non-retroactive application of article
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27 in exchange for the recognition of Obregón’s government by the U.S. The
Calles-Morrow agreement of 1928 solidified this guarantee, ended the pursuit of
more substantial reform, and preserved the status quo of the oil companies.18
The impetus for change arrived during the presidency of Lázaro
Cárdenas. After the presidency of Calles (1924-1928) and the informal
continuation of his rule during the so-called Maximato (1928-1934), President
Cárdenas revived the social, populist, and nationalist goals of the Mexican
Revolution in December 1934. To repel political attacks from the pro-business
Calles and build a base of mass support for his program of economic and social
restructuring, Cárdenas advocated for broad union organization. Where the
Constitutionalists had brought labor into the sphere of national politics during the
1910s, Cárdenas consolidated this effort when he incorporated labor into the
structure of the revolutionary state.19
Upon coming to power, Cárdenas quickly signaled a nationalist policy with
respect to oil. In his 1935 state of the union address, he indicated that national
interests would prevail over foreign ones and hinted at ending “indiscriminate oil
exports.”20 The Cardenas government confirmed new concessions very slowly,

18

Aguilar Camín and Meyer, In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution, 82, 150; Robert F. Smith,
The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1972), 221-222; Meyer, Mexico and the United States, 7, 232; Knight,
“Introduction,” Mexican Petroleum Industry, xii; Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern
Mexico (Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964), 272.

19

Kevin J. Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in
Mexico (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 87-93.

20

Meyer, Mexico and the United States, 152-153.

67

suspended tax exemptions, and the 1935 economic plan forecast an increase in
domestic oil consumption. The government also began preparing a new tax law
and new requirements for the active, regular production of mining properties.21
Even more alarming to foreign interests was the passage of the Expropriation
Law of 1936. This law “gave the government the right to expropriate any
property whatsoever for public use, compensation to be paid in accordance with
its fiscal value within a maximum of ten years.”22 The impetus for
nationalization, however, came from another direction.
The catalyst for nationalization was a labor conflict. As part of his effort to
increase worker unionization, Cárdenas had encouraged the creation of the
national oil workers union, the Petroleum Workers' of the Mexican Republic
(STPRM), in 1935 and its incorporation into the state-affiliated Confederation of
Mexican Workers (CTM) in 1936. The following year, the STPRM initiated
negotiations to establish the first collective contract between oil workers and
foreign companies and requested an increase of 65 million pesos in wages and
benefits. When the companies refused and tendered a counteroffer of 14 million
pesos, a strike erupted. The movement quickly ended after the CTM requested
the intervention of the federal labor board, the Federal Conciliation and
Arbitration Board (JFCA), which sought to determine if the companies had
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resources to grant an increase. Meanwhile, a commission of cabinet members
appointed by President Cárdenas levelled a general condemnation, saying that
these companies had brought more harm than good to Mexico. Four months
later, in December 1937, the labor board accepted the commission’s
recommendations and determined that the companies could afford an increase of
more than 26 million pesos.23
On March 1, 1938, the Mexican Supreme Court affirmed the labor board’s
decision, but the companies remained intransigent. The Compañía Mexicana de
Petróleo El Águila (“Mexican Eagle Oil Company”), founded and controlled by
aristocratic Englishman Sir Weetman Pearson, offered 22 million pesos plus
additional investment, while other companies began to close some operations
and indicated their unwillingness to comply. At the same time, the national oil
union threatened a national strike. On March 15, a week after the initial deadline
passed, El Águila “reported that it would not comply with the decision of the labor
board, which responded by suspending all contracts. With their pay suspended,
and a strike deadline looming, workers began to seize loading terminals and shut
down pipelines across all oil firms.”24 The possibility of industry disruptions
threatened to reverberate across the whole economy. The companies’ refusal to
respect the laws and decisions of the courts challenged Mexican national
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sovereignty and implied the possible collapse of Mexico’s most important
industry. Facing these threats, President Cárdenas announced the
nationalization of the oil industry on March 18, 1938.25
Scholars make a careful distinction between expropriation and
nationalization. Expropriation signified a takeover of a single company or group
of firms and implied a unique and limited occurrence that would have allowed for
the continued economic participation of other foreign companies. United States
officials considered “expropriation as analogous to eminent domain proceedings
– a one-time condemnation of private property for a narrowly defined public
purpose.”26 Cárdenas’s action more precisely followed the pattern of
nationalization: “it was not individualized or directed at any particular firm; rather,
it was a broad measure designed to bring about a basic change in the country's
economic structure through takeover by the state.”27 The nationalization of oil

25

Meyer, Mexico and the United States, 152-153, 162-163, 166-167, 169; Maurer, “Empire,” 600601; Aguilar Camín and Meyer, In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution, 153; Lázaro Cárdenas,
"IV Informe de Gobierno del Presidente Constitucional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Lázaro
Cárdenas del Río 1° de septiembre de 1938," in Informe del Presidente Lázaro Cárdenas
(México, D.F.: Centro de Documentación, Información y Análisis, 2006), 88; "Decreto que
expropia a favor del patrimonio de la Nación, los bienes muebles e inmuebles pertenecientes a
las compañías petroleras que se negaron a acatar el laudo de 18 de diciembre de 1937, del
Grupo Número 7 de la Junta Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje," Diario Oficial, March 18, 1938;
Manuel Martínez Sicilia, "Contestación al Sexto Informe de Gobierno del President Constitucional
de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, por parte del Diputado Manuel
Martínez Sicilia XXXVIII Legislatura. 1° de septiembre de 1940," in Informe del Presidente Lázaro
Cárdenas (México, D.F.: Centro de Documentación, Información y Análisis, 2006), 141. Lázaro
Cárdenas, "VI Informe de Gobierno del Presidente Constitucional de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos Lázaro Cárdenas del Río 1° de septiembre de 1940," in Informe del Presidente
Lázaro Cárdenas (México, D.F.: Centro de Documentación, Información y Análisis, 2006), 135.

26

Koppes, “Good Neighbor Policy,” 68.

27

Meyer, Mexico and the United States, 169.

70

took over an entire resource and the administration of an entire industry, and in
the process foreclosed the possibility of any foreign participation in that sector of
the economy. It was this possibility that motivated the oil companies to defy
Mexican courts and Mexican national sovereignty.28
Challenges on several fronts threatened the success of nationalization.
Armed intervention into Latin America and Mexico by the United States had been
a regular occurrence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Good
Neighbor Policy, and more importantly, the intimations of global conflict mitigated
the American response. With respect to the growing conflict in Europe, President
Franklin Roosevelt’s main concern focused on preventing the incursion of
fascism into Latin America and solidifying an inter-American alliance. Policy
makers in the United States recognized the need for caution, concerned that
stronger action would produce economic and political instability, potentially
driving Mexico toward alliances with fascist countries and ultimately doing more
harm than good for United States interests. When the Second World War
erupted in 1939, the State Department brokered an agreement with the Mexican
government without the participation of the oil companies,29 and yielded to
“Mexican national sovereignty over the interests of American oil companies.”30

28

Koppes, “Good Neighbor Policy,” 66-67; Maurer, “Empire,” 601.

29

Meyer, Mexico and the United States, 186, 192, 215; Aguilar Camín and Meyer, In the Shadow
of the Mexican Revolution, 155; Koppes,“Good Neighbor Policy,” 70; Maurer, “Empire,” 605.

30

Aguilar Camín and Meyer, In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution, 155.

71

Before the agreement had been made, the United States replaced armed
intervention with various forms of economic coercion to defend its private
property interests abroad. After the labor board’s ruling in 1937, the American
government and the oil companies began spreading propaganda, suspending
sales, and withdrawing bank deposits to encourage capital flight and to
aggravate an already existing economic crisis. After March 1938, the companies
would have preferred the State Department’s help in “the establishment of a
conservative, even fascist, government through a coup d’état.”31 Instead,
Secretary of State Cordell Hull attacked the legitimacy of Mexican courts by
measuring it against the rulings of international law, arguing that the Mexico had
failed to provide “prompt, effective, and adequate indemnity.”32 At the same time,
the U.S. set tough conditions on economic aid while obstructing
intergovernmental and private loans. The United States Department of the
Treasury altered the handling of silver purchases, which had brought the
Mexican government more revenue than oil, by changing contracts from longterm to short-term agreements that had to be renewed on a month-to-month
basis.33
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The most severe threat came from the boycott imposed by the oil
companies. With the State Department’s help, sales of oil were limited to Brazil,
Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Panama, and Paraguay. For a
short time, until the beginning of the Second World War, Mexico exported oil to
Germany, Italy, and Japan as well. After conflict erupted in 1938, these trading
arrangements unraveled. The American companies blocked imports of
machinery and chemicals and hindered the operations of railroads and ocean
tankers. The departure of specialized personnel also increased the burdens of a
small group of Mexican technicians tasked with maintaining “the enormous
industrial complex” undertaking its reorganization into a single centralized stateoperated enterprise.34
Despite American attempts to block it, the effort to nationalize the oil
industry survived. Global conflict and the resolution agreed on between the
Mexican government and the British Sinclair Oil Company in 1940, pushed
American officials to act without the participation of the American companies.
They agreed that the companies would not return to Mexico and that
compensation of 40 million dollars would be made in cash and oil over several
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years.35 In 1942, Deputy Manuel Gudiño described Cárdenas’s maneuver as
“the most audacious and courageous. . . since it challenged the wrath and
immense strength of the most powerfully organized wing of capitalist
imperialism.”36 The achievement of national sovereignty represented the
success of a strong state at acquiring and administering its own natural
resources. Now, Cárdenas proclaimed, they were “for the [Mexican people’s]
defense, conservation, development, and use.”37 The maneuver represented the
material embodiment of revolutionary nationalism. The Cardenista period,
highlighted by the nationalization of the oil industry, has been interpreted as “the
most progressive phase of the Mexican Revolution.”38 The one that came next
would be significantly different.

The Conservative Reaction
Paradoxically, Cardenista policies marked both the climax and end of the
Mexican Revolution. The nationalization produced a conservative reaction that
altered the political dynamics of post-revolutionary Mexico. Conservative groups
of various types and inclinations, scattered across the country, unified around
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their concern over nationalization and its exclusion of the private sector. These
groups threatened the survival of the revolution and prompted a reversal of
Cárdenas’s progressive policies, particularly the effort to incorporate labor and
peasantry as distinct groups into the national fabric of the country.39 He
disassociated himself from socialism and halted additional nationalization plans
in order to appease the private sector and regain the favor of foreign investors.
Although strategic in intent, Cárdenas’s retreat has been interpreted as signaling
the true close of the Mexican Revolution.40
The conservative reaction formalized itself during the presidential election
of 1940. Exemplifying this reactionary trend, General Juan Andreu Almazán
announced his candidacy for the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana's (PRM)
nomination, which threatened to destroy the political stability gradually built up in
post-revolutionary Mexico. Against this threat, Cárdenas relinquished his initial
choice of successor, Francisco J. Múgica, who represented the continuation of
Cardenista policies but whose victory would have pushed Almazán toward open
rebellion. So, Cárdenas transferred his patronage to an alternate candidate,
General Manuel Avila Camacho, whom he considered “as conservative as
Almazán but whom he felt he could try to commit up to a certain point to the
administration's program.”41 Avila Camacho was also liked by the United States,
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and regarded as more moderate than Cárdenas and Almazán, who was
considered too reactionary and had associated with fascist sympathizers.
Almazán eventually lost the election but never launched a rebellion.42
Despite Almazán’s defeat, the election of President Manuel Avila
Camacho began Mexico’s pivot toward a more conservative orientation. The
presidency of his successor Miguel Alemán (1946-1952), redefined the character
of Mexico for the subsequent decades:
presidential absolutism, one-party monopoly on power, manipulation of
mass organizations, the promotion of a nationalist unifying ideology in
place of class and ideological differences, the elimination of the political
Left from the official coalition, and state domination of the labor
movement….[It] also signified the ascent of a conservative
postrevolutionary oligarchy of financiers, businessmen, and
industrialists.43
Whereas Cardenista policies focused on labor, agrarian, and nationalist reforms
to serve popular interests; Alemán’s policies favored the interests of private and
foreign investors. Where the proponents of revolutionary nationalism argued that
social justice needed to be implemented alongside economic development,
Alemán’s supporters regarded the creation and accumulation of economic wealth
as “the better path to strengthen and consolidate national sovereignty and
development.”44 The state continued to intervene in the economy, but in order to
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facilitate the private sector’s businesses rather than to operate as a direct owner
and producer on behalf of the Mexican people. Just as significant as that of
Cárdenas, Alemán’s presidency transformed the political, economic, and cultural
dynamic in Mexico, and exemplified the growing fissures and contradictions
between revolutionary nationalism and the ruling party.45

The Mexicanization of the Mining Industry, 1961
Decades since the strike in Cananea, and centuries since the advent of
colonial mineral exploitation, Mexico asserted national sovereignty over its
mineral resources through the policy of Mexicanization. According to Juan Luis
Sariego, Mexicanization challenged the entrenched orientation toward mining
export production and foreign markets, with the goal of “recover[ing] under the
control of the nation the property, the administration, the exploitation and the
reorientation of the mineral resources of the country.”46 President Adolfo López
Mateos signed the Ley Reglamentaria del Artículo 27 Constitucional en materia
de explotación y aprovechamiento de recursos minerales, or Ley de
mexicanización de la minería, on February 5, 1961. This represented the
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culmination of nationalist mineral policy, yet in contrast to the oil nationalization, it
emerged as a much more moderate and conservative approach. It was also a
more complex and subtle process that reflected the experiences of 1938 and the
changed political culture of Mexico after the conservative reaction. Rather than a
direct takeover of an entire industry, the main stipulation of Mexicanization
required that a majority of a mining company rest in the hands of Mexican
nationals. This led to the creation of parastate enterprises, which permitted the
involvement of the state, preserved the participation of foreign capital, and
introduced the Mexican private sector into the mining industry.47 The meaning of
national sovereignty had changed remarkably since 1938, so that state
intervention operated on behalf of private interests rather than public ones.
Early nationalist policies in the mining industry had been limited to fiscal
measures. The governments of Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles
attempted to establish “a nationalist-style mining legislation according to the
postulates of the Constitution,”48 but they were hindered from implementing more
substantial reform due to post-revolutionary reconstruction efforts in addition to
industry and market pressures. Throughout the 1920s, the continued ownership
by foreign investors and dependence on foreign markets precluded significant
structural reform and, as stated before, reduced nationalist efforts to fiscal
measures.49
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Preceding Mexicanization, the mining industry suffered more than two
decades of stagnation. According to some scholars, the industry’s decline began
after the oil nationalization when the loss of financing from international sources
led to the absence of investment, exploration, and technological innovation in the
late 1930s.50 The Second World War and the Korean War alleviated these
trends for brief periods but failed to eliminate their long-term causes, the
symptoms of which included diminished exports and reduced revenues for the
government. As foreign investors pursued minerals and more dynamic economic
sectors beyond Mexico and Latin America, the main problem remained “the
constant absence of sufficient new investments.”51 Meanwhile, the crisis
reverberated into other industries, restricting the supply of minerals essential to
domestic industries that had emerged under the import-substitution policies of
the 1940s.52
Lawmakers and bureaucrats regarded the main cause of stagnation to lie
in the concentration and hoarding of mining concessions. In 1960, Alfredo
Valtierra, director of Mines and Petroleum, a sub-division of the Secretary of
National Patrimony, claimed that 85% of the mining industry remained under the
control of foreign enterprises and served foreign economies while contributing
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little to the long-term development of Mexico. Concession holders were
amassing mining concessions without engaging in active production, and thus,
failing to provide raw materials for industrialization, currency for foreign
exchange, or new sources of employment. Senator Manuel Moreno Sánchez
argued that mining concessions had been granted with the expectation that
concession holders would develop them. Unproductive concessions, he argued,
were one of the key problems that contributed to the industry’s stagnation and to
related social problems.53
Legislative efforts to address problems in the mining industry began in the
mid-1950s. On October 30, 1953, the First Senate Commission of Mines headed
by Senator Alberto Terrones Benítez offered three solutions: fiscal reform,
bureaucratic reform, and constitutional reform.54
As in the 1920s, mining legislation tended toward the most politically
feasible or expedient route. Fiscal policy remained the primary pivot in the
relationship between the state and mining companies and constituted the most
direct form of state intervention. Supporters of fiscal reform argued that the
existing tax structure had become too burdensome. Tax reductions would lower
costs, increase earnings, and prompt the recovery of mining. The Cámara
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Minera, a group representing the mining industry, requested reductions in taxes
applied to rent, earnings, imports, exports, and production. The Ley de
Impuestos y Fomento a la Minería (Law on Mining Taxes and Development 1955) eventually reduced taxes on exports and production and included the
possibility of limited fiscal arrangements. It also increased subsidies to small- and
medium-sized mining enterprises. Without altering the structure of the mining
industry, it “represented a political compromise with powerful international mining
interests.”55 When the industry failed to improve, the representatives of business
interests called for the elimination of all mining taxes. Persistent stagnation also
renewed calls from Senator Terrones Benítez in September 1956 and June 1957
for a more substantial reform that departed from fiscal policy.56 These calls were
answered by the new president.
After three conservative presidencies, the election of Adolfo López Mateos
in 1958 resurrected a more nationalist stance but prompted careful negotiations
among political forces on both the left and the right. When Miguel Alemán
became president in 1946, he moved the country to the right by realigning the
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state with pro-business factions, and by reducing the power of the left and of
labor as independent political forces. In a speech to the CTM, Alemán stated:
Private enterprise should have complete freedom and be able to count on
support from the state, so long as it acts on behalf of the general interest.
Property ownership should preferably be in the hands of Mexican citizens.
. . but foreign capital that comes to unite its destiny with that of Mexico will
be able to freely enjoy its legitimate profits.57
Moving away from the pro-state position of Cárdenas, Alemán opened the door
to private and foreign interests as viable partners in the alleged pursuit of
Mexican nationalism.
New business partners required the evisceration of the left and the labor
movement which had been empowered by Cárdenas, an effort aided by the
political climate of the Cold War. The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
denounced communism as an imperialist doctrine: “Anti-communism thus
became identified with anti-imperialism and, at bottom, with the affirmation of
Mexican nationalism.”58 While accepted by pro-government unions, this stance
was opposed by “unions in the public sector, especially in nationalized industries,
whose workers tended to identify national sovereignty with an anti-imperialist
opposition to foreign investment.”59
The control of labor was resolved through an event known as the
charrazo. During a railway workers strike that began in 1948, the government
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supported Jesús Díaz de León over a dissident leader, Luis Gomez Z. who had
created a separate union federation, the Unitary Confederation of Workers (CUT)
in opposition to the state-affiliated CTM. Of the two leaders, Díaz de León was
more amenable to resolving the conflict and signed a contract permitting the
firing of over 2,000 railroad employees. His became the model for controlling
labor: “docile labor leadership would sell out the interests of its members and
receive, in return, political backing (and financial benefits) from the state and/or
management.”60 This strategy effectively ended the existence of independent
unions and consolidated labor’s support for the ruling party.61 This behavior
became manifest in 1960 when the leader of the national mining union, Napoleón
Gómez Sada, acquiesced to the government's position on Mexicanization rather
than taking a more radical stance.
The state’s realignment toward business, and the decline of both the
autonomy of the left and the labor movement weakened the legitimacy of the
PRI. President López Mateos attempted to restore the revolutionary legitimacy
of the PRI by emphasizing his nationalist principles. On July 1, 1959, he
proclaimed himself at “the extreme left within the limits set by the Constitution.”62
He also asserted Mexico´s diplomatic independence during the Cold War by
maintaining the anti-communist position adopted by Alemán while expressing
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support for the Cuban Revolution in solidarity with the Mexican Revolution.63
When Mexicanization appeared on the horizon in 1960, however, its primary
audience was not the left nor the working class but rather the pro-business forces
on the right. After the conservative reaction to nationalization in 1938, the
Mexican state eventually adopted a different tactic.
Conservative forces, weakened and dispersed since the revolution, had
coalesced in opposition to Cárdenas. Indication of this shift became apparent
with the creation of the right-leaning Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) and the
strengthening of business interest groups including the Employers Confederation
of the Mexican Republic (COPARMEX), the Confederation of Industrial
Chambers (CONCAMIN), and the National Confederation of Chambers of
Commerce (CONCANACO).64 Business and the private sector had been shut
out from the reorganizations of the ruling party by Cárdenas and by Alemán, but
their exclusion from the corporate structure of the state belied their growing
power and influence through informal means. Jorge Legorreta, for example,
chairman of the Banco Nacional de México also sat on the boards of Nacional
Financiera, and the Compañía Minera de Cananea (see chapter 4). As
government policies contributed to the rising strength of the private sector, the
private sector increasingly used its growing power to oppose the government
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when it acted against their interests. After President Adolfo Ruíz Cortines (19521958) lowered the price of food staples in the early 1950s, the private sector
responded by reducing investment and engaging in capital flight.65 So when
López Mateos announced that he was on the extreme left of the Constitution,
“[c]onservative entrepreneurs and journalists reacted. . . with indifference,
knowing full well that the PRI machine would keep the nation on its pure path of
state-sponsored capitalist development.”66 The greatest challenge to substantive
mining reform was the potential threat posed by the private sector.
The institutional alignment of the state and private interests materialized in
the Secretary of National Patrimony (SEPANAL), created less than a month after
the new president's inauguration.67 The new ministry combined the duties of two
previous departments – the Secretary of Commerce and Industry, originally
granted oversight of the mining industry in March 31, 1917,68 and the Secretary
of National Properties and Administrative Inspection, created on December 7,
1946, which provided for the conservation and protection of national properties.69
SEPANAL was charged with executing and realizing the principles of article 27 of
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the 1917 Constitution.70 President López Mateos argued that its duties were to
"to regulate the use of natural resources and of private property, as well as
establishing the modalities that dictate the public interest."71 SEPANAL also
received the authority to "reclaim national property,"72 to achieve its stated goal,
according to López Mateos, "to promote, supply, develop, and strengthen the
efforts of private initiative.”73
When the Secretary of National Patrimony advanced its proposal to reform
the mining industry, it did so through a policy that came to be known as
Mexicanization. The origins of the term remain unclear, but it seemingly made its
first public appearance in the 1946 book La historia de la mexicanización de los
ferrocarriles nacionales de México (The History of the Mexicanization of the
National Railways of Mexico) by Servando A. Alzatí. During the Porfiriato,
foreign investment became central to the government's economic policy. The
success at attracting foreign involvement in the railroad industry, increasing the
total rail mileage from 416 miles in 1876 to 7,681 miles by 1898, prompted fears
of imperialist encroachement by American companies and motivated government
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officials to reduce the role of foreign capital and increase Mexican control. In
1898, finance minister José Yves Limantour (1893-1911), initiated the policy that
Alzati would later call, in 1935, Mexicanization. Limantour did not refer to his
own policy as Mexicanization but its major characteristics – majority control of the
new National Railways of Mexico, the institutionalized use of Spanish in the
industry, and the replacement of foreign workers with Mexicans – became the
hallmark features of future nationalist efforts that would fall under that name.74
With respect to its legislative precedents, Mexicanization had its origins in
Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution. According to the law, “Only Mexicans by birth
or by naturalization and Mexican corporations,” could acquire concessions to
exploit natural resources.75 Foreign entities could receive concessions by
permission from the Secretary of Foreign Relations and would be considered
Mexican nationals for such purposes and restricted from seeking any recourse to
their home governments. These requirements were modified in 1944 to regulate
the movement of foreign capital in Mexico during the Second World War. To
prevent the potential disruption caused by the inflows and outflows of capital, the
law required 51% of a company's total ownership to be in the hands of Mexican
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owners.76 According to John Sherman, the law was never enforced but used to
solidify an alliance between Mexican and United States business interests.77
The process of drafting, revising, and debating the Mexicanization Law of
1961 consisted of nationalist efforts to permit state intervention in the mining
industry while assuaging the concerns of the conservative, pro-business sector.
The first legislative step toward the Mexicanization law of 1961 was the revision
of the Constitution’s Article 27.78 Previously, Senator Alberto Terrones Benítez
had expressed that mining reform needed to include constitutional reform.
Persistent stagnation proved the failure of fiscal measures alone and confirmed
the need for more substantial reform.79 He argued that Article 27 permitted a
more active participation of the state in the mining industry. Senator Terrones
initially proposed a strong role for the state, allowing it to make direct use of
minerals in an industrial or commercial capacity.80 The constitutional reform
signed into law on January 20, 1960 was more subtle. The original version of
Article 27 stated that concessions could be granted to “individuals, or civil or

76

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, "Decreto que establece la necesidad transitorio de
obtener permiso para adquirir bienes, a extranjeros y sociedades mexicanas que tengan o
tuvieren socios extranjeros," Diario Oficial, Tomo CXLV, núm. 6, July 7, 1944, 2-3.

77

John W. Sherman, "The Mexican "Miracle" and Its Collapse," in The Oxford History of Mexico,
eds. Michael C. Meyer and William H. Beezley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 582.

78

Wallace Hall, La dinámica del sector minero, 139.

79

“La Ley Minera Requiere Simplificación Urgente,” Novedades, June 8, 1957.

80

“Insistirán en la Reforma, al Art. 27,” Novedades, November 3, 1955; “La Ley Minera Requiere
Simplificación Urgente,” Novedades, June 8, 1957; “Nadie se Ocupa ya del Dominio del
Subsuelo,” Excélsior, September 6, 1956; “Se Acometará Este Año la Total Reforma de las
Leyes Mineras,” Excélsior, November 3, 1955.

88

commercial corporations constituted in accordance with Mexican law.81 The
1960 revision changed this to “individuals or corporations constituted in
accordance with Mexican law.”82 This apparently minor revision actually
broadened the spectrum of mining enterprises, making room for state
participation in the mining industry.83
Shortly after the January reform, SEPANAL began drafting the
Mexicanization law. At the end of September 1960, Secretary Eduardo
Bustamente began campaigning on its behalf, initiating a period of debate and
revision. A group of senators introduced the draft on December 1, 1960 and
turned over the project to the United Commissions of Legislative Studies, Second
of Mines, and of Properties and National Resources.84 From December 7 to
December 10, 1960, the commissions hosted a series of public forums, or,
audiencias, during which a total of eighteen representatives from various
organizations presented their arguments for and against the Mexicanization law.
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Opponents of Mexicanization leveled numerous arguments against state
intervention. Engineer Máximo Muñoz argued that the state was too inadequate
to “encompass and administer. . . an industrial organization so complex as
mining in its diverse phases of exploration, production and commerce.”85
Senator Hilario Medina Goana argued that the proposed law was
unconstitutional, because it would lead to the creation of what he called a “Mining
State.”86 New restrictions on concessions were not provided for in the 1917
Constitution and would restrict the availability of mineral resources to companies.
He acknowledged that the Mexican state had the constitutional right to grant
concessions but not to act as an “entrepreneur” or participate in the “direct
exploitation of mines.”87
Many opponents argued that the law would fail to realize its objectives,
largely by inhibiting the participation of domestic and foreign capital in the mining
industry. Deputy Enrique Sámano Salgado claimed that the high capital
requirements of larger mining enterprises, even at 51%, would prohibit the
creation of new companies. Ownership requirements and the obligations of
concession holders were also considered too burdensome for Mexican investors
who possessed fewer capital resources and less access to technology than their
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foreign counterparts. Senior Engineer Alfonzo Martínez Berges argued that the
most experienced and knowledgeable group of people in the industry, mining
entrepreneurs, would be alienated. Foreign investors were inhibited from
Mexicanizing existing companies or entering into new mining ventures in which
they would have minority participation. Eduardo Prieto López argued that the
new obligations proposed in the law would discourage sources of private
investment and require stronger intervention by the state. The subsequent
nationalization would alienate private investors and strain the national budget,
ultimately leading to the collapse of the mining industry as well as the Mexican
state.88 Some argued that Mexicanization would be unachievable without
incentives. Sámano Salgado observed that the law contained no “specific means
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to reorganize the mining industry technically and economically” to increase
production and produce national effects.89
Some lawmakers and professionals made overtures toward nationalization
but quickly yielded to more moderate stances. Senator Natalio Vázquez
Pallares, for instance, asserted that the only definitive solution to the country’s
problems would be the complete nationalization of the mining industry.90 Yet, he
quickly pointed out his recognition of the need for prudence, and acknowledged
that the nationalization of oil had occurred during a specific historical context that
aided its success. Ernesto Lobato, chair of economics at the National
Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), supported the law because it was
simultaneously nationalist and pragmatic. He supported the gradual restructuring
of the mining industry “through an evolution compatible with the necessities and
possibilities of the country, within the framework of the historical reality that we
are living.”91 While not as direct or totalizing in scope, Mexicanization
represented a significant step toward a future in which Mexico reclaimed “the
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complete patrimony of the nation.”92 Alfredo Valtierra, director of Mines and Oil,
a sub-division of SEPANAL, described the policies of Mexicanization as a
“healthy nationalism that does not intend to trample over acquired rights nor
exclude foreign capital.”93
Supporters advanced numerous defenses of state intervention. Against
critiques that the nationalist aspects of the law opposed liberal economic policies,
supporters of intervention argued that all countries had adopted “forms of
economic policy incompatible with classical liberalism” and saw in this philosophy
the “right of the strong to extend its power freely, and a barrier for the weak who
yearned to free themselves.”94 Against arguments of the law’s
unconstitutionality, Senator Ramón Ruiz Vasconcelos argued that the
Constitution provided for the exploitation of mineral resources by individuals and
corporations, the latter of which included the possibility of entities created by the
state. In addition to the mining enterprises themselves, the task of mineral
exploitation would be facilitated through the creation or reorganization of the
state’s “own specialized organisms” such as the Mining Agencies, the Council of
Non-Renewable Resources, and the Mining Development Commission.95
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Against fears that Mexicanization would impose a mining state, Senator Manuel
Moreno Sánchez argued that the Mexican people could not wait while the mining
industry remained idle in the hands of foreign private investors who were
unwilling to revive production and make new investments.96
To strengthen the legitimacy of Mexicanization, its proponents touted its
connection to colonial mining policy. Senator Ramón Ruiz Vasconcelos argued
that the mining project was “congruent with the historic tradition of our country” in
which the subsoil’s property is the inalienable patrimony of the sovereign with the
state charged to develop it according to the general will.97 The transfer of
sovereignty from the Spanish king to the Mexican nation kept these policies
intact, but were disrupted when Porfirian mining laws broke this tradition. The
laws of 1882, 1890, and 1909 were considered the most liberal mining laws in
Mexican history: They ceded control of mineral resources to foreign investors,
“repudiating. . . [the] patrimonial rights of the State over the subsoil sustaining,
instead, that they were the exclusive property of the owner of the surface.”98
Article 27 restored colonial mining policy but on behalf of the sovereign Mexican
nation. If successful, Mexicanization would join other legislative milestones – the
1857 Constitution, 1917 Constitution, and the 1938 oil nationalization – as
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another step toward the consolidation of national sovereignty and begin a “new
and transcendental stage in the history of our mining.”99
Supporters of the Mexicanization law acknowledged that the state desired
greater participation and control of the industry but emphasized repeatedly that it
did not seek direct ownership or management. They conceded that the
exploitation of mineral resources was too large and complex for the state to
administer alone. They desired the participation of the private sector and
conceived a relationship in which the private sector and the Mexican state
worked in coordination. The government also desired the participation of foreign
investment, as an essential component of Mexico’s economic development.
Ernesto Lobato claimed that the law was nationalist but “without … prejudicing
the rights previously acquired by foreigners."100 And, though it may have
preserved too many rights of foreigners for some, the moderate policy of
Mexicanization sought to preserve the connection to “global markets and the
system of association,” needed for the export of products manufactured
domestically.101 Senator Agustín Olivo Monsiváis maintained that the state
would respect the private sector but affirmed that it “will intervene in everything
that is the work of superior coordination, future planning, and general inventory of
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resources, in short, in all those tasks that correspond to it because of its public
nature and its historical responsibility."102
When Secretary Bustamente began campaigning for the law in September
1960, his main goal was to clarify the differences between Mexicanization and
nationalization. He admitted that Mexicanization was similar to the oil
nationalization since it entailed state intervention in the economy. But in contrast
to nationalization, Mexicanization would not involve a takeover of mining
properties nor create a centralized state-owned and operated enterprise like
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) to administer them. To pacify fears of
nationalization, Bustamente claimed that such a maneuver was impossible
because the nation’s mines had always been the property of the Mexican nation.
The purpose of state intervention, then, was to rescue the industry from its
decades-long stagnation, and ultimately, to transfer mining property to private
Mexican owners.103
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After hearing these and other arguments, the United Commissions revised
the draft accordingly. The bulwark of support came from government agencies
and state-affiliated organizations such as the national mining union. Opposition
came primarily from professional and business interest groups such as the
Association of Mining Engineers, Metalworkers, and Geologists, the Mexican
Mining Chamber, and the Mining and Commercial Credit company.104
The bill drafted by the SEPANAL eventually led to the Mexicanization of
Mining Law (Ley Reglamentaria de Artículo 27 Constitucional en materia de
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explotación y aprovechamiento de recursos minerales, or Ley de Mexicanización
de Minería). At its broadest, the law was intended to normalize "the principle of
national sovereignty over mineral resources and their exploitation consecrated in
the constitutional article 27."105 It focused on six main problems: the creation of
government organizations inside the mining industry, the performance of fiscal
policy, the structure of parastate companies, the regulation and arbitration of
labor, and the management of working conditions.106
While tackling such problems, Mexicanization pursued three long-term
objectives. First, the movement of the mining industry away from the foreigndominated, export-oriented model of production. Second, the integration of the
industry toward domestic needs and the process of national industrialization.
Third, the promotion of the domestic processing of raw mineral resources. In so
doing, it sought to stimulate new industries, increase diversification, improve the
nation’s technical capacity, add new sources of employment, and provide cheap
inputs for national industries.107
Mexicanization proposed to achieve these objectives by increasing state
intervention. The main tactic involved the restructuring of mining property by
transforming the concessionary regime so that concessions could only be
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granted to those enterprises with a majority of Mexican ownership. This
requirement permitted the inclusion of both the state and the private sector into
the mining industry while preserving foreign investment.108
The streamlining of bureaucratic procedure occurred through the
aforementioned creation of the Secretary of National Patrimony. As granted in
the Law of Secretaries and Departments of the State of 1958 and then in the
Mexicanization Law of 1961, SEPANAL made the final decisions on the rights
and obligations of concession holders; possessed the right to intervene in the
organization, direction, administration, and finances of parastate enterprises;
and, oversaw subordinate dependencies tasked with the day-to-day execution of
the law.109
President López Mateos signed the law on February 5, 1961. The new
law imposed several nationalist requirements that pertained to the
Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea. The fourteenth article of
the law stated, “Only Mexicans and corporations constituted in agreement with
Mexican laws and that have the majority of capital underwritten by Mexicans,
have the right to obtain the concessions.”110 This requirement comprised the key
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innovation and mechanism of Mexicanization. Significantly, this did not comprise
a nationalization of the industry. While increasing the possibility of state
intervention, the law also permitted the inclusion of private enterprise and
preserved foreign participation in the mining industry while reducing its control.111
As a result, new types of mining enterprises with various combinations of the
state, national and foreign investors became possible.112
For existing mining companies with foreign ownership, like the Compañía
Minera de Cananea, the law contained no schedule or requirement for
compliance with it, permitting companies to act at their own discretion. Stronger
efforts to restructure property were out of the question: the restrictions to be
imposed by Mexicanization were considered so demanding that incentives and
security for investments were needed to encourage compliance. Domestic
investors needed them because Mexicanization dissuaded the participation of
foreign capital in the mining industry. Foreign investors also benefited from this
arrangement because incentives, rather than retroactive measures, became the
primary means of achieving Mexicanization. Incentives were not included in the
Mexicanization Law but in amendments to the 1955 Law on Mining Taxes and
Development. Articles 52 and 56 provided a series of graduated tax exemptions
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to new mining operations or mining operations that had been defunct for more
than ten years. The reforms in December 1960 extended these incentives to
those companies which complied with the capital structure requirement in the
Mexicanization Law.113
In contrast to the decades-long emphasis on fiscal policy, Mexicanization
did emphasize more direct forms of state intervention. In order to fulfill the social
and economic aspirations of the 1917 Constitution, supporters of the law wanted
to confirm the dominion of the nation over its mineral wealth and use the state “to
protect, support, and develop that wealth.”114 State intervention would benefit
the Mexican nation through industrialization and employment, strengthen
industry, secure economic independence, and consolidate national
sovereignty.115 The ultimate argument for state intervention rested upon the
claim that its final goal was the transfer of “mining property and mining
concessions into the hands of private Mexican companies.”116 After its
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Mexicanization in 1971, the Compañía Minera de Cananea became a parastate
enterprise – a corporation with state, domestic, and foreign participation – when
Anaconda sold 51% of its shares to a combination of public and private investors
in Mexico.117

Conclusion
Beginning in 1961, the Mexicanization of the mining industry emerged as
the strongest assertion of national sovereignty over the nation’s mineral
resources. Yet, in contrast to the nationalization of the oil sector in 1938,
Mexicanization represented a more moderate and conservative approach.
Instead of taking complete ownership and administration of the mines by the
state, the primary goal of state intervention became the transfer of mining
property to the domestic private sector. This change in policy largely resulted
from the conservative reaction that followed the oil nationalization and was thus
designed primarily to appeal to pro-business factions. Since 1938, however,
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state intervention had created such a strong association with nationalization that
the proponents of Mexicanization remained always on the defensive during the
debates on the law in late 1960. Editorials and debates revealed that the two
nationalist processes were often considered equivalent, and the burden to
distinguish them rested on government officials. Thus, the debates on
Mexicanization and their substantive innovations, the capital majority
requirement, reveal an actual change directed toward elite concerns. How these
changes were negotiated with respect to popular concerns of national
sovereignty is the subject of the next chapter.

103

CHAPTER III
The Mexicanization of Compañía Minera de Cananea, 1971

A decade after the passage of the Mexicanization Law in 1961, the
Compañía Minera de Cananea (CMC) became the final large mining enterprise
to undergo the process. This concluded a long struggle that began in 1906,
sustained itself over generations, and culminated in President Luis Echeverría’s
announcement on August 27, 1971. The Mexicanization of the CMC completed
Mexico’s strongest effort to assert national sovereignty over its mineral
resources. Ostensibly, it represented the peak of nationalism in the mineral
industry and the recovery of the nation’s mineral resources. To be sure, scholars
have regarded the nationalization of the oil industry as the apotheosis of the
Mexican Revolution and the consummation of revolutionary nationalism.1 In
contrast, the Mexicanization of mining revealed a conception of national
sovereignty representative of the institutionalized Mexican Revolution and a
"corrupted" form of revolutionary nationalism that emerged with President Miguel
Alemán.
As a result, the approach taken to mining represented the victory of elites
over the revolution. While the Mexican Revolution initiated genuine change in
Mexico, it obscured the continuation of pre-revolutionary tendencies such as
authoritarianism, marginalization, oppression, and the perpetuation of elite rule.
Adam Morton has aptly described the Mexican Revolution as a passive
1
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revolution, arguing that "both state intervention and mass mobilization were
conjoined to ensure processes of primitive accumulation and the creation of
modern capitalism."2 Mass mobilization legitimized limited social change, but its
more enduring effects brought change in favor of a new elite, in which new power
was consolidated, the progressive aspects of the revolution eroded, and class
rule restored.3
As discussed in the previous chapter, the legislative phase of
Mexicanization confronted the discourse established by the nationalization of the
oil industry under Cárdenas. His action had established a narrative in which
state intervention became associated with the complete takeover and
management of strategic natural resources by the state, foreclosing the
participation of the private sector and foreign investors. The social myth of
revolutionary nationalism defined legitimate power strictly within the context of
the nation-state, and empowered the state to act on behalf of the nation and
serve as an intermediary for labor. With Mexicanization, government officials
offered a counter discourse for elite consumption, promoting the idea that state
intervention and the national control of resources would serve private interests.
The restoration of class rule is particularly significant in the post-Cardenista
period, during which the ideals of the Mexican Revolution increasingly diverged
from its reality. The Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea, three
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decades after the end of Cardenas’s presidency (1934-1940), resides at the
edge of revolution and reaction.
The Mexicanization of the CMC emerged as one of the last gasps of the
Mexican Revolution and revolutionary nationalism in the second half of the
twentieth century. Still, it was at the same time a byproduct of conservative
efforts to assuage foreign capital, whose vociferous reaction after the oil
nationalization had generated multiple crises in the country. As Mexican politics
became less revolutionary and more conservative, the ideology of revolutionary
nationalism remained an essential basis for the legitimacy of the Mexican state
and the governing party. But, increasingly, it served the narrower interests of the
elite and offered fewer direct benefits for workers. Despite the differences
between nationalization and Mexicanization, government officials maintained the
rhetoric of revolutionary nationalism while advancing a more moderate policy to
assert “sovereign” control of mineral resources. Nonetheless, the Mexicanization
of Compañía Minera de Cananea was promoted as both a total assertion of
national sovereignty, equivalent to nationalization, and a fulfillment of the
Mexican Revolution.
This chapter demonstrates how the Mexicanization of the Compañía
Minera de Cananea appealed to notions of popular national sovereignty. While
Mexicanization had to appeal to elites, it also had to appeal to ordinary Mexicans,
particularly workers. So, it preserved the popular discourse established by
Cárdenas: that the achievement of national sovereignty and control of natural
resources would be used to advance the social well-being of the Mexican people;
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that the Mexican state embodied the general interest of the nation; and, that
workers were to play a role subordinate to national interests. The critical change
from nationalization to Mexicanization, mentioned in the previous chapter,
involved the latter’s opening to the participation of foreign investors in the mining
industry. This inclusion threatened the legitimacy of Mexicanization as a true
nationalist policy. As a result, government officials worked to demonstrate that
national sovereignty would be strengthened by foreign participation rather than
weakened by it. In the end, Mexicanization demonstrated the achievement of a
distinctly national sovereignty that subordinated the working class to the Mexican
nation’s needs.
This chapter focuses on the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de
Cananea in 1971. Much of its organization and many of its themes parallel those
encountered in the previous chapter. With respect to the nationalization of the oil
industry, this chapter focuses less on its political, economic, and geopolitical
aspects and examines more closely the relationship between the Mexican nation
and the oil workers. Where the previous chapter focused on the legislative
aspects of Mexicanization, this chapter examines its implementation from 1961 to
1971, concluding with the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea.
Article 27: Social Function of Property
The previous chapter, examined the concession theory of property in
article 27, this section considers its social function. Article 27 of the 1917
Constitution presents national patrimony as a form of property distinct from
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modern conceptions of private property. In western legal tradition, private
property emerged as a natural inalienable right of the individual. Martín Díaz y
Díaz criticized this absolute notion of property for “rarely recognizing that its
dispositions may be in tension with the social dynamic." He rejected the ideas of
“private property. . . as a unique institution and [that] its consolidation implies the
elimination of original patrimonial rights," that is other possible competing quasiproperty rights.4 In contrast, article 27 proffered a different type of property.
Compared to its western version, private property in Mexico, in particular that
over the subsoil, did not emanate from natural right, nor was it sacred or
absolute; instead, it was granted by concession and never released from the
state’s sovereign ownership.5 Thus, private property could be regulated,
appropriated, and redistributed or conserved according to national and public
need.6
Nationalization of the Oil Industry: Cultural Facets
Where the previous chapter focused on the legal, political, and economic,
aspects of the oil nationalization, this chapter examines the foundational cultural
discourses related to national sovereignty in Mexico. These discourses
communicate the nature of relationships among the various factors of production
4
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– labor, natural resources, and the organization of society. First, nationalization,
defined by state administration of resources and the exclusion of foreign
participation, became the means to achieve national sovereignty after centuries
of foreign domination. Second, state control and management of natural
resources became associated with economic and social development for the
Mexican people. Third, the Mexican state embodied the general interest of the
Mexican nation. Fourth and last, workers were to inhabit a passive role in
Mexican society, subordinate to the Mexican nation and state.
When President Cárdenas announced the nationalization of oil deposits
on March 18, 1938, he was met with broad popular enthusiasm including the
support of industrialists, labor, and the middle class. Spontaneous popular
mobilizations in support of the government’s actions occurred on March 22 and
23. Private citizens and neighborhoods collected funds to finance the costs of
the nationalization, leading to the creation of the Mexican Committee for
Economic Liberation (CUMPLE) to administer the funds. Though meager in
proportion to the total cost of compensation, the symbolic weight of this gesture
was substantial as ordinary, working Mexicans paid the debt of nationalization to
express their patriotic support against decades of foreign control.7
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During the revolution, a pragmatic desire by revolutionaries to control the
oil industry became incorporated into the program of revolutionary economic
nationalism and consecrated in the 1917 Constitution. A pragmatic decision with
a lasting cultural influence, revolutionary nationalism helped to unite warring
factions of Mexicans against a common enemy – foreign investors who
dominated the nation’s economic interests. And nationalization, legitimized in
article 27, became the most effective means to exercise national sovereignty
against the continued dominance of foreign interests and end the neo-colonial
structure of foreign ownership and export-orientation of a strategic industry. This
represented the height of the nationalist revolution.8 This concluded the struggle
of the Mexican people to affirm the national patrimony of oil resources and further
“solidify the sovereignty of the Nation on solid bases that guarantee its effective
independence.”9
The achievement of economic independence promised popular social
benefits. Deputy Manuel Gudiño believed that the greatest triumph of
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nationalization was the achievement of the “economic and moral salvation of the
Mexican people.”10 He regarded the exercise of national sovereignty as the
foundation for economic independence, which in turn provided the basis for
political liberty: “Without economic liberty, political liberty will always end up being
a hollow term.”11 Nationalization implied not only better wages but also better
treatment for workers and their elevation in the eyes of Mexican society. The
social implications of nationalization also constituted a more humanistic regard
for workers as indispensable and deserving of “the protection of life, health and
the material and moral patrimony.”12 Improved facilities and stronger rights to
“educational services, doctors, and social welfare” were direct improvements for
oil workers, which provided indirect positive effects for the well-being of the
economy and allowed workers “to lend an effective service to the collectivity and
increase. . . the patrimony of the nation.”13
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With national control of natural resources, economic development would
shift away from exclusive market-centered policies, proceeding according to
national needs rather than foreign ones. After centuries of unrestrained
exploitation, lawmakers desired rational control over resource production.
Rational control, they argued, would make production more efficient while
granting more consideration to social purposes. Together, some of those
lawmakers considered the economic and social orientation of production as
measures in defense of national patrimony. Beyond the sphere of petroleum,
Cárdenas called more generally for moderation in the pursuit of profits, and
toward the creation of an economy that benefited the majority rather than the
interests of a few. In his 1942 presidential address, Avila Camacho exclaimed
that Mexico followed a unique and alternative path to national development, one
that demanded “a humanization of the systems of commerce and…an effective
recognition of the rights of each nation” by which “sovereignty may be
respected.”14 Social and economic goals converged in PEMEX. Direct material
outcomes included the provision of lower-grade gasoline at lower prices to
domestic consumers, the subsidization of fuel prices for transportation
infrastructure needs, and “a level of employment that took account of social and
political needs in addition to efficient production standards.”15
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Because of President Lázaro Cárdenas, the Mexican state came to
embody the general interest or will of the Mexican people. The nationalization of
the oil industry solidified the place of Lázaro Cárdenas as one of the most
revered presidents in Mexican history, remembered alongside the revolutionary
heroes Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata. He instituted changes related to
“land, labor, the ruling party…popular measures [which] formed the cornerstone
of his presidency and integrated campesinos, workers, and intellectuals into the
revolutionary state.”16 Through these measures, Cárdenas succeeded in
consolidating the state and providing the foundation for future economic success.
In the process, he remarked, “the state alone embodies the general interest, and
for this reason the state has a vision of the whole. The state must continually
broaden, increase, and deepen interventions.”17
As a byproduct of nationalization, the Mexican state became the exclusive
authority in the country, and ultimately, reduced the participatory role of labor.
Some workers believed that nationalization would lead to their direct participation
in the management of the industry’s everyday operations. In August 1937, a
workers’ commission proposed the takeover and transformation of the Poza Rica
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oil fields into a cooperative managed by workers. This “represented the first
attempt by workers to modify the existing structure and property relations of the
industry,” but it was rejected by Cárdenas.18 It would have given workers
complete control of production. Workers began taking steps in this direction in
early 1938, prompting Cárdenas to move forward with nationalization. “Workers
exercised de facto control of the mines," replacing managers and controlling
production until July when Cárdenas eventually decreed the creation of Petroleos
Mexicanos and the Distribuidora de Petroleos Mexicanos, thus professionalizing
and centralizing the industry.19 Cárdenas also granted a local and limited role in
administration to the national mining union, a “minority membership on the board
of directors,”20 as a means to appease labor and foster cooperation between
unions, workers, and the state, without inhibiting “state administration at a
national level.”21
The Mexican state, however, did not merely seek labor's cooperation as
an equal partner but sought to impose its dominance over the working class.
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After the nationalization, the leaders of the oil workers union demanded the
wages and benefits increases that had been awarded in December 1937, an
impossible demand in the context of an ongoing economic crisis and boycott,
creating a tense relationship between workers and government officials.
Eventually, the government imposed itself against the intransigent workers until
they “had to conform to the imperatives of national policy.”22 Appeals to the
working class constituted an essential component of state legitimacy. At the
same time, the state demanded labor’s subservience to the needs of the nation.
Except for the addition of 10,000 jobs, the “oil workers. . . gained little from the
nationalization. . . Wages rose and the work week fell from 44 to 40 hours, but
management refused to grant the rest of the original labor award.”23 The
nationalization of oil thus recovered the industry from foreign companies while
preempting its control by Mexican workers. A critical step in the consolidation of
the Mexican state, nationalization defined the parameters of legitimate workers’
actions within the context of state interests.24
Through nationalization, the Mexican state subordinated the interests of oil
workers to those of the nation. After a change in its strategy, union leadership
served less as an advocate for workers and more as one for private capital and
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the Mexican state, by discouraging independent labor activities and keeping
wages low for domestic industry. These union leaders, under pressure by the
government to reduce costs, neglected workers’ aspirations to controlling
industrial relations, and reformed union policy in 1939, seeking a collective
contract that defined conditions and protected wages under the aegis of the
state. While oil workers were elevated in the public eye, they were also
encouraged to surrender their interests to those of the nation, “as guardians and
custodians of this great national patrimony, conscious as they are of the
responsibility they have acquired.”25 To the workers, the replacement of foreign
control by Mexican control signified their increased power over work processes,
conditions, and security. But for Cárdenas, sovereign control of mineral
resources rested in the Mexican nation – to the exclusion of workers.26
The nationalist reforms implemented by President Cárdenas were critical
to achieving economic independence and national sovereignty. From the
economic foundation of the nation’s oil industry, Deputy Rodolfo Delgado claimed
that Mexico would construct “a new system of economic production” based on
the ideals of the Mexican Revolution and revolutionary nationalism.27 Within this
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system, Mexican workers labored on behalf of the Mexican nation, rather than for
themselves. Ongoing labor problems after the nationalization provoked the
Mexican state to impose its will and force workers to adhere to nationalist policy.
Thus, dominance by foreign investors relented to the more subtle domination of
the nation-state. Material improvements such as the increase in employment
and higher wages strengthened the myth that a strong and sovereign Mexican
state acted on behalf of the working class.
Conservative Reaction
As examined previously, the conservative reaction prompted a turn by
Cárdenas and successive administrations toward more reactionary positions
politically and economically. The cultural impact of the oil nationalization and the
nationalist rhetoric of Cárdenas held fast. But after Cárdenas, the rhetoric of
revolutionary nationalism increasingly diverged from reality and became more
and more superficial. Successive presidents and political leaders espoused their
connection to and respect for the Mexican Revolution and its principles.28 But
while the social and economic rhetoric of revolutionary nationalism remained
consistent, its execution increasingly served as a tool of capital accumulation for
the benefit of the elite. As Mexico became more authoritarian, the social aims of
revolutionary nationalism became increasingly superficial and transformed
themselves merely into a means of legitimizing elite rule.29 The nationalist
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rhetoric of Cárdenas held. Except, it now took the form of Mexicanization, a
seemingly attractive notion suggesting a new push for independence from foreign
interests but devoid of the radical meaning and substance nationalization had
originally conveyed.
When Mexicanization was pushed by President López Mateos and
Eduardo Bustamante in 1960, the primary goal became to convince business
groups in Mexico that state intervention would be used to advance their interests.
With the participation of foreign investors in the picture, government officials
needed to present Mexicanization as a legitimate nationalist policy to the
Mexican people. So, they preserved the popular discourse of national
sovereignty associated with the oil nationalization, that it would promote social
well-being of the Mexican people, that the Mexican state embodied the general
interest of the nation, and that workers were to play a passive role subordinate to
national interests. Government officials argued that the inclusion of foreign
investors would strengthen national sovereignty, and in the process, promote
social and popular interests.

Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea, 1971
Ten years after the passage of the Mexicanization of mining law,
President Luis Echeverría declared the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera
de Cananea on August 27, 1971. Where the Mexicanization of mining in 1961
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represented the “culmination of nationalist policy,”30 the Mexicanization of the
company in Cananea represented the culmination of Mexicanization policy itself.
Since the signing of the law, production had increased, internal markets had
expanded, and dependence on foreign markets had declined. President López
Mateos lauded the modification and restructuring of mining property on behalf of
national interests. State intervention had increased the availability of public
funds, sources of employment, the viability of mining operations, and the
desirability of private investors to participate in the industry. The state also
provided opportunities for the private sector by permitting Mexican companies to
take over majority ownership through the purchase of shares.31 Clarifying the
new policy, Robert Wallace Hall stated, “the “greater nationalism” of
Mexicanization aims to strengthen Mexican capitalism without harming the basic
interests of foreign investors.”32
The first decade of Mexicanization was its most transformative and nearly
all major mining companies were Mexicanized. According to Sariego, the peak
year for the Mexicanization of mining process was 1963. In that year, hundreds
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of new companies were established and 150 existing companies, including three
large mining companies, complied with the new policy. ASARCO, for instance,
the largest copper company in operation besides Cananea, Mexicanized itself in
1966. According to Wallace Hall, mining production by Mexicanized companies
reached 90% in 1969.33 At the end of the decade, the Compañía Minera de
Cananea remained the last large mining enterprise still under foreign control.
Mineworkers in Cananea expected national control of mineral resources to
bring them benefits, but early steps toward the Mexicanization of the CMC were
nominal. On December 31, 1960, the company changed its name to the
Compañía Minera de Cananea.34 This included an increase in the company’s
total capital stock, but neither the ownership nor management of the company
changed.35 The name change was immediately met with suspicion from workers
and regarded as a way to conceal the lack of substantive transformation within
the company.36 Nonetheless, in its early years workers in Cananea expected
positive changes to come from the policy of Mexicanization, particularly better job
security and a higher standard of living. They had witnessed the benefits of
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Mexicanization for workers at Peñoles, the first company to be Mexicanized, who
had received a wage increase of 13%, compared to the 5% received by workers
at Cananea.37
Delays instilled disillusion with the process of Mexicanization early on.
The union newspaper, the 1906: Semanario órgano oficial de la Sec. 65 del
S.I.T.M.M.S.R.M., documented the workers’ dissatisfaction. When the law went
into effect in April 1961, one writer, skeptical about Anaconda’s willingness to
comply with the new law, remarked that nothing had changed, and no change
was expected in the future.38 Later that year, on the anniversary of national
independence, an editorialist remarked, “we see with bitter desperation as our
awaited economic independence still has not come to this country.”39 The
continued presence of the foreign companies propagated an entrenched “colonial
slave economy,” that would inevitably “annihilate our resources and our wealth,
annihilating also the most precious and valuable for our country, the health and
strength of its children.”40 In November 1962, the companies continued to profit
“at the cost of hunger and misery of a people…[who] have committed no crime
more than working intensely for the good will and good living of our neighbors.”41
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While Mexicanization was delayed, workers experienced worsening
working conditions and new challenges after 1961. The American-owned
Compañía Minera de Cananea made changes to increase productivity,
introducing new heavy machinery and automating work processes. For workers,
these innovations changed the nature of work, shortened vacations, and most
importantly, threatened long-term employment. These innovations also
challenged and circumvented existing labor guarantees indirectly by “increas[ing]
responsibilities and the work of the operators."42 Labor abuses continued and
were encouraged by the hiring of personnel from out of town “who have no other
mission than that of despotic jailers, a vivid image of those Nazi guards of the
concentration camps.”43 One writer expressed the sentiment of many, that
Anaconda was increasing its productivity to extract all the nation’s minerals too
quickly.44 “Like the horsemen of the Apocalypse, where the horde of Yankee
Imperialism passes through, only misery, destruction, lament, death. . . [and]
grief remain.”45 Taking national control of the copper mines from its foreign
owners became a fight “for the survival” of the people of Cananea, “which does
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not want to die and for the conquest of bread, independence, and national
sovereignty.”46
For workers, national control of the mines became the key to improving
their working lives. As the delay for Mexicanization lengthened, some workers
began to call for the full and direct nationalization of the country's mines. In
1962, one editorialist in 1906 called for the nationalization of the entire mining
industry in order to finally end imperialism, to break up large unproductive mining
concessions, and to eradicate the discrimination of Mexicans in their own
country. Nationalization was also seen as a restraint against unlimited increases
to productivity and the exhaustion of Mexican resources, and a means to employ
resources rationally at the service of the Mexican people.47 Francisco Javier
López argued that Mexicanization would fail to harness national resources
effectively, because it preserved the diffusion of the industry across hundreds of
mining companies instead of creating a single nationalized agency to manage
the entire industry. To be efficient, produce to capacity, and provide the greatest
national benefits, he argued, the companies needed to be “driven as a whole,
and not as a sum of companies that compete amongst themselves.”48 He also
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argued that Mexicanization concealed and sustained the dominance of private
and foreign investors.49
When Luis Echeverría became president in 1970, he sought to revive the
use of state intervention for direct social improvements. There was a clear
economic crisis and social tension prevailed among many sectors of Mexican
society left out of the Mexican Miracle. At this point, the state had essentially lost
the popular base established by Cárdenas and had devolved to the interests of
domestic and foreign capital that had grown powerful during the presidencies of
Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958). To restore
the autonomy of the state, President Echeverría tried to create a new
“sociopolitical base” by resurrecting the Cardenista tactic of mobilizing workers,
peasants, and middle classes, which eventually led to the creation of the Popular
Alliance, a multiclass political coalition intended to secure governance.50 In
reaction, “business and political groups. . . were joined by official unions and
major landowners in a campaign to resist Echeverría and to sabotage the
economy."51 Similar to Cárdenas, he was opposed from many sides and forced
to mitigate his stances. So, when Echeverría announced the Mexicanization of
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the CMC, his effort represented one of the last gasps of revolutionary
nationalism.52
The Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea was announced
on August 27, 1971 in a ceremony presided over by President Luis Echeverría,
Secretary of National Patrimony Horacio Flores de la Peña, and Anaconda
president and CEO John B.M. Place. A formality more than anything else, the
assembly declared Anaconda’s intent to sell 51% of shares to domestic investors
which included five groups: the Comisión de Fomento Minero (13%), Nacional
Financiera (13%), Cobre de México (9.81%), Banco Nacional de México (9.81%),
and the workers and employees of the CMC (5.38%). Anaconda would own the
remaining 49%, the maximum allowed by the law.53
Mexicanization was presented as an improved form of nationalism,
described by Secretary Flores de la Peña as “a healthy and balanced
nationalism.”54 Through the new capital requirement, Mexicanization transferred
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the majority of the company to Mexican ownership without subjecting the
economy to any major disruptions like those experienced after the nationalization
of the oil industry. Also central to this "healthy and balanced nationalism," was
the participation of foreign capital. Flores de la Peña argued that the presence of
foreign investors in a minority position was a convenient relationship that
maintained access to international markets, good credit standing, and access to
imports of technology and machinery. The takeover of mines through a gradual
process also increased the credibility of Mexico as a workable business partner
while strengthening the nation’s economic independence.55 One editorialist
claimed that efforts to advance the common good demanded better efforts by
private and state initiative to become “complementary rather than contradictory
forces.”56
Mexicanization was a nationalist policy that sought to preserve good will
and good relationships with foreign capital. In the second half of the 1960s,
Mexican officials increasingly desired the Mexicanization of the CMC in order to
complete the integration of the nation’s copper industry. Instead of using threats
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to spur Anaconda's compliance, the government offered more incentives. In
1968, the government specifically targeted Anaconda when it extended a “special
automatic subsidy of 50% to producers.”57 Yet, the final decision to Mexicanize
came from the executives of Anaconda themselves. On December 31, 1969, the
company released a study on the benefits of Mexicanization and included a plan
for carrying it out. The Wall Street Journal indicated that Anaconda's executives
were actively moving forward with the plan on May 20, 1971. Anaconda‘s
President and CEO John B. M. Place himself professed that Mexicanization was
not a coerced, but a voluntary decision.58 This contrasted with the company's
recent experience.
Anaconda’s greatest concerns at the time involved its properties in Chile,
which far surpassed Cananea in production and value. In the early 1900s, the
Kennecott Copper Company and the Anaconda Copper Mining Company began
operations at three mines – El Teniente, Chuquicamata, and Potrerillos. Copper
soon replaced nitrates to become the foundation of the Chilean economy and a
critical source of government revenue by the 1950s.59
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To gain control of its copper resources and increase government revenue,
the administration of President Eduardo Frei adopted the policy of Chileanization.
Kennecott agreed with the plan right away, in December 1964, but Anaconda
waited for another five years. In 1969, Anaconda sold 51% of the shares in each
of its two affiliates: Chile Exploration and Andes Mining. The remaining 49% was
to be sold at the end of 1972; compensation payments would be completed by
1982. Frei lauded the moderate character of this nationalist process: "[t]he
country has not suffered, nor will it have to suffer upheavals nor violence, neither
has it compromised its international credit.”60 Chileanization preserved a
cooperative relationship with Anaconda, which “committed to maintain the rhythm
of planned investments, and. . . provide due technical assistance.”61 The next
president quickly upended this approach.62
On December 21, 1970, President Salvador Allende presented a
constitutional amendment, which permitted the nationalization of Chile’s copper
mines. Chilean leaders criticized Anaconda and other multinational corporations
for exploiting natural resources without bringing lasting national development.
Repossessing the mines, it was claimed, would bring economic improvement,
shield national enterprises from international markets, and steer production
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toward national interests.63 Anaconda had already agreed to nationalization in
1969, so the major effect of the pronouncement involved the amount of
compensation owed. Allende determined that “instead of being entitled to
compensation, Anaconda and Kennecott should pay the state US$78 million and
US$310 million respectively.”64 On July 11, 1971, the Chilean congress
approved the constitutional amendment sent by President Allende to nationalize
the mines, and as a result, the date became celebrated as the Day of National
Dignity.65 For Anaconda, the loss portended the company’s decline. 66
In contrast to direct nationalizations such as the Chilean one, the
Mexicanization of mining succeeded as a nationalist policy intended to preserve
the goodwill and support of foreign investors. What had previously “seemed an
extreme measure,”67 began to appear moderate and beneficial for foreign
investors. R. H. MacWilliam, president of San Francisco Mines of Mexico
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defended Mexicanization as a reasonable nationalist policy, without incurring the
expense of local and foreign investors. Lucien Sermon, president of the Belgian
delegation to the XIX Congress of the Chamber of International Commerce,
affirmed Mexico’s amenability to investment, owing to its political and financial
stability and its adherence to the “rule of law, even in the case of
expropriations.”68 Contrary to the fears of its early opponents, the policy of
Mexicanization yielded no impediments to foreign financing. In the New York
Times, Alan Riding affirmed that after decades of stagnation, Mexicanization had
“stimulated an upsurge in investment, much of it from abroad.”69 Gradually, even
foreign investors saw Mexicanization as a guarantee against expropriations and
nationalizations that preserved their access to mineral resources while benefiting
from access to state resources.70
In contrast to its experience in Chile, Anaconda's executives welcomed
Mexicanization as a practical business decision. Largely due to the loss of its
Chilean properties, the Mexicanization of the CMC coincided with Anaconda’s
decline and its transformation into “a smaller, leaner Anaconda Company.”71
Complying with the Mexicanization law entitled the company to receive
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incentives, largely in the form of tax reductions.72 Company president John
Place commended the hybrid nature of Mexicanization as a policy that
encouraged Mexican development by not alienating foreign investors who feared
the nationalization of their properties in Latin America. According to Alan Riding,
in the New York Times, “foreign interests recognized the difference between this
policy of “institutionalized nationalism” and the waves of nationalism sweeping
parts of South America.”73 When asked to compare Mexicanization with the
nationalization of Anaconda’s properties in Chile, Place responded that they were
like “night and day.”74
Anaconda pledged to cooperate with the newly-Mexicanized company.
Anaconda’s Vice-president Paul S. Bilgore announced his desire “to keep
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cooperating in its [Mexico’s] economic development, associated with local
interests.”75 In contrast to the oil nationalization, investments continued and
facilities expanded. Secretary Horacio Flores de la Peña (SEPANAL) projected
an investment of 24 million pesos between 1972 and 1974 to increase production
to 65,000 tons per year. Anaconda stated its desire to continue with plans for a
two-stage expansion of the company’s facilities. The first saw an investment of
300 to 400 million pesos to double copper production in five years; the second
included an investment of 2,000 million pesos to double production to nearly
140,000 tons of copper annually.76 The preservation of foreign investment in the
mining industry thus, possessed a significant role in the achievement of national
sovereignty.
Upon hearing the news of Mexicanization, the workers and townspeople of
Cananea celebrated “the end of seventy years of economic submission to a
foreign company.”77 This concluded a struggle sustained over generations by the
“descendants of the martyrs of Cananea” and the “heroic miners who ignited the
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flame of the Mexican Revolution”78 They also celebrated the final recovery of
their national patrimony with the expectation that it would benefit “the miner, his
family and the population in general.”79 Municipal president Roberto Elzy Torres
hinted, “now that its principal source of work will be operated from a Mexican and
nationalist point of view," Cananea's future prosperity would be achieved.80
Despite the preservation of foreign interests, workers and state officials
alike presented the Mexicanization of Cananea's mines as an achievement of
national sovereignty and economic independence. They considered the change
a national victory, the joyous culmination of a struggle against foreign exploitation
that began with the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors. The leader of the
national mining union, Napoleón Gómez Sada, for instance, stated that the
Mexicanization of the CMC had been a “trial of the concerns of all Mexicans to
conquer the full economic independence of our country.”81 Secretary Flores de
la Peña confirmed this sentiment, declaring that Mexicanization combined “the
necessitities of economic development and popular aspirations and
corresponded to the permanent desire of the current government to affirm our
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economic independence.”82 The main working class newspaper in Cananea,
regarded the Mexicanization of the CMC as representing “an alternative for our
economic development,” an alternative that involved not foreign control but
national control, and not mere economic exploitation and productivity but the
implementation of social goals as well.83
In contrast to the oil nationalization, the aspiration of national control
through Mexicanization did not entail isolation from foreign investors or markets.
Mexicanization steered mineral resources toward domestic industries and
emphasized their rational exploitation, but participation in international markets
and cooperation with foreign investors remained essential to internal
development. Exports comprised a key facet of development, critical to securing
and strengthening the country’s economic independence. No longer, however,
would these exports consist of raw mineral resources, but would consist of
manufactured goods with added value. The revenue from exports would
reinforce the benefits of Mexicanization through increased employment, wages,
and long-term economic stability. Thus, the nationalist orientation of
Mexicanization included a definitive, outward orientation, and represented a key
factor in nurturing resiliency against international market forces and foreign
investors. Mexicans wanted the “equitable cooperation with foreign capital as
complementary to that of Mexican [capital].”84 According to these views, national
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sovereignty would be achieved and strengthened by maintaining ties to foreign
investors and working within the international system.
Despite the participation of foreign investors, government officials
presented Mexicanization as a step toward economic independence that would
promote national interests. After the Mexicanization of the CMC, President
Echeverría proclaimed, “mining development is subordinated to the general
interest of the nation.”85 With sovereign control of resources, Mexico would no
longer be at the mercy of foreign suppliers. The President claimed that the
outward and irreversible flow of resources and profits would be halted and
redirected for the Mexican economy.86 Director of Nacional Financiera,
Guillermo Martinez Domíngez defended state intervention by citing the
“imperative of national sovereignty” to transform the company’s purpose toward
domestic industries, the creation of jobs, and the preservation of the social
order.87 Thus, parastate enterprises embodied national sovereignty and
guaranteed that the conservation and exploitation of mineral resources would
benefit the Mexican people. Economic development would not just increase
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GDP and wealth but extend to all aspects of Mexican society for “the adequate
redistribution of national income.”88
The recovery of mineral resources was more than the accumulation of
wealth: it also represented the recovery of national patrimony and pride. Luis de
la Peña Porth, undersecretary of SEPANAL, claimed that control of the
Compañía Minera de Cananea was the final step in regaining Mexico’s mineral
wealth. Once completed, the mining industry can begin to progress “with the
support of the entire people, owner of our resources, we expect to increase our
patrimony.”89 Sovereign control over natural resources became a source of
national pride, a nationalist purification that began to erase the ignominy and
humiliation of Porfirismo, and provide the foundation for Mexico to affirm its own
destiny and establish political independence, according to Senator Enrique
Olivares Santana.90 For the political leaders of the country, sovereign control of
resources conveyed associations beyond the purely economic realm and
included notions of justice, sovereignty, dignity, autonomy, individual and national
self-realization. President López Mateos appealed to the exploitation of copper
as the cultivation of the nation's patrimony: “Our prosperity must support the
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harmonic employment of our natural, human, technical, and financial resources,
to create an abundance that strengthens and integrates a healthy economy,
elevates human life, and assures the independent and sovereignty existence of
the nation.”91
Although Mexicanization affirmed national control, the role to be played by
workers would be passive and indirect. There would be no decision-making or
control of the workplace by workers. The social ends of the policy would be
accomplished by providing employment. Mexicanization would strengthen and
secure employment by implementing policies focused on production.
Mexicanization also gave workers the opportunity to purchase shares and own
part of the company. Workers could make payments through regular paycheck
deductions over a period of “five years without interest and with rights to the
dividends.”92 Public opinion viewed employment as a means for private investors
to contribute to national well-being and allow workers “to participate in the
common patrimony.”93 Pedro Reyes Zuñiga, the local Secretary of Labor within
Section 65, criticized the effort because the number of shares purchaseable by
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workers (between 3% and 5.88%), represented no harm to the companies and
were a small portion compared to the majority position held by other
shareholders. Workers primarily became interested in the possibility of
ownership as a way to preserve employment.94 Despite their indirect and
passive role, editorialist Cesar Silva Rojas claimed otherwise, arguing that mine
workers were now “owners of their own advancement” and servants of the nation
since they would work “now to triple their production in the interest of Mexico.”95
After the Mexicanization of the CMC, President Echeverría appealed to
workers to subordinate their interests to those of the nation. He implored them
“to keep working with the intensity and patriotism as you have done until now” for
the purpose of reinforcing and strengthening “the economy of Mexico.”96 The
union leaders of Cananea accepted the challenge, and proclaimed, “we will keep
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working with patriotism in production. . . without sacrificing the workers.”97 Thus,
temporarily at least, Mexicanization mitigated labor radicalism and precluded
further calls for nationalization. According to President Echeverría, “The labor
movement has contributed vigorously to the growth of the economy, to the
nationalization of our natural resources, and to the achievements reached toward
social justice. Without their combative action the contemporary institutions of
Mexico would be incomprehensible.”98 Workers had previously played a direct
and participatory role in advancing the goal of national sovereignty. With national
sovereignty achieved, government officials expected workers to contribute as a
mere factor of production, subservient to national interests.99
For many, the Mexicanization of the CMC in 1971 was a moment that
signified the closure of a long historical process. The national mining union
published a full page letter in national newspapers praising President Echeverría
for having “accelerated the nationalist process that began, precisely in Cananea,
in the year 1906.”100 J. R. Gámez Terán wrote that that Echeverría’s
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administration “settled a debt yesterday with both the initiators of the Revolution
and organized syndicalism in Mexico.”101 The Mexicanization of Cananea cast
Echeverría in a more revolutionary light, and garnered comparisons with Lázaro
Cárdenas. The writers of 1906 described him as the leader of “a Revolutionary
government [who] signed in peace what those visionaries began with their
blood.”102 Mexicanization signified “the recovery of the dignity of a people, finally
liberating them from foreign tutelage, [and] initiating a new era for Cananea.”103
Government officials such as Horacio de la Peña described the
Mexicanization of the CMC as the achievement of total control of the mining
industry.104 During the legislative phase of Mexicanization, many editorials and
newspapers carefully distinguished Mexicanization from nationalization, but with
respect to Cananea in 1971, the differences were more often conflated.
Mexicanization was inaccurately referred to as nationalization, although it more
accurately corresponded to a termination of majority foreign ownership rather
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than the total exclusion of foreign participation.105 The national mining union
expressed its satisfaction that Mexicanization had achieved “the full economic
independence of our country.”106 For President Echeverría the control of the
Compañía Minera de Cananea could be added to the list of historical
accomplishments achieved by the Mexican nation – independence, the Reforma,
the revolution, and the oil nationalization.107 One editorialist asserted that the
country's mines were “now almost totally ours.”108 Yet the subtle distinction
remains: the completion of Mexicanization truly meant that the mining industry
had come under the majority control of Mexican capital, nothing less, nothing
more.109 Foreign companies, like Anaconda, still retained 49% of the ownership
in the Compañía Minera de Cananea and in other mining ventures too.
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Conclusion
The Mexicanization of Compañía Minera de Cananea in 1971 granted
Mexico full sovereign control of its mineral resources after nearly 500 years of
foreign exploitation. As with the oil industry and then with mining, the securing of
these resources by the state rested upon the activism of the working class, which
became inscribed in Mexican history as a nationalist, anti-imperialist force.
Government officials presented workers’ struggles as part of a larger nationalist
struggle, but workers’ aspirations were rather different. For oil workers in 1938,
and copper miners in both Chile and Cananea, sovereign control of resources
emerged as “a way to guarantee their own political and economic sovereignty.”110
With the Mexicanization of mining, it became clear that it was the securing of the
nation's sovereignty that had been achieved. Despite its contributions, the
Mexican working class was no longer to participate in direct political action but to
contribute indirectly by working for the benefit of the nation. Cárdenas had
established a narrative whereby the Mexican state embodied the general will and
national sovereignty over natural resources would be used to advance the social
well-being of the Mexican people. Labor willingly became subservient to the
Mexican state as it imposed control over the working class. While the takeover of
the Compañía Minera de Cananea represented a nationalist victory, it
represented the victory of conservative forces, against the social ideals of the
Mexican Revolution and of revolutionary nationalism.
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CHAPTER IV
The Compañía Minera de Cananea, 1971-1989

President Luis Echeverría and others claimed that the Mexicanization of
the Compañía Minera de Cananea (CMC) meant the achievement of Mexico’s
national sovereignty over its mineral resources. It represented the culmination of
a struggle that began in the 1906 strike, continued through the Mexican
Revolution, and persisted until 1971. The Mexicanization of the CMC was
heralded as the total control of Mexico’s mineral resources by the Mexican state
and its achievement of “full economic independence.”1 A review of the company
after its Mexicanization reveals a more complicated situation. In contrast to the
nationalization of the oil industry, Mexicanization maintained the participation of
foreign investors in the mining industry. Therefore, claims that it was equivalent
to full sovereignty were but mere (and hyperbolic!) cultural constructs.
The literature on the Mexicanization of the CMC largely focuses on the
relationship between domestic private capitalists, foreign investors, and the
Mexican state. Juan Luis Sariego, the most prolific scholar on the topic, argued
that Mexicanization altered the monopoly character of the mining industry and
introduced two new actors: the state and the private sector. Mexicanization also
extended the participation of the Mexican state into the broader governance of
Mexico, dismantling the “socio-economic imperial arrangement” of the enclave, in
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which labor and the company had been the main components.2 In the process,
the state increasingly became the mediator of labor’s interests, weakening the
latter’s strength and legitimacy. Finally, one segment of the literature
alternatively suggests that foreign investors benefited more than they suffered
from Mexicanization and were able to use it to their own advantage, extending
new forms of control and dependence that were more effective than direct
methods of exploitation. The nationalist rhetoric of Mexicanization thus obscured
the complex interactions between national and foreign entities.3
This chapter continues this study's focus on discourses and culture. But
to provide a grounded material foundation for this cultural approach, I examine
some of the issues and concerns of business history. This field has focused on
the “historical evolution of business systems, entrepreneurs, and firms, as well as
their interaction with their political, economic, and social environment.”4
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Historians of business in Latin America have examined the social organization
and relationships among business elites and, those dealing with Mexico, have
examined the role of the Mexican state as an industrial entrepreneur.5 All of
these inquires acquire a special character when considering foreign enterprises
as agents of imperialism and foreign investment as its primary means.6
Sources related to the business history of the CMC between 1971 and
1989 were limited by a number of factors. The Archivo Legal de la CMC and the
Archivo Laboral de la CMC were both destroyed in a fire in 2007. The papers of
president Luis Echeverría (1970-1976), whom argued that the Mexicanization of
the CMC represented the achievement of national sovereignty and “full economic
independence” with respect to mineral resources, remain disordered and
disorganized at the Archivo General de la Nación due to lack of funding.
The evaluation of Mexicanization as a successful venture requires
analyzing the consequences in terms of both elite and popular national interests.
Mexicanization succeeded in turning over decades of full foreign control and
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permitted the entry of Mexican capitalists into the mining industry by transferring
majority ownership to Mexican shareholders. Yet, the majority capital
requirement offered more of an image of nationalist control while in actuality the
company retained multiple connections with foreign investors that cultivated more
effective forms of dependence. No longer, however, did foreign participation in
the Mexican economy necessarily signify a failure to achieve national sovereignty
neither did it cause immediate economic stress. It actually prevented problems
associated with the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938. In addition, the
Mexicanization of the CMC provided an infusion of state resources, while
expansion and modernization programs improved production and promoted the
integration of the mining industry.
Meanwhile, workers in Cananea expected the national control of
resources to increase their well-being, through greater control of their economic
and working lives. Instead of increased financial security and participation in
work processes, workers continued to endure harsh working conditions,
negligent managers, and job discrimination. Government discourses justified
these realities in a number of ways. First, they wove an alternative narrative of
success by focusing on economic indicators such as the improvements to
productivity and efficiency as a result of expansion and modernization projects.
Second, government officials encouraged employees by making appeals to the
Mexican nation. By making appeals to the national interest, workers were
expected to sacrifice and defer their own interests and well-being on behalf of the
Mexican nation. Through workers' perseverance and hard work, the
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improvements to the company and to the national economy would eventually
reach down to the workers. As the expectations of state sovereignty in mining
diverged from workers' experience, the identification of labor and the Mexican
nation, cultivated by the myth of Cananea, began to break down. This chapter
demonstrates the breakdown of the social dimensions of economic norms and
practices. This occurred because of the pursuit of new understandings of national
sovereignty and revolutionary nationalism whereby naked economic (profit)
criteria ruled supreme.
This chapter examines the achievement of national sovereignty embodied
in the company in Cananea and examines the meaning of national sovereignty
as it concerned workers. The first section examines questions related to the
business aspect of the CMC. It examines the changes in the company's
ownership as a result of Mexicanization. The second half of the chapter traces
the experience of Cananea's mine workers from 1971 to 1989. This section
demonstrates the continuity of labor relations as ownership changed from foreign
to Mexican ownership. It examines the expectations and the results of
Mexicanization with respect to funding, modernization, changes in the nature of
work, and the growing disillusion with Mexicanization as a fulfillment of the
Mexican Revolution.

Compañía Minera de Cananea: Ownership Structure
When Mexicanization altered the ownership structure of the CMC, the
company adopted the form of a parastate enterprise. The new parastate
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enterprise emerged as the material embodiment of national sovereignty.
Preceded by fiscal, legal, and constitutional reforms, parastate enterprises
constituted the final strategy to recover control over the nation’s mineral
resources. Whereas nationalized industries such as the oil industry were wholly
owned and administered by the state, mining companies that had undergone
Mexicanization often retained foreign participation. According to Dag MacLeod,
parastate enterprises lacked a formal definition, but have been generally
understood as a type of enterprise "that cooperate[s] with the state without
forming part of its administration."7 In contrast to the public sector, which
includes “administrative managerial government services at the level of
municipalities, states, and federal government,” the parastate sector focused on
industry including petroleum, mining, manufacturing, communications, banks,
airlines, and railroads, among others.8 By 1970, the largest and most
economically significant enterprises had been integrated into the parastate sector
with the exception of the CMC.9 The presidency of Luis Echeverría witnessed a
dramatic increase of this sector, numbering 87 in 1970 and increasing to 493 in
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1975. In 1981, a few years after he left office, the number of parastate
enterprises reached a peak of 1,155 firms. As for mining specifically, by 1980,
the state-owned equity in 48 mining companies, 29 in which it held a majority
stake. In 19 others, including Cananea, the state was in a minority position.10
The development of parastate enterprises had to negotiate three main
challenges. The first challenge focused on social and popular needs. A large
portion of parastate enterprises originated as foreign companies whose
insolvency threatened jobs and social stability. The involvement of the state
increased the viability of these companies, increased employment, and improved
the control of labor by introducing the state as a mediator of labor’s struggles.
The second challenge involved domestic capitalists. A historically weak sector,
parastate enterprises encouraged the participation of the private sector in
industries that required large amounts of capital for risky, long-term endeavors,
and which provided cheaper inputs for domestic industry. The third challenge
focused on preserving the relationship with foreign investors, ties to the global
market and access to financing and technology.11
Parastate enterprises also emerged in contrast to multinational and
transnational corporations, which increasingly became a concern in the 1960s

10

Homero Urías, “¿Quien Controla la Minería Mexicana?” Comercio Exterior 30, no. 9
(September 1980): 957.

11

Cypher, State and Capital, 98; Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: PostRevolutionary Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University, 1982), 95-96; Alejandro Carrillo Castro
and Sergio García Ramírez, Las Empresas Públicas en México (México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa,
1983), xi; Homero Urías, “¿Quien Controla la Minería Mexicana?” Comercio Exterior 30, no. 9
(September 1980): 957.

149

and 1970s as a new form of imperialism. These large corporations commanded
such economic resources that they were permitted to act as virtual states with
their own autonomy and sovereignty. The denomination "multinational" implied
the existence of entities without territorial attachment, allowing them to evade
responsibility for their conduct of business. Yet, multinationals remained closely
affiliated to their countries of origin and often expressed the interests of their
home countries. Their size and power meant they were able to pressure and
influence developing countries, whose economic needs made them vulnerable to
political manipulation. Thus, multinational corporations emerged as a new
imperialist threat to the sovereignty of Mexico and other Latin American
nations.12 In contrast, parastate enterprises became the embodiment of national
sovereignty during this period. Yet, their nationalist veneer concealed the
encroachment of foreign capital, a source of dependence and control, in subtler
ways.
The Mexicanization of the CMC altered the foreign ownership of the
company, nearly unchanged since its founding. As examined in the first chapter,
William C. Greene had established an operating company based in Mexico on
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September 30, 1899, the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, and a
holding company, the Greene Consolidated Copper Company, on Feb. 10, 1900,
based in West Virginia. After the 1906 strike, Greene partnered with Thomas F.
Cole and John D. Ryan, associated with the Amalgamated Copper Company,
with whom he formed the Greene Cananea Copper Company. The takeover of
Greene's companies by Amalgamated Copper was completed in February 1907
after Greene was voted off the board of directors. In 1917, the Amalgamated
Copper Company was dissolved and its subsidiary the Anaconda Copper
Company, came into possession of Greene's former companies. The Cananea
Consolidated Copper Company changed its name to the Compañía Minera de
Cananea in 1961 but remained under the control of the Greene Cananea Copper
Company as a subsidiary of Anaconda until 1971.13
When President Adolfo López Mateos signed the Mexicanization of mining
into law in 1961, the Mexican state began to loosen the monopolization of the
industry by foreign investors since the beginning of the century. Mexicanization
transformed the CMC into a hybrid entity that preserved foreign enterprise while
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introducing the Mexican state and private capital. Anaconda sold 51% of its
owning shares to Mexican buyers, and retained 49% through its subsidiary, the
Greene Cananea Copper Company. At the time of its announcement, the
Mexican ownership of the CMC was divided among two government entities –
the Comisión de Fomento Minero (13%) and Nacional Financiera (13%) – and
two private entities – Cobre de México (5%) and Banco Nacional de México
(5%). Twelve percent of the company went on sale to private shareholders. The
remaining three percent was placed in a trust managed by the Banco Nacional
de México for sale to employees and workers of the CMC.14
Established in 1934, the Comisión de Fomento Minero (CFM), that as
indicated above possessed 13% of Cananea’s equity shares, was tasked with
providing technical assistance and financing for small- and medium-sized mining
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enterprises. In 1976, The CFM owned equity shares in 32 companies related to
mining.15
The Cobre de México, S.A. was established in 1943 for the purpose of
refining blister copper and became the first refinery with the capacity for
electrolytic processing. This constituted the first major step toward the
integration of the copper industry and the satisfaction of domestic industrial
needs. This effort toward integration initially failed because the two major
producers of copper, including the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company,
sent blister copper for refining to the United States. This changed after
Anaconda bought a 25% stake in Cobre de México. Thereafter, Cananea
redirected all of its production there for refining and sale.16
The main private owner of the CMC was the Banco Nacional de México.
Although it only owned 5% of the company’s shares, it wielded a disproportional
amount of influence. The oldest private bank in Mexico, Banamex was one of the
main institutions that comprised the financial oligarchy based in Mexico City. In
the 1970s, it owned shares in more than one hundred companies. Only in twenty
of these did it have majority ownership, but its executives wielded vast influence
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through their membership on the boards of dozens of these companies.17 Due to
its financial resources and participation in the administration of large industrial,
commercial, and service enterprises, Banamex “occupied a hegemonic position
in the economic structure as a whole.”18 It was able to influence both the
direction of financial and economic policy, and the appointments to public
institutions including the Bank of Mexico and Nacional Financiera.19 One
outstanding feature of the Banco Nacional de México, is the “strong majority
participation of North American transnational enterprises in its capital, its
direction, and its financing."20 The interests of Banamex often aligned with the
interests of foreign investors and both shaped the Mexican economy through the
efforts of the bank's chairman of the Board of Directors, Agustin F. Legorreta,
who also served on the board of directors of the Banco de México and the
CMC.21
Among Cananea’s various owners, Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA)
emerged as the most important government institution. It was initially formed in
1934 as part of an effort to construct viable government institutions for the longterm promotion of the country’s political stability and economic recovery after the
Mexican Revolution and Great Depression. Initially formed as an agrarian bank,
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it was restructured in 1940 to become the primary institution for the financing of
industrialization. NAFINSA became the primary intermediary in the negotiation
and acquisition of international loans for public and private enterprises in
Mexico.22 It fostered the development of economic activities with “linkage
effects," promoting new and existing firms for the purpose of integrating the
industrial process within Mexico.23 The acquisition of the CMC more closely
integrated the company with properties in which NAFINSA also had possession.
In this way, NAFINSA participated in every process associated with copper
mining. The CMC became more closely integrated with Cobre de México, which
refined electrolytic copper and sold blister copper to two major manufacturers of
copper products, Industrias Nacobre, S.A. and Condumex, S.A.24
The board of directors of Nacional Financiera consisted of seven
members. Three of these positions were populated by the heads of the
Secretaries of the Treasury, National Patrimony, and Industry and Commerce.
NAFINSA’s president and general manager was a board member of the Bank of
Mexico and other corporations in which NAFINSA possessed majority and
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minority equity shares in industries related to “finance, manufacturing, mining,
petroleum, and public utilities.”25 Ownership by NAFINSA often provided
membership to the company’s board of directors. In this way, NAFINSA became
“a means for protecting a significant creditor or minority-ownership position, or a
means for voicing the official interest of the federal government."26 In 1970,
Nafinsa possessed equity in 113 companies.27 Nafinsa’s participation in the
economic development in Mexico, made it more influential than any private
sector group.
Mexicanization drastically reduced Anaconda’s ownership of the CMC, but
the change in ownership belied the extent of Anaconda’s influence in Mexico.
Anaconda retained 49% of the enterprise through its subsidiary, the Greene
Cananea Copper Company, making Anaconda the single largest possessor of
equity shares in contrast to the dispersed nature of Mexican holdings. For
Anaconda’s executives, compliance with the Mexicanization Law emerged as a
practical business strategy, promising tax reductions of 50 to 100% on
production, export, import, revenue, and surveying for five years.28 Anaconda
also possessed significant holdings in complementary firms including Cobre de
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México, Industrias Nacobre S.A. (40%), and Condumex S.A. (23.2%). By
retaining ownership in the CMC and these associated companies, Anaconda
possessed equity in all aspects of copper production in Mexico – extraction,
refining, fabrication, and sales.29 With Mexicanization, companies like Anaconda
persisted as a significant force in the Mexican economy despite losing majority
ownership in its many enterprises.
In 1960, Eduardo Bustamente claimed that Mexicanization would integrate
mining into the industrialization and economic development of Mexico. After the
company’s new shareholders received formal control on November 15, 1971,
they installed a new board of directors to begin this process.30 A number of
American managers were demoted and reassigned to new positions. Robert C.
Weed, the executive president and general manager of the CMC, became
president of the Primary Metals Division of the Anaconda Company. William A.
Humphrey, executive vice president and general manager of the CMC, was put
in charge of mining and metalurgical operations.31 Americans continued to hold
director positions. In turn, Mexican officials populated the board of directors of
the company. Eduardo López Prieto was elected the company’s first chairman
and director general and charged with the responsibilities of executive
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president.32 In 1960, López Prieto had been the most strident opponent of the
Mexicanization law as a defender of foreign interests. Ten years later, he took
on the duty “to carry out the integral Mexicanization of the company.”33 While
serving as the CMC's chairman, López Prieto also held leadership positions on
the board of directors of other companies including Condumex, S.A.34
Parastate enterprises emerged to assert state control over the industry.
Typically, the control and oversight of parastate enterprises extended to three
government ministries: the Treasury, the Presidency, and the Secretary of
Energy, Mines and Parastate Industry (SEMIP). The CMC should have fallen
under the jurisdiction of SEMIP. Instead, Cananea reported its finances to
Nacional Financiera in quarterly meetings; operations and management
remained independent. Mark Eric Williams writes, "management consistently
tried to avoid the attention of central authorities. It chose not to establish a public
relations department, rarely issued news briefs, and seldom accepted calls from
bureaucrats in Mexico City.”35 And so, the CMC emerged as the most
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autonomous of parastate enterprises and operated more like a private enterprise
than a publicly-owned one.36
After decades of stagnation, Mexicanization brought an infusion of funds
into the mining industry. From 1973 to 1988, the Compañía Minera de Cananea
underwent three major expansion and modernization efforts. The first, from 1973
to 1976, included an investment of 1,800 million pesos in concentration, foundry,
and pits to elevate annual production to 70,000 tons of blister copper, at a
reported cost of $118 million. The second expansion, the “Basic Work Program,”
lasted from 1977 to 1980. During this project, expenditures on capital
improvements, the repayment of debt, and improvements of machinery sought to
increase production to 100,000 tons a year. Total costs eventually reached
$494.1 million (1,000 million pesos).37 At a billion dollars, the third and final
expansion project, from 1982 to 1988, became the “largest most expensive
public investment program” of the decade.38
Still, Mexicanization imposed significant costs on the company, and
placed it in debt to several international banks. Taking sovereign control of the
company itself, first required the purchase of Anaconda’s holdings at a cost of
$24,000,000, with an additional “liquidating dividend” of $30,000,000, which
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forced the company to take a loan from Chase Manhattan Bank and First
National City Bank. After the first expansion, the CMC possessed credit and
loans from Citibank, Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of America, International
Mexican Bank, Arizona Bank, Chemical Bank International of Chicago, Nacional
Financiera, and Banamex. The second expansion was funded by the American
Express Bank, Dresdner Bank, A.G., Bank of Montreal, Citicorp International
Group, and Continental Illinois Limited.39 Funding for the third expansion was
mediated by the Secretary of Treasury and NAFINSA for financing and
machinery. By 1987, the CMC held loans with at least fourteen foreign banks
and three domestic banks.40
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Mexicanization represented, at least in theory, the strongest assertion of
national sovereignty over the nation’s mineral resources. José Campillo Saínz,
sub-secretary of Industry and Commerce, claimed that the policy of
Mexicanization had increased the participation of Mexican capital in the mining
industry.41 The establishment of majority control by Mexican nationals, however,
did not forbid the involvement of foreign capital. Mexico relied heavily on
external sources of funding, technology, and sales. So, although foreign
investors seemed to have lost control of the company after the change in
ownership, they continued to exert control over the mining industry, creating new
forms of dependency that were more effective and subtler.42 Mexicanization thus
provided more the rhetoric of nationalist control more than its reality.

Workers' Experience
After the Mexicanization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea, workers
expected national control of resources to bring greater control of their economic
and working lives. As these promises gave way to a harsher reality, government
discourses justified these realities in a number of ways. First, the success of
Mexicanization was measured by economic indicators, such as productivity and
efficiency rather than the well-being of workers. Second, the complaints of
workers were met by appeals to the national interest, and told to sacrifice
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themselves for the national interest, for deferred gains. For the economic wellbeing of the nation, workers were to inhabit a passive and subservient role within
the Mexican economy. The health of the company and the national economy
increasingly stood in for the social well-being of the workers.
The acquisition of the CMC allegedly completed the recovery of the
country’s national sovereignty, and expectations for the mining industry and for
copper mining soared. The infusion of state support in material and financial
terms generated enthusiasm and optimism among many sectors of Mexican
society. State intervention became critical in the revival of the mining industry,
channeling funds into the mining industry and fueling multiple expansion projects.
The infusion of funding helped to revive defunct companies, provide employment,
and strengthen industrial stability, which in turn increased investments. The state
promoted the rational use of natural resources and controlled prices for the
benefit of domestic producers. In turn, these investments strengthened the
mining industry making it a sounder proposal for investments from private
sources. The Mexicanization of Cananea also eliminated a key obstacle to
industrial development by providing a steady supply of copper to the electrical
and metalworking industries, two of the nation’s most productive industries since
their formation in the 1940s.43
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National control of the mining industry promised economic gain. On the
eve of Cananea’s Mexicanization, Echeverría announced a total of 58 million
tons of copper in reserve. Annual production by it sat at 42,000 tons annually,
and the company produced 60% of the nation’s copper supply. In 1972,
President Echeverría announced an investment of 8 billion pesos to fund
fourteen projects with the goal of doubling the total production of the mining
industry. Cananea received nearly a tenth of this amount. Its first expansion
began with an initial investment of 93 million pesos and eventually reached a
total of 750 million pesos. In its first year as a Mexicanized company, Cananea
achieved records in production, sales, and revenue. Horacio Flores de la Peña,
Secretary of National Patrimony, announced “sales of 635 millones de pesos,
representing an income 36% above the previous year, generating a net profit. . .
of 91 millon 500 thousand pesos (91,500,000).”44 Governor Alejandro Carrillo
Marcor announced that Sonora was poised to become the primary mining state
in the country and transform Mexico into “one of the largest producers of copper
in the world.”45 At the conclusion of Cananea’s first expansion in 1976, President
Echeverría claimed that copper reserves reached 1,600 million tons and would
guarantee a supply of the metal for more than a hundred years. Annual
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production increased to 75,000 tons a year, representing 80% of the nation’s
copper output.46
Supporters of Mexicanization claimed that participation with foreign capital
strengthened national sovereignty. Workers recognized that Anaconda and other
firms associated with the Compañía Minera de Cananea derived numerous
advantages from Mexicanization.47 These included easier access to financing,
tax reductions, access to “a captive market, access to technology, and easy
repatriation of its capital, in addition to the use of cheap inputs.”48 This differed
sharply from the nationalization of the oil industry by Cárdenas, which had
entirely excluded foreign participation in that sector, leading to a boycott, and
causing significant economic and political crises. With respect to Mexicanization,
claims of sovereign control of mineral resources rested solely on the basis of
majority ownership in mining firms. With the CMC, one foreign company owned
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nearly half of the company; over four different entities comprised the Mexican
portion. Claims of national control thus appeared weak.
Mexicanization achieved economic independence through the
participation of foreign investors but on terms beneficial to Mexico. As in the
colonial and Porfirian eras, foreign investment was seen as critical to the
economic development of Mexico. Juan Guillermo Becker Arreloa, a sub-director
of the Secretary of Industry and Commerce, argued that true economic
independence required foreign participation, but not in its traditional role as an
imperialist. With Mexicanization, the CMC was “no longer a company serving
transnationals.”49 Instead, foreign investors were expected to work in
cooperation with Mexican firms in order to advance Mexican interests. According
to an article in El Nacional, success had already been achieved:
The association of national and foreign capital has produced better
knowledge and mutual respect and has permitted to combine the
techniques of the companies coming from the exterior with the knowledge
of the market, of the laws, the uses, the customs and traditions of the
Mexican people.50
The earning of profits remained a legitimate pursuit, but foreign investors were
expected to associate with Mexican companies on a minority basis, promote the
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hiring and training of Mexican nationals, and comply with the laws that protected
national sovereignty.51
President Echeverría presented foreign investment as a complement to
revolutionary nationalism. His efforts were praised for advancing the national
interest and implementing durable policies meant to bring lasting change. And
for this, he was celebrated as one of the country’s most revolutionary presidents,
following Lázaro Cárdenas and Adolfo López Mateos.52 One writer in El
Nacional argued that Cananea demonstrated Echeverría’s political shrewdness
and pragmatism, by preserving foreign investments while expanding national
sovereignty. These policies, he contended, “are complementary and represented
a common expression: revolutionary nationalism.”53
The nationalization of Lázaro Cárdenas fundamentally linked national
sovereignty to a combined economic and social development. This economic
philosophy faded during the presidency of Miguel Alemán but reemerged with
Luis Echeverría. According to the President of the Congress of Labor and
Senator Carlos Jonguitud Barrios, the emphasis on economic growth as a
prerequisite to social justice always deferred the latter into the unreachable future
and preempted the social promises of the Mexican Revolution. This was not just

51

“La Inversión Nacional, la Inversión Extranjera y la Independencia Económica,” El Nacional,
February 11, 1973; “Tesis de México Sobre Inversiones Extranjeras,” El Nacional, October 15,
1972; Luis Cordova, “Defensa de Nuestra Independencia,” El Nacional, January 6, 1973.

52

“10 Millones de Trabajadores Rendirán Homenaje a Echeverría, el 1º de Mayo,” El Nacional,
April, 19, 1976; “Más de 5 Millones de Trabajadores Hicieron un Reconocimiento a la Labor de
Echevrría,” El Nacional, November 28, 1976.

53

“Palabra Cumplida (Cananea),” El Nacional, October 21, 1976.

166

an idealistic matter, but also a practical one. Wealth without equitable
distribution, he contended, created the “germ of violence.”54 State intervention,
as many recognized, had been essential to the growth and success of the private
sector in the industry. While President Echeverría expressed the need for a
strong entrepreneurial class, he insisted it be tempered by social considerations:
“We need a business class, but modern, nationalist, without a colonial mentality,
one that feels it must be truly creative, in the construction of a country.”55 A
company's success, he argued, had to be measured not only by its financial
success but also by its social ones.56
For workers, the achievement of national sovereignty and economic
independence offered promises of improved financial security. Workers thought
that Cananea’s historical legacy and its economic significance would bring them
and their city prosperity and greater control over their lives: “We thought. . . it
would be our city that would benefit the most, but we see with sadness that,
unfortunately, this is not the case.”57 Five years since the change in ownership,
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Luis Bojórquez pointed out that there had been no improvements for workers
who continued to endure the same burdens and mistreatment they had
experienced under foreign ownership.58 The most optimistic assessment claimed
that the company’s managers and administrators were negligent.59 More often,
poor treatment and labor abuses were considered deliberate and purposeful:
“their mentality was and keeps being in the majority of cases, a systematic
behavior against the worker.”60 The company’s transition from foreign ownership
to majority Mexican ownership failed to manifest goodwill toward Mexican
workers.61
The sale of ownership shares in the company promised worker
participation in the company. In August 1972, national and regional newspapers
announced the sale of 180,000 shares, or 3% of the company’s total shares, at
100 pesos each. Eduardo Prieto López, the company's director, indicated that
workers would be able to purchase shares worth up to three months’ salary,
payable over five years in monthly installments. These transactions were to be
conducted on the basis of individual contracts maintained by a trust managed by
Banco Nacional de México. These efforts toward “the democratization of capital.
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. . exclusively among Mexican investors” were celebrated as a remarkable
achievement.62 Workers were esteemed as participants in the company’s
ownership, control, management, and benefits equivalent to those of the
company’s private and public owners.63 The rhetoric of ownership and
participation, however, failed to match its reality.
The possibility of owning the company ultimately generated more
skepticism among workers than confidence. Writers in the union weekly pointed
out discrepancies in the number of shares for purchase: In a 1971 article
President Echeverría had indicated that 5.88% of the total shares would be
available to workers, while former executive president and general manager
Robert C. Weed claimed that this figure stood closer to 3%.64 Further confusing
the situation, Echeverría claimed that this total reached as high as 8% in 1976.65
In all cases, the number of shares available to workers comprised a small
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fraction of the company’s ownership, vastly outmatched by the preponderance of
government and private capital, nullifying any power the workers might gain
through their participation.66 The possibility of ownership masqueraded as
participation, yet real participation was negated by the small proportion of shares
made available to workers and the limited financial resources of workers to buy
them. Pedro Reyes Zuñiga, Secretary General de Trabajo from the national
mining union, suggested that the sale of shares obscured the reality of
management failures and worsening labor conditions.67
The most promising economic benefit afforded by Mexicanization was
employee profit sharing. Yet, almost as soon as it began, the company ended
the program in 1975 and it quickly became a source of recurring grievance.
Company managers and executives justified the change as necessary to recover
the costs of depreciating machinery used by workers. At first, the government
seemed willing to intervene on behalf of the workers. In November 1975, the
Finance Minister determined that the company had underreported its earnings
and failed to pay 8 million pesos out of a total 39 million pesos and determined
that $5000 pesos should be distributed to each worker. Two years later this
ruling was reversed, and the company received an official deferral in 1980.68
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Less than ten years after the acquisition of Cananea, employee profit sharing
had “become a myth.”69
Workers expected national sovereignty to improve financial security, but
instead, they suffered from indirect forms of exploitation. Wages were reduced
through inflation, taxes, and the high cost of living. Workers complained of an
unjustified increase in 1978 in the cost of essential goods which registered an
increase between 30% to 40%.70 Five years later, prices jumped by 300%,
reducing real wages and producing economic hardship and a strike in 1983.71
Wages were further reduced through excessive taxation. When tax withholdings
should have been closer to “200 or 300 pesos for the year,” the companies had
levied ten times the amount.72 These cuts were not a loss of luxury goods, but
constituted an existential harm perpetrated on workers and the well-being of their
families. Contrary to claims that workers were greedy, the workers were
concerned about survival. “We ask to live,” pleaded one writer.73 Jorge Acedo
Samaniego, leader of Section 65, described the threat posed by taxes as a
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“genocide that is being committed against our economy.”74 The national
sovereignty won by Mexicanization was that of national interests defined by the
government bureaucracy and private capital. Rather than advancing its own
interests, labor remained subservient to those of the nation.
Workers expected national control of resources to give them greater
control of work processes. President Echeverría claimed, “[t]he patrimony of
man and society is work.”75 Work as national patrimony, then, became
something inalienable and intrinsic, suggesting that it had more than pecurinary
value for the worker. Many expressed gratitude that nature had provided
subsistence to generations of workers and were proud to work the mines they
considered their heritage.76 They regarded the mines as an economic resource
that needed to be developed and exploited for the benefit of the community.77
One editorialist contested the notion of productivity as a purely accumulative
concept. He defined productivity “as a means to reconcile the requirements of
growth with those of social development, and it is evident that the latter is an
indispensable condition for obtaining a significant increase simultaneously with
the achievement of greater social welfare.”78 Efficency was defined as the use of
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“available resources to produce social wealth.”79 The purpose of economic
development was not the accumulation of goods but the human capacity to
improve “the existence and development of man in all its manifestations of
civilization and culture and affection for the ends of a society balanced in justice,
freedom, and law.”80 The exploitation of natural resources conveyed meanings
beyond purely economic purposes.
The mine workers in Cananea regarded themselves as having more
knowledge about their work than the experts employed by the company.
Managers and engineers were known as “cerebros” or “sabios” and considered
unparalleled in their knowledge and unchallengeable in their authority.81 Yet,
according to one writer in 1906, workers were the true experts of Cananea’s
mining operations. He argued that Mexicanization was supposed to have led to
greater control of work and the workplace, allowing skilled and knowledgeable
workers to actualize their know-how and experience. Such workers often found
ways to improve productivity and safety in ways that education could not provide.
One article relates how the death of a driller in the 1950s had resulted in new
regulations and rules limiting work on slopes after heavy rains. After
Mexicanization, the single-minded focus on productivity and production led to the
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quick replacement of workers, eliminating the voices of experience, leading to
circumstances in which the machines and the bodies of men were pushed
beyond repair. Although workers received most of the blame for the company’s
problems, the malfeasance of managers was often the true source of the
company’s problems.82
Veteran mine workers blamed the managers and employees hired by the
company as incompetent. The writers of 1906 mocked the expertise of
engineers and technicians who asserted their authority but lacked experience
and learned knowledge. They blamed them for the breakdown of machinery that
generated losses in the millions of pesos and often wrongfully attributed to
workers. In 1981, ten years after the Mexicanization of the CMC, the only
measurable accomplishment of those experts had been the “gradual
indebtedness” of the company. In 1985, administrators and managers were
characterized as provocateurs who enjoyed exacerbating labor relations. Cases
of mistreatment and labor abuses against confidential employees, engineers, and
managers rarely led to punishment. The penalties they suffered were light and
sometimes led to reassignment but never resulted in firing. Instead, blame was
often attributed to workers for the faults of their superiors.83
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Instead of a participatory role, Mexicanization ascribed to mine workers an
indirect and passive one. Echeverría celebrated labor’s accomplishments in his
annual address of 1973: “The workers movement has contributed vigorously to
the growth of the economy, to the nationalization of our natural resources and to
the achievements in social justice. Without their combative action the
contemporary institutions of Mexico would be inexplicable.”84 Workers were still
to participate in the economic development of the country but now they would
participate indirectly “through their parastate enterprises.”85 Workers would
contribute to the economic development of Mexico through their employment and
productivity. State control of mineral resources increased funding for expansion
and modernization projects but also helped to stabilize wages and increase
employment. By expanding employment, more Mexicans would contribute “to
the accelerated development of the country.”86 In this way, workers affirmed their
patriotism in the task of realizing the promises of Mexicanization and
consummating the Mexican Revolution.87
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Mine workers from Cananea, in particular, were relegated to a subordinate
position within the company. This became apparent in the use of confidential
employees. These non-unionized employees provided a flexible portion of the
work force and were often used to bypass and weaken the collective contract.
Some confidential employees started out in menial jobs and justified their hiring
by arguing that their employment did not reduce opportunities available to
unionized workers. But in some cases, they demanded the company pay them
according to the wage and promotion scale of the unionized workers. Others
took positions for which they were unqualified and were promoted despite their
low experience or ability. In doing so, they usurped "The right of seniority and
promtion [that] are the exclusive property of workers."88 These employees failed
to appreciate the contributions of labor to their own livelihood and harmed the
prospects of the entire workforce by eschewing union representation.89
In several cases, confidential employees emerged as the direct
antagonists of unionized workers. Some were accused of undermining morale
by acting as spies and spreading rumors about mine closures, personnel, and
hour reductions. Many were hired outside of Cananea and Mexico; from Chile,
Argentina, Spain, and were placed in positions of authority and management, like
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Juan Gallegos F. from Argentina who was accused of treating workers like
slaves. It was claimed that workers hired outside of Cananea were more likely to
treat workers harshly. Meanwhile, workers from Cananea were denied the
opportunity to reach management positions and were “condemned to serve. . .
only as day laborers.”90 The administration routinely cited fiscal problems to
deny promotions and benefits. Meanwhile, outsiders were hired for jobs for
which they were unqualified and paid exorbitantly; managers were seen driving
new cars and taking vacations. Company administrators also sought to divide
workers and prevent their unification against company interests. In one instance,
the company refused to disburse housing loans of 110-million-pesos a year –
provided for by the collective contract. Instead, the company constructed houses
and gave them to confidential workers in an effort that gained the support of the
state governor and Cananea’s municipal president but undermined the union’s
strength and authority as a representative and advocate for workers.91
The success of Mexicanization was increasingly determined not by its
ability to advance the well-being of the company's workers but on its economic
production. The details of the first expansion were published in “Obras de
Ampliación, 1973-1976,” a document produced by company management. This
pamphlet emphasized and celebrated the positive contributions of the expansión
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project, stressing the integration of the company. Expansion would also
strengthen Cananea’s integration into the domestic economy, by increasing the
availability of copper supplies for complementary industries. It would double
mining production by exploiting existing copper reserves, newly discovered veins,
and undiscovered sources of copper. The pamphlet detailed the improvements
made to facilities, processes, and infrastructure, and they improved the rational
use of mineral resources.92 The document described the changes as “a
collective effort of technicians, workers and officials,”93 which produced “a
multiplying effect on jobs, goods, and services.”94 It claimed as well that
Mexicanization “had substantially improved the salaries and benefits of its
workers” who enjoyed a higher standard of living indicated by rising ownership of
homes, automobiles, and household goods such as refrigerators and freezers.95
Finally, the pamphlet emphasized the general improvements made to the
Compañía Minera de Cananea, while white-washing the long, contentious history
of the mines.
The government heralded the increases of productivity and production, but
these had different implications for workers. First of all, apparently there truly
was no accompanying increase in workers’ livelihoods. Articles in the union
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weekly demonstrated that workers possessed their own meanings about the
nature of Mexicanization. They argued that Mexicanization was not equivalent to
the increase of productivity if it meant the intensification of work at the cost of
workers’ health.96 Workers had previously expressed their willingness to work
hard, out of a sense of patriotism and desire to advance the national interests of
Mexico. But this did not mean slavish compliance nor the sacrifice of their lives
and health, and they insisted on being treated with respect and dignity. Workers
scoffed at the campaign initiated by the company which distributed brochures on
the recent expansion and modernization efforts. While the pamphlet described
the changes as beneficial to the company, miners themselves argued that “for
the benefit of the worker there will be nothing.”97
New machinery increased worker productivity but it also changed the
nature of work. The introduction of new machinery and updated technology
transformed workers from skilled, autonomous laborers into unskilled, passive,
and interchangeable workers. As technicians, workers felt they were losing
control of their work as management failed to recognize them as human beings
rather than as interchangeable cogs. Managers were more concerned about
production, ignoring requests for maintenance and repairs which led to the
degradation of machinery and the deterioration of workers’ health, causing
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injuries and death, with repercussions beyond the individual, putting the
livelihoods of entire families in jeopardy.98
Before 1971, workers had viewed Mexicanization as a potential solution to
the problems created by the automation of mining processes. Instead,
consequences such as the loss of employment persisted as government officials
touted the increase of production for domestic industry. Workers remained wary
that new technology and machinery would create unemployment.99 The changes
that improved production were good for the company, national development, and
domestic industrialization efforts, but harmful to individual workers. Workers
rejected such progress if it came at the cost of “hunger and desolation.”100
Mexicanization also failed to decrease the occurrence of illness and death.
Despite millions invested in modernization, the company had failed to modernize
hygiene and safety measures and reduce the presence of incompetent doctors.
Company doctors were often the final arbiter in determining indemnities for
workers who had been injured or suffered death. Workers continued to suffer
from silicosis and other lung ailments which effectively eliminated any wage
increase and all manner of job security. The companies were unable to
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recognize its workers as human beings, lacked concern for their health, and
pushed them to the point of sickness and death. Against the hesitation and
failures of the company to pay indemnities for disability or death, workers
demanded immediate restitution and considered its denial “inhumane” since it not
only effected the worker but also his family.101 Expansion and increased
productivity might be good for the nation, but they could be physically harmful to
workers. Genuine and lasting increases in production would mean a safe work
space with the necessary equipment available to protect workers.102
Unfavorable working conditions were answered by appeals to make
sacrifices and hard work. More than a lack of effort, however, the problems
faced by workers were those created by managers. In some instances, workers
died from “the negligence to take safety measures that truly fulfill the function of
minimizing the occupational risks of workers.”103 Contract violations were the
fault of “complacency” by the company’s directors, including Emilio Ocampo
Arenal, who failed to assume “the minimum responsibility” in the company’s
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operations.104 Workers were expected to keep toiling, even while equipment
remained unrepaired.105
Instead of gaining control, workers increasingly lost control of working
conditions, and they increasingly lost the means to fight back. Mexicanization
increased the power of the national mining union but weakened the autonomy of
the local chapter in Cananea. After President López Mateos signed
Mexicanization into law, the national mining union made efforts to centralize and
consolidate its power, becoming more closely aligned with the state. As labor
decisions moved from the local to the national level, Section 65 lost much of its
autonomy. At the same time, the state increasingly acted as an intermediary for
labor because of its new involvement in the mining industry and its new role in
the administration of public services. As the company appeared to lose its
foreign character, union mobilization diminished. The presence of the state
helped suppress, in particular, protest arising from nationalist inspired
grievances. The mixed nature of the company’s ownership made it difficult to
locate a distinct antagonist for workers to protest against.106
As Mexicanization failed to realize its promises, workers' allegiance to the
Mexican nation began to weaken. As problems persisted, the leaders of Section
65 emphasized Cananea’s historical association with the larger narrative of

104

“C. Pdte. de la República Lic. Miguel de la Madrid, C Srio. del Trabajo Lic. Farrell Cubillas,”
1906, October 27, 1984.

105

“Grave Crisis en Compañía Minera,” 1906, August 14, 1982.

106

Sariego, Enclaves, 372-373, 388, 391-392 (in 1961).

182

Mexican history. Referring to one of the myths addressed in Chapter One,
Secretary General of Section 65, Jorge Acedo Samaniego, described the strike
of 1906 as a uniquely Mexican event. In his words, it was “pure as the snow on
the peaks, there was no demagogue, there were no foreign doctrines,” the
absence of which had lent a unique shape to the Mexican Revolution.107 The
strike of 1906 was often described as an eschatology, conjoining labor struggles
with nationalist ones: “the history of Cananea. . . is that of the revolution, that of
labor, that of redemption.”108 This historical association meant that the workers
of Cananea were dedicated “to the best national vanguard causes.”109 But, while
workers realized the need for industrialization and affirmed their patriotism, they
would not serve national interests unconditionally: they wanted just and equal
treatment, and demanded reciprocity from management and administrators,
particularly from the company’s Director General, Eduardo Prieto López.”110 In
1906, Rafael Sánchez Velázquez warned that workers had limits and would be
compelled to resume more direct forms of struggle if abuses persisted.111 During
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a meeting about workers’ bonuses, one manager exhorted workers to work hard
for the sake of work itself rather than for a pecuniary reward, declaring “We all
are the Company.” An editorialist responded with derision, claiming that workers
would work hard when they were paid adequately and no longer had trouble
feeding their families.112
Workers and citizens increasingly became disillusioned with the Mexican
government and the Compañía Minera de Cananea. Critics faulted the
government for appointing and tolerating administrators and managers who
continued to violate the collective contract. The high cost of goods and the
rationing of food in the wake of the debt crisis in 1982 eroded the legitimacy of
both the company and the municipality from the perspective of Cananea’s
workers and townspeople. Enthusiastic patriotism relented to calls for greater
vigilance and militancy. Secretary General Alberto Salcedo de Alto, of Section
65, reminded union members of their predecessors in 1906 and urged them to
protect the rights that had been won earlier, and to fight for future ones. The
state had failed to redeem Cananea’s historical legacy in its opposition to the
repressive policies of Porfirio Díaz and the imperialist ambitions of the United
States.113 Seventy-four years after the Mexican Revolution, what remained was
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a constitution and a government that could only claim “revolutionary pretensions,”
defunct for the majority of the population but successful in advancing the goals of
the elite.114
As disillusionment grew, the bonds of the nation grew weaker among the
workers in Cananea. Several writers emphasized the distance of Cananea “from
the Mexican social, cultural, and economic structure,” bridged only by “an
increasingly weak historical link," which had been damaged more and more by
persistent attacks on labor rights.115 One author described the 1917 Constitution
as a defunct law that perpetuates a historical fiction that there ever existed a
coherent Mexican nation served by a revolutionary state.116 Another writer
condemned the failures of decision-makers who resided far from Cananea, in
Mexico City, “where they devise thousands and thousands of solutions for the
equitable distribution of the riches of our vast land.”117 The concerns of Mexico
City were not the same as those in Cananea. Workers’ loyalty went neither to
the company, the state, the Mexican Revolution, nor the ideology of revolutionary
nationalism, but increasingly focused on the identity of the union itself, with an
emphasis on the local rather than national leadership.118
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As the promises of Mexicanization diverged from its reality, workers also
expressed their disillusion with the Mexican Revolution. Less than a decade
after the company’s change in ownership, the writers in 1906 lamented that “no
so-called “revolutionary” has taken the country out of poverty, no “plan of the
revolution” feeds us, nor does any revolutionary lead us, quite the opposite.”119
Despite Cananea’s mythical contributions to the revolution, the revolution had
provided no reciprocal benefits for Cananea. In 1981, there existed “no
guarantee of the right to health, medical assistance, nor the protection of the
means of subsistence for a large part of the population.”120 The murals and
monuments celebrating Mexico’s revolutionary past had “degenerated into
marketing.”121 The corruption of revolutionary ideals and proclamations of
revolutionary achievements encouraged workers to view the Mexican Revolution
as myth instead of reality. One author, in 1984, argued that it was best to
dispense with the myth of the Mexican Revolution, that the state would work on
behalf of revolutionary principles, and that the achievement of national
sovereignty had meant greater well-being for Mexicans. Preserving faith in a
mythical revolution created a dependency that hindered active struggle. Only
once ending that myth, could the struggle begin for the “justice and social wellbeing for all Mexicans.”122
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Conclusion
From 1971 to 1989, the Compañía Minera de Cananea embodied national
sovereignty in the form of a parastate enterprise. The change in the company’s
ownership was as an assertion of total control of the mining industry, but the
concrete gains were limited to those made by elites. Mexicanization succeeded
in changing the monopoly character of mining and permitted the entry of the
Mexican private sector into the mining industry. Government discourse asserted
that foreign participation would strengthen national sovereignty. Instead, it
established new forms of dependence. The fear that multinational corporations
propagated imperialism in more covert ways belied the subtler penetration of
foreign capital within parastate enterprises. By late 1980, Homero Urías argued
that Mexicanization had succeeded in reorienting the mining industry toward
domestic needs but had truly failed to gain control of mineral resources and
remained subject to the vicissitudes of the global market.123
Mexicanization promised the achievement of national sovereignty, and the
control of natural resources for the well-being of the Mexican people. With
national control of resources, workers expected greater control of their economic
and working lives. Instead, they experienced much the same conditions as
before. The success of Mexicanization revealed itself in modernization projects
and measured by production increases. Workers were told to sacrifice their
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interests for national interests. What was good for the nation was good for them.
As the expectations of Mexicanization diverged from workers' experience, the
identification of labor and the Mexican nation, which had long been nurtured by
the myth of Cananea, began to break down. After a long period of labor
dormancy, the first strike in twenty years occurred in 1979, followed by strikes in
1981, 1983, and 1984. Any convergence between the workers of Cananea and
the revolutionary state had disappeared by the mid-1980s, and the bonds of the
nation weakened as workers returned to struggle.124
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CHAPTER V
The Privatization of Compañía Minera de Cananea, 1989

After centuries of foreign exploitation, the policy of Mexicanization meant
sovereign control of mineral resources in Cananea. But less than two decades
later, the Compañía Minera de Cananea was privatized by the administration of
Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) during his first year of office. In the early morning
hours of August 20, 1989, the company was declared bankrupt and thousands of
federal soldiers occupied its installations. For the next three months, the mines
remained closed but on a daily basis generated national controversy and protest,
largely as a result of Cananea's historical symbolism. At the same time, the
controversies that erupted in Cananea were emblematic of larger structural
changes in the country resulting from neoliberalism and privatization policies
introduced at the beginning of the decade. The events brought about an abrupt
end to a company more closely associated in the collective imaginary than any
other with the Mexican Revolution.
With the exception of Petroleos Mexicanos, President Carlos Salinas had
targeted the most historically symbolic parastate enterprise in the country
through aggressive means. His ultimate success required the renegotiation of
cultural myths associated with Cananea. The previous chapters of this
dissertation have examined how the myth of Cananea fundamentally shaped the
discourse of Mexican national sovereignty by establishing a connection between
labor and the Mexican nation, providing legitimacy to the new revolutionary state,
and by including labor into the corporatist structure of the ruling party. While the
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relationship between the Mexican state and labor had been cultivated for
decades, the Salinas administration sought to destroy it.
The administration of Carlos Salinas sought to reorganize Mexican
society, by eliminating the traditional connection between the working class and
the nation. Where revolutionary nationalism emerged as the backbone of the
predominant mode of accumulation throughout the twentieth century, it was
replaced by neoliberalism toward the century's end. The main impediment to
change, however, resided in labor, which had become an intrinsic part of the
state's legitimacy since the Mexican Revolution, forged, in part, by the myth of
Cananea. As revolutionary ideals increasingly diverged from reality in the
second half of the twentieth century, the role of labor became less a means of
legitimacy and more a source of contestation. So, when the privatization of the
Compañía Minera de Cananea became a possibility in the late 1980s, labor
protested the move as a threat to national sovereignty and the Mexican
Revolution itself. The key challenge of privatization, then, involved the
elimination of labor’s larger association with the Mexican nation.1 Neoliberalism
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and privatization eroded the key elements of revolutionary nationalism in Mexico
and thus represented, "the first major hegemonic shift since the Revolution. . .
perceived as an attempt to dismantle the Revolution, displacing its political
symbolism."2 Central to this shift was the displacement of labor within the
Mexican nation.
In this chapter, the privatization of the Compañía Minera de Cananea
represents the fruition of a long-term effort to eliminate the social goals of the
Mexican Revolution. This proceeded by dismantling the connection between
labor and the Mexican nation. Some in Mexico, in particular segments of the
ruling elite, considered the multiple efforts by the state to impose control over
natural resources throughout the twentieth century to be proof of socialist or
communist influences. But if one goes back in time, from the beginning, a more
radical measure such as the takeover of the oil industry, for instance, was rather
a move that rather than undermining it strengthened capitalism. The policy of
Mexicanization, in turn, more clearly prioritized market forces over social issues,
but even then, labor retained institutional representation and a key role in stateand nation-building. The goal of Salinas, then, was to eliminate all social
considerations from economic policies and remove all forms of institutional
representation of workers. Salinas redefined national sovereignty so that the
social well-being of workers was no longer an issue. Only financial health and
sound business practice would matter.
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This chapter focuses on the association of Cananea with the working
class, the nation, and the Mexican Revolution, and the attempts by the
administration of Carlos Salinas (1982-1987) to deconstruct this association. It
briefly examines the events that began on August 20, 1989, the declaration of
bankruptcy and the military occupation, collectively referred to as the big Sunday
or “domingazo.” The bulk of the chapter examines debates on the causes of
bankruptcy and popular concerns of the bankruptcy’s implications with respect to
labor, national sovereignty, and the Mexican Revolution. These debates were
collected from a number of, specially, regional, and national and regional
newspapers, emphasizing the voices of journalists and politicians.
Many of the newspapers published articles by intellectuals across the ideological
spectrum. Newspapers that leaned left and were in the favor of Cananea's
workers included El Sonorense, La Jornada, Unomásuno; centrist newspapers
included El Universal and Excélsior; those reliably conservative included El
Nacional and El Economista. 1906, the weekly union newspaper published by
Section 65, remained out of print during this period. This chapter concludes by
examining the attachment of new meanings to both national sovereignty and
modernization.
Background
Social and economic problems had been simmering for a long time in
Mexico but the debt crisis in 1982 provided the impetus toward national
transformation. Economic decline and recession in the early 1970s reversed in a
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few years, after the discovery of new petroleum deposits, which reached a total
of 45.8 billion barrels by late 1979. President José López Portillo used exports of
oil to increase public borrowing to finance social and economic development
projects. But after the price of oil collapsed in 1981, Mexico announced it might
not be able to pay its debts thus triggering a wave of capital flight by the private
sector. Out of desperation, López Portillo made one last use of direct state
intervention in the economy when he nationalized the banking industry in
September 1982, which further broke the already damaged relationship between
the private sector and the state. This state of affairs changed immediately after
the inauguration of President Miguel de la Madrid in December 1982 who
renegotiated the debt and initiated Mexico’s new stance toward neoliberalism.3
From the beginning, privatization was always a politically sensitive issue
because of its potential effects on employment, the state's role in economic
development, and national sovereignty over natural resources. The de la Madrid
administration (1982-1988) indicated its clearest support for neoliberalism on
May 6, 1983, when the Secretary of Energy, Mines, and Parastate Industry
(SEMIP) announced its “intention to sell or liquidate 255 industrial parastate
firms.”4 The National Development Plan outlined the objectives of privatization,
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later implemented through the constitutional reforms of Articles 25, 26, 28 in
1983 and the Law of Federal and Parastate Entities in 1986. As a result,
“desincorporación” became the official euphemistic term over “privatization,” a
more politically loaded one the government likely wished to avoid. Before the
wave of privatizations reached Cananea in August 1989, 725 companies had
undergone liquidations, mergers, transfers, and sales.5
While Mexico became engulfed in the debt crisis, a parallel crisis
consumed the copper industry and the CMC. As the company began its final
expansion project in 1982, the price of copper declined from $1 per pound in
1980 to $0.65 per pound by 1986. This harmed the ability of Nacional Financiera
(NAFINSA) to pay its loans and prompted it to look toward privatization as a way
to reduce debts that reached nearly $700 million dollars. Years before,
NAFINSA had become the sole responsible agent for the CMC when the Atlantic
Richfield Company sold its shares to NAFINSA in 1982, and when the shares of
Banco Nacional de México were transferred to NAFINSA because of the bank
nationalization. As a result, the Mexican government owned 99.8% of Cananea’s
stock by 1988. NAFINSA controlled three quarters (75.1%), while the remaining
portion went to the Mining Development Commission (24.7%), with private
investors owning just 0.2%.6
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Nacional Financiera made its first formal announcement for bids in
January 1988. Cananea was originally to be sold to Grupo Protexa of Monterrey
for 910 million dollars (2,068,430,000 pesos) but the sale was canceled by
Gustavo Petricioli, Secretary of Treasury and Director of NAFINSA on June 22,
1988.7 With the specter of privatization temporarily halted, Cananea subsided
into a period of relative calm. After the initial bid collapsed, NAFINSA sought to
lower labor costs discreetly in order to make the CMC more attractive to potential
buyers. Management regarded the high wages and benefits for workers as a
necessity, so NAFINSA replaced the director general in February 1989 with one
more amenable to privatization.8 On June 21, Section 65, Cananea’s local
chapter of the national mining union, petitioned to go on strike before the
renegotiation of their labor contract.
The situation exploded two months later, when the company declared
bankruptcy and almost 3,000 soldiers of the Mexican Federal Army occupied the
mine facilities during the early morning hours on Sunday, August 20, 1989. The
mine workers, surprised at the state's forceful action, condemned the bankruptcy
during an assembly later that day. The next day, Monday, August, 21, Luis
Alberto Pérez Aceves, the acting director of the CMC, announced the beginning
of workforce liquidation while offering assurances that a majority of the workers
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would be rehired. The army withdrew from the mines on August 24th, and
Financiera Nacional Azucarera, S.A. (FINASA) led by Salvador Trueba
Rodríguez, took custody of the mines and operations of the CMC in bankruptcy.9
The domingazo – the bankruptcy and military occupation together –
unleashed widespread popular protest throughout the country. For the next three
months, the events captured the attention of Mexicans, dominating the front
pages and editorials of newspapers. Students, town councils, unions, political
parties, and the Catholic Church published letters in the newspapers announcing
their support for the miners and condemning the domingazo. The Workers'
Union of the National Autonomous University of Mexico created a fund to sustain
the Cananea Strike Committee. The miners of La Siderúrgica Lázaro CárdenasLas Truchas, in Michoacán, took the most dramatic action, when they announced
their solidarity with Section 65, and launched their own strike, certainly related to
their own industrial grievances, on August 22.10
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During the first week of the mine's closure, Cananea became host to
numerous national politicians. Luis Donaldo Colosio, president of the PRI,
represented the moderate face of the ruling party. The PRI had been facing a
crisis of legitimacy since the presidential election of 1988, so his position was
intended to express his support for workers and bolster the image of the PRI. In
front of 3200 workers, Colosio supported a change in company-worker relations,
but not through the means employed by Salinas. Declaring that the bankruptcy
was not the fault of the workers, he asked for the immediate reopening of the
CMC and the respect of the existing collective contract.11 His opposition was a
tactical one and preceded the most anticipated visitor, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas,
who arrived a few days later. The son of President Lázaro Cárdenas, he
represented the strongest oppositional voice against the bankruptcy and military
occupation. He had created the Party of the Democratic Revolution in 1986 as
an offshoot of the ruling PRI, to preserve revolutionary nationalism and the
Mexican Revolution against the encroachment of neoliberalism. In Cananea, in
front of a crowd of workers, he advocated for the preservation of labor rights and
national sovereignty, a call that resulted in the creation of the National Patriotic
Front a few weeks later.12
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Cananea’s historical symbolism and its evocations of the 1906 strike were
a common theme throughout the controversy and often intensified reactions.
Raul Trejo Delarbe, an editorialist for La Jornada, wrote that Cananea persisted
throughout the twentieth century as an important symbol of state legitimacy,
combining “the revolutionary tradition, the worker spirit, the anti-imperialist
epic.”13 For many observers, such as Valentín Campa, the events of 1989
evoked memories of 1906, and seemed to represent the advent of an age of
“neoporfirismo.”14 Like Porfirio Díaz before him, President Salinas pursued a
policy of modernization through force and violence that concealed the reactionary
nature of his administration. The Popular Socialist Party accused Salinas and his
twentieth century científicos of promoting the interests of foreign investors over
the interests of the Mexican people, by handing over the national patrimony of
the mines to foreign investors. Because of its resemblance to events in 1906,
August 20 became known as Green Sunday or Domingo Verde, recalling
Cananea's original imperialist, William Greene.15
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The response to the domingazo also reflected negative attitudes toward
the larger structural changes that had been taking place in Mexico throughout the
1980s. Previously, the politically sensitive nature of neoliberalism meant that the
government had conducted privatization discreetly and obfuscated it with
terminology such as “desincorporación.”16 In part, Salinas and his administration
justified this obfuscation by casting it as an economic issue rather than a political
or social one. At the center of this debate was the economic development
model, which had centered around a strong interventionist role of the Mexican
state.17 The reexamination of the state’s role, however, brought into play a much
broader survey of the economic, political, and cultural structures in place since
the Mexican Revolution. Cananea thus became emblematic of the larger
changes taking place in the country. It is no wonder that an economic analyst
remarked, “Cananea is a living and extraordinary example of the structural
change that is taking place in our country in terms of the political and economic
relations between the factors of production.”18
The problems in Cananea resurrected debates on the end of the Mexican
Revolution, argued prominently during the 1950s by Daniel Cosio Villegas. In his
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Historia moderna de México, Cosio Villegas claimed that the revolution had
ended with President Lázaro Cárdenas and the nationalization of the oil industry.
Similar proclamations, that the "Revolution" was dead or dying, intensified with
the decline of economic growth and the student massacre at Tlatelolco in the late
1960s. The divergence between the ideals and the reality of the Mexican
Revolution had become a apparent feature. Revolutionary nationalism remained
a central component of the country’s political culture and the legitimacy of the
ruling party even into the 1980s, but its social character had been stripped of
content . The events of 1989 in Cananea, however, represented a most
significant strike against the Mexican Revolution.19 Echoing the myths of
Cananea, Secretary General of Section 65, Octavio Bustamente Maldonado
remarked, “here [in Cananea] the Revolution was born and. . . here it could
die.”20
The immediate concerns of Cananea's mine workers were more
mundane, though. They feared that the mine’s closure would lead to the
permanent loss of jobs. But they were also aware that their livelihoods could be
directly effected by a privatization that suggested a broader attack on labor
rights, institutionalized labor protections, the country’s independence, and its
revolutionary past. In fact, President Carlos Salinas, his administration, and his
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proponents were trying to implement their own revolution by renegotiating the
meanings of national sovereignty, revolutionary nationalism, and the Mexican
Revolution itself.
Criticizing Labor
The Salinas administration and its proponents criticized the political role of
labor and the economic intervention of the state as contrary to sound business
practice. The popular voices – students, unions, workers – against the
bankruptcy claimed that the decision had been a political one, intended to
weaken the union’s strength and legitimacy, and to destroy the labor contract.
But, the supporters of the bankruptcy argued that it had been a purely financial
decision. By 1989, the debts of the CMC totaled $652 million dollars, which
included debts of 20 billion pesos to the national treasury, 25 billion pesos to
various lenders, $67 million dollars to American Express, and $578 million dollars
to Nacional Financiera. The government and its supporters presented calls for
privatizing the company as pragmatic rather than motivated by any political
considerations. In contrast, they considered workers’ fears that the closure
would lead to a permanent loss of jobs irrational and ideologically based. One
editorialist reassured workers that the CMC remained an essential component of
Mexican industry, that it was too important to be closed permanently, and so they
had a good chance of being rehired.21
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Several mainstream commentators, favorable to neoliberal solutions,
argued that the company’s problems had originated in 1971 with the company's
Mexicanization, that is, when the state became involved. As per a local observer
from Cananea, before the state's involvement, the CMC had been an exemplary
enterprise when the company had been owned by Anaconda: “Neither the
centralist "dedazo" nor the "polaca" in its worst forms, nor the irrational
demagoguery of the union's unlimited conquests, existed then.”22 Polaca was a
pejorative expression to designate politics, and dedazo the method whereby
candidates to political office, even the country’s presidency, were not selected on
merit but on the basis of being finger-pointed by political bosses. This and other
observers thus blamed political interference and favoritism for the poor shape of
the company.
Although political interference possessed a long history, the supporters of
neoliberalism regarded it as endemic to socialism. Columnist Luis Pazos pointed
out that the company’s Mexicanization had occurred during the resurgence of the
left under president Luis Echeverría, who allegedly had been convinced by
Horacio Flores de la Peña, Secretary of National Patrimony, “to adopt the
policies of state socialism.”23 For the advocates of neoliberalism, the policies of
the CMC were driven by politics and ideology, “demagoguery and populism,”
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rather than rational and pragmatic decision-making for nearly twenty years.24
According to Pazos, the company’s insolvency had revealed the true character of
socialists, including Emilio Ocampo Arenal, the company’s director from 1982 to
1988, who “condemn[ed] the profit of private capitalists” while using public and
national companies to become rich.25
During his presidency Lázaro Cárdenas made synonymous the
achievement of national sovereignty with state owned and managed enterprises.
Over four decades later, this association had weakened in the minds of some
Mexicans, and now it was widely believed that the participation of the Mexican
state would destroy sound business practices. Alfredo Farrugía Reed, an
editorialist in El Imparcial, a newspaper based in Hermosillo, the capital of
Sonora, argued that “the government cannot be a good businessman, and
therefore, it is impossible that it can administer a company with efficacy.”26 Too
often bureaucrats applied political logic to economic problems. Economic
analysts faulted Echeverría’s policies for having “provoked a false and ephemeral
distribution of wealth based not on the noble concept of work, but on classic
cronyism, [and] nepotism.”27 The desire for steady growth promoted wasteful
spending, the creation of unnecessary jobs, and the loss of profitability.28 Instead
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of productivity, the company’s operating model relied on subsidy. Economic
analyst Luis Rubio condemned a business model, dependent on “the continuous
flow of subsidies from the federal government. In this manner the company is
preserved, [while] impoverishing the country.”29
For other critics, the real fault lied with the company’s administrators who
they blamed for corruption and the abuse of power. They also faulted the
administration for having failed to anticipate labor costs and to control the
company’s finances by granting wage and benefits increases as short-term
solutions to long-term labor problems, embraced without considering the
company's long-term viability. As a potential confirmation of mismanagement in
the hands of government administrators, a week after domingo verde, Emilio
Ocampo Arenal, the company's director from March 1982 to March 1989, was
arrested on charges of fraud.30
The events in Cananea demonstrated that the relationship between the
labor and the state had fundamentally changed. Since the Mexican Revolution
and the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, labor had become an institutionalized
part of the Mexican state and essential to the legitimacy of the ruling party. By
the 1980s, the state had become the antagonist of labor. Officials from the
Secretary of Energy, Mines, and Parastate Industry (SEMIP) blamed the
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bankruptcy on the corruption of union leadership, but also blamed labor more
generally as the source of the company’s insolvency.31 Some critics
distinguished between leaders and rank-and-file union members and argued that
the former worked for their own self-interest while neglecting the needs of the
latter. Director General of Financiera Nacional Azucarera, Salvador Trueba
Rodríguez “admitted that the workers. . . had nothing to do with the poor
management and bankruptcy of the parastate.”32 In some cases, observers
presented ordinary mine workers as victims of corruption and abuse of power
rather than its perpetrators. They blamed the leadership of national unions for
maintaining “corporate privileges” while disregarding the needs of the Mexican
nation more generally.33
While some made a careful distinction between union leaders and its rankand-file members, many critics blamed labor in a more general sense. The
management of the CMC argued that the decline of the company began with the
signing of the union’s first collective contract in 1932, which had normalized
“inefficiency and lack of competitiveness.”34 They stated that mineworkers in
Cananea received the highest wages in Mexico, 3.5 times more than other
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workers in the country, and had transformed the sacrifices of their predecessors
into a contract that protected a privileged sector of Mexican society. In addition,
the company maintained a workforce double the necessary size, permitted
workers “to miss three and a half months with pay,”35 and even “suspend[ed]
operations in the middle of the day, on Sundays and holidays.”36 These factors
reduced the productivity of the company and resulted in higher costs of copper,
increasing the costs of domestic manufacturing and reducing the
competitiveness of exports. In 1989, Cananea was producing copper 33% more
expensive than its global competitors.37
Those amenable to the new changes, expected workers and their unions
to remain subservient to the Mexican nation, and to sacrifice their own needs for
the needs of the company. Observers blamed unions and their members for
demanding increases in wages and benefits year after year, making it difficult to
control the company’s finances and undermining the company’s viability. It was
the prerogative of unions to fight on behalf of its members, but many
commentators encouraged them to moderate their demands in times of
economic crisis.38 It seems workers had something else in mind.
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In June 1989, the union had asked for a 330% increase in salaries and
benefits, which included additional paid vacation days, excusable absences,
household expenses, celebrations, and school supplies. Advocates of the
workers justified the demands by arguing that these were reasonable requests
given inflation, the high cost of living in Cananea’s geographical isolation, and the
economic sacrifices already made by the working class such as that indicated by
the Pact of Stability and Economic Growth signed in December 1988. The
company’s administration, in turn, claimed that such demands forced it into
bankruptcy by exacerbating an already precarious financial situation and
consuming liquidated funds needed for reinvestment and modernization.39
Even more sympathetic observers tended to ultimately agree with the goal
of the domingazo. Several editorialists noted labor’s historical contributions to the
development of modern Mexico. They denounced the handling of the situation
by Salinas, but they agreed with the end result of the bankruptcy as a necessary
measure.40 Journalist Raúl Delarbe Trejo, for instance, argued that labor had
failed to take into account “new economic situations and new social facts,”41
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which had their origins in the global crisis in the 1970s and the debt crisis of
1982. The new political and economic situation imposed “the exigencies of an
increasingly acute international competitiveness that demands. . . higher levels of
productivity.”42 In the face of this situation, the union's demands were
unreasonable. As per President Salinas, labor needed to adapt and the failure to
do so would bring greater risks to Mexico.43 Even academics such as Eliezer
Morales, director of the Economics department at UNAM, warned that if unions
persisted in such demands there would be more cases like Cananea.44
Privatization became a means of overhauling the traditional aspects of the
economy that many observers in Mexico increasingly regarded as harmful to
national interests. Editorialist Sara Lovera argued that Mexican unionism had
resulted from a particular historical context in the first half of the twentieth century
– the revolution, economic underdevelopment, and the central role of the state.
While unionism had once served as “an effective instrument that permitted the
state to promote industrial development,” traditional unions had become an
obstacle to generating creative and “imaginative” solutions to new problems.45
The continuation of populist policies and union patronage were harmful to the
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wider interests of the nation and eliminating them was a need.46 Privatization
would foster “a new Mexican Revolution” that would transform the nature of work
and transform workers into efficient producers, capable of producing to match the
products of globally competitive enterprises.47 In the business newspaper, El
Financiero, Enrique Moreno Cueto argued that previous approaches to work
rested on the foundation of cronyism and patronage rather than production: the
blunt conclusion was that workers of Cananea claimed “the highest wages and
standard of living and labor rights without having earned them.”48

Defending Labor
Contrary to the official position, the pro-worker public reaction argued that
the bankruptcy was “a political decision, illegal and arbitrary.”49 Many saw it as a
pretense to privatize the company. If the sale of Cananea was premised on
reducing the public debt, then the government had made a poor business
decision:
In the previous seven years, the government, through NAFINSA, had
made substantial investments in the mining company to expand its
production, modernize its facilities and provide it with an export platform.
Precisely when these improvements were concluded, and the CMC
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became one of the most profitable export companies, the government
decided to sell it.50
The supporters of the CMC also pointed to the historical legacy of the company.
In a joint letter signed by multiple unions, the authors argued that the bankruptcy
violated the 1917 Constitution because it “violently transgresses the historical
rights of the Mexican working class, conquered in the revolutionary feat of 1910
that had its cradle precisely in Cananea.”51 The bankruptcy violated the right to
strike but procedural irregularities and the abruptness and haste of judicial
proceedings aroused suspicions when the paperwork for bankruptcy was filed in
Mexico City, although the CMC's headquarters were in Cananea.
Through overwhelming force, the Mexican government ended the
possibility of any successful intervention by the local union after bankruptcy was
declared. The use of the military to occupy and shut down mining installations,
violated Article 129 of the 1917 Constitution, which prohibited the use of the army
in extra-military functions during peace time.52 Government officials claimed that
the military was sent in to protect the mining installations from sabotage. In La
Jornada, Enrique Calderón Alzati questioned their unsubstantiated claims, “To
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protect them from what, or who? Perhaps there was danger of a foreign
invasion? Or do there exist new armed guerrillas and we are not informed so as
not to create uncertainty?”53 Despite the lack of casualties, the Partido Popular
Socialista described the army’s action as “moral and physical violence,” intended
to intimidate workers from striking.54 Journalist Oscar Romo Salazar wrote that
such actions “correspond more to a repressive police state, rather than one in the
process of modernization and democratization.55
More than any other parastate enterprise, Cananea possessed a long
contentious history that symbolized labor’s achievements and the endurance of
labor militancy in the history of modern Mexico. Before August 1989, the policy
of desincorporación had resulted in the privatization of 725 companies. None of
these, however, shared the historical weight and symbolic resonance as the
Compañía Minera de Cananea. Many commentators noted that the company’s
Mexicanization, less than two decades old, represented the achievement of
Mexico’s national sovereignty, the endurance of Mexico's revolutionary
legitimacy, and a material expression of the revolution and of labor struggles.
The company not only represented the historical achievement of national and
popular sovereignty, but also was a source of employment and national
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economic development by which workers participated in the ongoing realization
of the Mexican Revolution.56
The historical memory of Cananea had discouraged previous attempts to
privatize the company and the government was well aware of this.57 So, fearful
of the popular reaction, the Salinas government used the bankruptcy to
maneuver around the symbolic blockade posed by Cananea’s memory and to
legitimize the company's sale. The bankruptcy became the means to eliminate
the labor contract, weaken the union, and dismantle workers’ rights, with the goal
of transforming the workforce into one that was “docile and flexible.”58 The attack
on Cananea was thus meant to destroy the primary symbol of the labor
movement and its association with the revolutionary state. These changes would
make the company more attractive to potential buyers, who set the termination of
traditional labor relations as a precondition to purchase.59 The approach taken
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by Salinas “was welcomed. . . by investors and by the specialized press that
treated it as being a further proof of the resolve of Salinas’s government to
modernize the Mexican economy.”60 Destroying the most powerful symbol of
labor would make probably future privatizations easier.
For the majority of Mexicans, however, an attack on state enterprises
constituted an attack on the revolution. Historian Adolfo Gilly called
neoliberalism “a Mexican counterrevolution.”61 While some members of the
Salinas administration observed in privatization a new stage of the revolution,
others considered it a resurgence of political reaction, which appeared
recurrentlly throughout the twentieth century. In El Financiero, Carlos Ramírez
asserted,
to each revolutionary milestone corresponds a reactionary force in the
opposite direction. . . the Callista pact corrected the course of the 1917
Constitution, the Alemanista pact halted the advance of Cardenismo, and
the pact of the Delamadrista-Salinista seeks to stop the nationalizations of
Echeverría and López Portillo.62
The assault on labor in Cananea, then, represented the next step in this
reactionary tendency. Guadalupe Hernández Garcia of the Partido Popular
Socialista considered Salinista measures a regression through a
“counterrevolutionary economic policy that leads us to the loss of national
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independence and sovereignty.”63 In other words, for her, to privatize the CMC
was to destroy the Mexican Revolution. Workers sympathized.
Workers rejected the privatization of Cananea as an attack on national
sovereignty.64 According to analyst Heberto Castillo, the privatization of
nationalized industries represented a greater threat to sovereignty than any
military aggression encountered in Mexico’s history and was “even more
dangerous because that aggression came from within.”65 The National Patriotic
Front of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas protested that on behalf of modernization, the
Salinas administration transformed Mexico into “[the] exclusive patrimony of an
oligarchy and unarmed tributary of transnational companies.”66 The policies of
the Salinas administration, according to the Popular Socialist Party, “led to the
cancellation of popular aspirations, to deprive the people of their sovereignty and
the loss of national independence.”67 National sovereignty implied the
government’s responsibility to advance the well-being of the Mexican people.
Privatization meant the reverse, “the abandonment of the social responsibilities
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of the State, the cession of sovereignty, contempt for the interests and values of
the people, and the deliberate obstruction of a democratic perspective.”68
Many disapproving columnists pointed out that the neoliberal policies of
the Salinas administration were not Mexican but the product of a foreign ideology
that originated in American universities and institutions.69 Commentators such as
Lucinda Nava Alegria pointed to the spread of neoliberal ideas through
institutions such as the Heritage Foundation, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund, whose proposals sought modernization at the
expense of “economic sovereignty, and at the expense of the elemental rights of
Mexican workers.”70 In El Sonorense, editorialist Miguel Angel Vázquez Ruiz
suggested that Mexico’s neoliberal policies were an extension of those previously
imposed in South America, particularly Chile, which had been inspired by Milton
Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics.71
In contrast, the ideology of revolutionary nationalism was praised as an
autochthonous product of the Mexican Revolution, free of ideology and foreign
influence. Commentators were quick to point out that the Mexican economy was
capitalist, but a unique Mexican form of capitalism. Acquiescence to neoliberal
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institutions such as the International Monetary Fund would only relinquish
Mexican national sovereignty. Critics argued that such measures would not
actually alleviate the burden of public debt but promote social control through a
new cycle of debt. Austerity measures and fiscal discipline became the key to
establishing good credit in order to finance the payment of debt, but this strategy
preserved the power of certain groups while delegitimizing others.72
Privatization was often presented as a novel cure for Mexico’s troubles.
Its supporters often presented private property in almost reverential terms, as
“superior to the state and the social, it is a guarantee of efficiency and it is the
guarantee of liberty and democracy.”73 Supporters of the revolutionary state, in
contrast, decried these associations:
Private property is not synonymous with efficiency, but with voracity; it can
be, but not always, efficient, yet at the same time it is a source of
antidemocracy in its management and in its objectives, and deeply unfair
in the way of distribution. The maximum profit is the sole purpose of the
capitalists, not the solution of social problems.74
Critics also pointed out that private property had always existed in Mexico. Even
during the period of heightened state involvement in the economy in the 1970s,
private property had been present alongside state and parastate enterprises.
The new emphasis on the merits of private property neglected its failures and
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shortcomings, and denied the positive role of the state in the growth of private
business groups.75
One editorial declared that privatization was an unconstitutional
maneuver. Article 27 detailed the state’s responsibility to advance the “material
and spiritual development of the Mexican people founded in social justice.”76 The
bankruptcy, the closure of the mines, and privatization itself were in opposition to
the constitution since they threatened the social function of the CMC by creating
unemployment and endangering the economic, political, and social stability of
Cananea. Moreover, privatization would give private foreign capital, rather than
any domestic authority, the power to determine national economic
development.77
While neoliberals blamed many problems as intrinsic failures of the state,
many in Mexico defended its economic role and laid the blame elsewhere. For
Héctor Reyes Tirado, a pro-intervention writer, the failures of the CMC resulted
from improper conduct and corruption by specific individuals.78 Editorialist
Eduardo Montes somewhat agreed, claiming that individual bureaucrats and
politicians were to blame: “the failure of such companies is because they have
been handled precisely as the private property of the ruling political group,
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without any democratic control, with bureaucratic methods and contaminated by
the dominant corruption in public administration.”79 In the end, many agreed that
Cananea’s unique problems failed to justify the total elimination of the state in
economic development.80 The success of any enterprise under any type of
socio-economic arrangement depended on “transparent finances and honest
management; preconditions that operate for any type of industry.”81 To further
debunk the neoliberal arguments against state economic intervention, Petroleos
Mexicanos (PEMEX) and the Federal Commission of Electricity were cited as
examples of successful state intervention, and the complementarity of public and
private ownership.
Many supporters of the CMC emphasized that state intervention had been
essential in the development of private enterprise. Reyes Fuentes Garcia, a
member of the left-leaning Party of the Authentic Mexican Revolution, noted that
Cardenista policies were formative in the development of “the capitalist Mexican
state” through expropriations often mistakenly labeled as socialist measures.82
His policies “permitted the pacification of the country, the control of the workers,
the consolidation of the party in power and the subsequent development of a
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national bourgeoisie.”83 The traditional weaknesses of the private sector and the
need for economic development often demanded some form of sustained state
intervention. Rather than a socialist policy, Mexicanization had been a policy that
rescued bankrupt private enterprises, transferred them from foreign to Mexican
control and rehabilitated them, largely in favor of domestic capitalists.84 In the
process, the state established “a permanent source of subsidy to private capital”
through enterprises such as oil, railroads, electricity, and telephones.85
Countering the myth of the protestant work-ethic, José Luis H. Ayala, member of
the Party of the Revolutionary Worker, asserted that the success of the private
sector was not the exclusive result of “its creativity and intelligence," but was tied
to the availability of public investments granted through parastate enterprises.86

Eliminating labor from nation
The institutionalization of labor presented the greatest obstacle to
neoliberalism. Where revolutionary nationalism provided a semblance of
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workers’ participation in the state, “[t]he ideology of neoliberalism demand[ed]
passivity from workers” and their subservience to the needs of the market.87 The
persistence of revolutionary nationalism in the country’s political culture
demanded a redefinition of Mexican nationalism rather than its total replacement.
So, in part, Salinas propounded a new ideology, social liberalism, an alleged
“synthesis of the Reforma and the Revolution.”88 This new nationalism consisted
of “respect for freedom of belief, the need to give more participation to civil
society, [and] the reaffirmation of the commitment to reverse poverty in popular
neighborhoods and injustice in the countryside.”89 On this basis, modernization
through privatization became “a continuation of the progressive impulse of our
libertarian struggles,” modifying rather than forsaking the revolution.90
Neoliberalism signified a drastic revision of state economic intervention.
President Lázaro Cárdenas had created one paradigm of state participation in
1938 when the Mexican state fulfilled national sovereignty through the creation of
fully state-owned enterprises. Mexicanization in 1961 combined state
intervention with the participation of domestic and foreign investors. When
neoliberalism became the fashionable strategy in the 1980s, privatization
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entailed the complete elimination of the state from active economic participation.
Eliminating the state, through bankruptcy in the case of Cananea, became an
advantageous transfer of public financial resources to private capital by
decreasing labor rights and selling the company at a lower cost. This probably
contradicted one of the primary tenets of neoliberalism, an ideology against the
interventionist role of the state. Instead of weakening, the character of state
intervention simply changed, except this time to facilitate private interests.91
Weakening labor was another objective.
Although some regarded the bankruptcy as a purely financial matter, the
same group of people failed to consider the possibility it could cause political
instability and social unrest. Some commentators regarded the lack of such
considerations a demonstrable weakness of neoliberal theory, which threatened
to undermine the economic recovery and growth promised by privatization. By
dismantling “the established framework for regulating the relations between the
factors of production,”92 Salinas-style modernization represented an attack on the
corporatist model of governance, which had been in place since the creation of
the PRM in 1938. Challenging the political role of labor threatened the legitimacy
of state power and threatened as well to undermine the state’s control of labor
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and, in consequence, the stability of the governing party more generally. The
alienation of labor threatened to widen internal divisions in the PRI and push
labor toward an alliance with the oppositional PRD, making it a stronger force
against the current government and against social stability.93
For workers, their most immediate concern were their jobs. National
sovereignty had been seen as a way to guarantee those jobs and preserve the
labor protections established in the 1917 Constitution. They feared that
privatization would eliminate their jobs, overturn the labor contract, destroy labor
rights more generally, and create a neoliberal “paradise” for investment.94
Referring to neoliberal policymakers, historian Adolfo Gilly commented,
They want a country of defenseless and disorganized workers, without
social protection, without contractual regulation of the rhythms and
conditions of work, without safety standards in companies, a country
without industrial unions.95
For the workers and people of Cananea, privatization, as an attack on labor
rights and national sovereignty, threatened “to extinguish our historic roots.”96
The alliance between labor and the state had been replaced by “an alliance
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between the State and the national and foreign private capitals.”97 This new
alliance only magnified the growing uncertainty about jobs.
Salinas and his supporters sought to deconstruct the association of labor
from the Mexican nation. Editorialist Edgard Mason argued that the association
of Mexican national sovereignty with the interventionist role of the state had been
invented through the nationalization of the oil industry and propagated through
“textbooks,” “the official history’s political discourse,” and “government
propaganda.”98 He argued that state ownership nor bureaucratic oversight
increase national sovereignty or guarantee positive outcomes for Mexico. On the
contrary, Mason concluded “state companies often put into play the country's
sovereignty and well-being when their inefficiencies, their corruption and others
pushed them to exaggerate debt.”99 Rodrigo Morales M. argued that the
conflation of national sovereignty with state enterprises restricted the forms by
which government officials could pursue structural changes even if they benefited
the nation.100 President Salinas added that a nation incapable of competing in
the global economy weakened its national sovereignty.101 Labor wanted to be a
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part of the nation, but neoliberalism sought to eliminate its existence as a
distinctive bloc that needed institutional protection.

Sound business practice
Salinas and his supporters redefined the meaning of national sovereignty,
so that it could not be achieved by direct economic production or management by
the state but through the development of private industry and sound business
practices. Rather than standards of living or wages, benefits to workers and the
Mexican nation were to be measured in terms of the company's financial wellbeing. In a public letter, the company stated that its greatest challenges were the
need for greater efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness. Many
commentators agreed, the elimination or weakening of the union’s participatory
role in company affairs and in the political sphere would reduce interference and
wastefulness from business operations. President Salinas claimed that the
perceived harms of privatization would actually reduce the existing debt, lower
the burden of public financing, and promote self-sufficiency.102 These changes
would make the company more viable, increase its financial soundness, and
bring long-term benefits for workers.
Sound business practices required engagement with foreign participation
and global markets rather than isolation. Of course, for its entire duration as a
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parastate enterprise, the CMC had never excluded foreign participation; its
connections to foreign technology, markets, and capital always remained intact.
From the perspective of the Salinas administration, however, all forms of state
economic participation suggested an anti-business approach. So, President
Salinas asserted, “Sovereignty never meant [national] self-sufficiency or
autarky."103 Interdependence did not contradict national sovereignty but
strengthened it though engagement with other “sovereign nations.”104 Progovernment analysts argued that privatization and modernization were the key to
saving and preserving their jobs, not the harbingers of their extinction. These
programs would fulfill the Mexican Revolution, according to Salinas, by making
the company globally competitive and financially viable. The modernization of
the CMC would guarantee a source of employment and, in this way, would be
nationalist and popular.105 Editorialists and columnists thus considered workers
who protested after the domingazo to have renounced “a better future for all.”106
The privatization of the CMC was legitimized by claiming that it would
achieve the original goals of the revolution. Neoliberalism and the project of
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privatization undertaken by Salinas comprised “the current stage of the Mexican
Revolution.”107 Modernization was not meant to be a replacement of national
sovereignty but a new means toward its achievement. It was a strategy to
improve global competitiveness, financial responsibility, institutional organization,
and access to technology. Salinas claimed that such aspirations did not
“contradict the autonomy of the country or social justice.”108 He claimed that
change would not destroy the Mexican Revolution but preserve it, secure its
principles, and contribute to their advancement.109 In another speech, he
remarked, "a country with a healthy and prosperous free enterprise economy can
be and in fact is. . . much more independent. . . True sovereignty is not in the
hands of a bureaucratic and arrogant elite, but in the hands of a prosperous
people with an efficient and vigilant government.”110
Many agreed that the model of economic development, originating from
the Mexican Revolution, in which the state played a major economic role, had
become defunct. Modernization was thus generally accepted but workers
rejected the elite definition of it offered by Salinas. Modernization was a
malleable notion. At the same time, it could be used to harness almost any
program of change, often carrying a politically determined meaning. The
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component of modernization most rejected by workers were its implications with
labor relations, in which modernizers employed the euphemistic term “flexibility”
to designate employers’ freedom to hire, fire, and change the terms of
employment, even lowering workers’ salaries and benefits.111
Despite its alleged association with progress, in the hands of Salinas
modernization became regressive in terms of labor protections. Modernizing the
company implied the removal of social protections and the dismantling of the
corporate relationship between labor and the state. Such changes would
eliminate the labor contract, bring wage cuts, intensify work, reduce employment,
and degrade workers’ standard of living.112 According to its critics, Salinista
modernization would “accentuate the enormous social inequalities and favor,
even more, small groups and privileged sectors.”113
Salinista modernization was also rejected because it was considered antidemocratic. In his campaign, Salinas had argued for greater democracy and
political openness, in the way Mikhail Gorbachev called for perestroika and
glasnost in the Soviet Union.114 Yet, observers argued that his economic policies
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and those of his predecessor had not been open to discussion and were being
imposed by a small group of individuals.115 According to editorialist Enrique
Quintana, the bankruptcy became a maneuver to eliminate discussion. He
asked, "Was it impossible to negotiate with the union a collective bargaining
agreement that would allow for the reorganization and efficiency of the company?
Or, would it imply having to jointly agree and define the precise meaning of
modernization in the company?"116 The events of Cananea revealed the
possibility of imposing “economic modernization as a process exclusive of
political modernization.”117 Salinista modernization, like the Porfiriato, was
aggressive, and threatened more violence as the attack on labor came to be
seen as an attack on the prevailing social corporate structure of Mexico. The
imposition of modernization through anti-democratic, forceful means ultimately
threatened the success of any such program.118
Many rejected Salinas's elite modernization in favor of a popular one.
Workers also rejected the notion that the company’s privatization was the only
possible solution to its problems. The workers of Cananea did not reject
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modernization but wanted to participate in defining its qualities. Instead of a
modernization that invalidated the Revolution they wanted one in line with its
principles.119 Workers wanted a modernization that was not associated with
neoliberalism but one that “responds to the great objectives of the national
project and whose orientation be nationalist, popular, and democratic.”120 The
National Patriotic Front of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas announced: “On the contrary,
we affirm that Mexicans are capable of promoting modernization in accordance
with our sovereign principles and our social priorities, and that the technology or
resources required from other countries must be managed through the control of
workers and all Mexicans.”121 Many argued that it was possible to increase
productivity and transform the CMC into a competitive company without ending
protections for workers. The Mexican Revolution had already provided an
alternative model that permitted a more ethical and socially-conscious
capitalism.122 As one of the workers’ supporters put it, Cananea’s future owners
“will not be able to operate even a single day, without having a few hundred
workers. The machines do not work alone and the ovens do not turn on by
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themselves.”123 With President Salinas, the Mexican Revolution and the
Compañía Minera de Cananea may have survived, but labor's position suffered
irreparable damage. Salinista modernization had effectively removed the human
and social touch from the state’s relations towards the working class.

Conclusion
Almost three months after it occurred, the mine’s closure brought
economic ruin to Cananea. Without any other means of employment and
subsistence, workers were compelled to give up their protest and renegotiate the
labor contract in disadvantageous ways. The new contract modified retirement
pensions and placed limitations on work rules, but Section 65 continued to exist
as a representative of workers’ needs. What had been fundamentally and
irreparably damaged was the working relationship between labor and the
company, which had been in place for decades. The company reopened in
November 1989, but its actual privatization took almost an additional year, sold to
Grupo Mexico, owned by Jorge Larrea, on September 28, 1990. Two years later,
the new mining law eliminated the majority capital requirement, and permitted

123

Gilberto Herrera Medina, “Cananea y la desgracia del trabajadores del cobre,” El Universal,
August 22, 1989.

230

any company of any origin to hold concessions as long as they abided by
Mexican law.124
Where the myth of Cananea brought the working class within the domain
of the nation in Mexico, the assault on Cananea by Salinas eighty-three years
later was a fundamental attempt to destroy that association. Throughout the
1980s, the greatest impediment to structural change was a political myth in which
labor functioned as a central element of state legitimacy. The myth of Cananea
had tied the Mexican working class to the nation through the Mexican Revolution.
President Cárdenas added another discursive element, so that national
sovereignty became primarily expressed as the placement of valuable resources
under the control of a state owned and operated enterprise. Mexicanization
modified the meaning of national sovereignty in favor of the private sector, but
even then, the institutional representation of labor remained intact, making it
difficult to impose an agenda akin to the future neoliberal one.
Reducing the power of the working class required eliminating the positive
association of labor with the Mexican nation in the myth of Cananea. Salinas
revised the national character of the working class by removing it as an
identifiable portion of the nation. After denigrating labor and the state, Salinas
and his supporters offered a new ideal of national sovereignty to be achieved
through sound business practices. Labor's worth was reduced to their abstract
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market values. Whereas before foreign investors were the most likely violators of
national sovereignty, it later became inefficient and unproductive workers who
presented a greater threat to national sovereignty. By attacking Cananea,
Salinas had taken one element of corporate society organized by Cárdenas and
dissolved it, throwing it into the greater mass of the now undifferentiated Mexican
people.
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Conclusion
In its examination of the "institutionalized" revolution, this dissertation
looked at the myth of Cananea, the emergence of Mexicanization as a policy, its
implementation in the CMC, the short experience of the CMC as a Mexicanized
company, and, then, its privatization. The study opened with four major
questions. First, to what degree did the Mexicanization of the mining industry
help achieve national sovereignty in Mexico? Second, how does the concept of
national sovereignty provide insight into fundamental cultural assumptions
related to natural resources, work, and the political organization of the world?
Third, how does national sovereignty communicate perceptions of class,
particularly the bifurcation of national sovereignty into popular and elite forms?
Finally, how does national sovereignty emerge as a paradigm of economic norms
that is, at once, opposed and complementary to, the hegemony of global
capitalism and the organization of the world around the market?
Chapter one examined how the myth of Cananea established a
relationship between labor and the nation. Before the 1906 strike, there had
been no connection between the two entities. The loyalties of Mexican workers
in Cananea resided with other workers, even Americans, more so than with any
abstract nation. The rapprochement of labor by the Constitutionalists during the
Mexican Revolution brought the working class within the boundaries of the
nation, creating a foundation for the legitimacy of the new Mexican state,
institutionalizing and incorporating the working class into the Mexican state.
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Through myth, workers came to be transformed from an undifferentiated mass
into a distinguishable and coherent group – the nation’s working class.
The second chapter dealt with elite concerns. The nationalization of oil
created a set of discourses in which the dominant expression of national
sovereignty became associated with direct state intervention in the economy,
achieved through the state’s exclusive ownership and management of a critical
resource and the exclusion of both foreign participation and private involvement.
The Mexicanization of mining altered this dynamic by changing state intervention
so that it worked on behalf of private interests. Nationalist mining policy then
emerges as a much more moderate and conservative expression of national
sovereignty. In this process, the interests of the Mexican nation became more
narrowly defined as the interests of the business sector in Mexico.
In chapter three, a strong interventionist role of the state in the economy
emerged to promote the economic and social well-being of the Mexican people.
As a result, the Mexican state became the embodiment of the nation's general
interest or will. As such, workers occupied a distinctly subservient position.
Their role transformed from active, with direct engagement in labor actions, to
passive, one whereby Mexicans employed by Cananea and similar firms were
supposed to work and sacrifice their own interests on behalf of the Mexican
nation. Mexicanization of the CMC preserved the popular discourse of national
sovereignty mentioned above and presented itself as the achievement of full
national sovereignty despite the participation of foreign enterprise.
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In chapter four, the divergence between elite and popular notions of
national sovereignty materialize outwardly. Economic indicators were the sole
measure of elite national sovereignty by the 1970s. The praises of President
Luis Echeverría and the company's modernization efforts suggest an image of
success and financial well-being that differed drastically from the experience of
Cananea's mineworkers. Workers expected Mexican control of the CMC to bring
results for them through work security and control of their work. Instead, they
were plagued by the same problems as those prevailing under the control of
Anaconda. Except, now workers were asked to sacrifice themselves on behalf of
the Mexican nation. Ultimately, the lack of reciprocity threatened the bond
between the miners of Cananea and the Mexican nation.
In chapter five, President Carlos Salinas attacked, more frontally than any
other leader ever did, the long-standing relationship between labor and the
Mexican nation. His efforts vastly undermined the premises of revolutionary
nationalism by transforming the interventionist role of the state in the economy.
He also redefined the meaning of national sovereignty, eliminating the social
well-being of workers as a component of it, and implementing economic
measures that largely conformed to neoliberal impulses of the time. Although it
became an ongoing process, Salinas began to take measures against the
institutional representation of workers, eliminated their privileged position in
Mexican society, and transformed them into an undifferentiated mass.
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In 1906, with the large protest it witnessed in favor of social protection for
workers, Cananea became the alleged cradle of the Mexican Revolution; in
1989, as part of a larger neo-liberal wave of reforms, Salinas made an effort to
put it in its grave by declaring its bankruptcy, ordering its occupation by the
military, and eventually privatizing the company, all of which represented the end
of a close relationship between the state and labor. In between these extremes,
there was a critical development – namely, Mexicanization. The Mexicanization
of the Compañía Minera de Cananea, in 1971, represented a unique moment in
the history of Mexico.
Mexicanization emerged as a hybrid policy, one that straddled the popular
appeals of the Mexican Revolution and the elite shift toward neoliberalism. At
the same time, the Mexicanization of mining ultimately demonstrates the victory
of conservative forces in Mexico, which sought to dismantle the social promises
of the Mexican Revolution, represented particularly by the radical nationalization
of oil three decades before, in 1938. In the early 1970s, the Compañía Minera
de Cananea found itself at a crossroads of the country's history – namely, the
decline of the Mexican Miracle (and its multiple ramifications). This was a fairly
unremarkable period if compared to the events at the beginning and end of the
twentieth century.
At its outset, this study sought to assess the achievement of national
sovereignty in mineral resources through the policy of Mexicanization. After
decades of foreign ownership beginning in 1899, the mines experienced a
significant change in ownership in 1971. That year, 51% of the company was

236

sold out, bought by public and private Mexican interests. The policy differed
significantly from the oil nationalization: it did not create state-owned or managed enterprises (except in special circumstances) and included the
participation of private and foreign interests. The regime touted this change as a
healthy nationalism, moderate and somewhat conservative. In contrast to the
action taken by Cárdenas in 1938, the Mexicanization of mining in the last third of
the twentieth century would seem to be a failure or, at least, a merely partial
achievement of national sovereignty.
Still, the claim of the Mexican government was that national sovereignty
was being achieved through majority capital control. While constituting a
historical transition from complete foreign ownership, under Mexicanization
foreign investors like Anaconda continued to own nearly half of the Compañía
Minera de Cananea. The participation of foreign investors in Mexicanized
industries seems to contradict the achievement of national sovereignty with
respect to mineral resources. At the same time, the weakness of the Mexican
ownership led to the division of the company’s holdings among four or five
different entities. This demonstrated that, at least on an individual basis, national
control over the mining assets was substantially weaker. While Anaconda
retained 49% of the company, the 51% of Mexican stockholders in the CMC was
dispersed among different organizations: Nacional Financiera, Comisión de
Fomento Minero, Banco Nacional de México, and Cobre de México. The
holdings of each of the Mexican owners represented a fraction of Anaconda's
total. So, while some authors emphasize the radical nature of Mexicanization, as
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per this study its moderate or weak character seems undeniable. Anaconda just
complied with the minimum acceptable level of ownership according to the
Mexicanization law.
The peaceful transition of Cananea's ownership thus opens up questions
about the meaning of national sovereignty itself. Lázaro Cárdenas set the
standard for achieving national sovereignty when he nationalized the oil industry
in the late 1930s. At the same time, the oil nationalization was an extreme,
totalizing assertion of national sovereignty that led to diplomatic disputes and
economic boycotts. The Mexicanization of mining and of the CMC, in contrast,
did not use economic coercion and preserved the participation of foreign
investors. Although not as totalizing, Mexicanization did change the ownership
structure of the mining industry in favor of Mexican interests.
Assessing the achievement of national sovereignty, then, would require
asking whose sovereignty was achieved and whose interests were defined as
national ones. If national interests are defined as a function of elite interests,
then the achievement of national sovereignty through Mexicanization emerges as
an adequate assessment of the historical events of 1971. If national sovereignty
is defined as the achievement of popular interests, then such a claim is
considerably weaker.
One of the most oft-told narratives about the Mexican Revolution
espouses the progressive nature of the 1917 Constitution. But, hidden within its
structure is a fairly conservative notion: the working class would be subordinate
to the nation. Splitting the protections of workers and the sovereignty over
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resources, fundamentally weakened the former relative to the latter. Despite its
institutional representation within the Mexican state, the working class itself
possessed no sovereignty. The inclusion of workers' protections in the 1917
Constitution was a critical improvement essential to advancing the interests of
labor in Mexico. Yet the progressive document imposed a social hierarchy in
which workers were subordinate to the Mexican nation whose interests were
predominantly defined by elites. This constitutional division of labor and natural
resources ensured that labor was a factor of production that could be controlled
and deployed according to national interests.

In this dissertation, I wanted to interrogate some of the fundamental
assumptions by which people exist and operate in the world. Epistemological
assumptions related to identity, social roles, facts, truth, and the reliability of
one's senses, to name just a few examples, are often unspoken, unwritten, and
unexamined. When I approached this project, I wanted to know about the
fundamental assumptions concerning economic life and how economic norms
are established, normalized, and perpetuated. The field of economics and
economic understanding in general has succeeded in separating human life from
economic life. Notions such as "homo economicus" too easily dismiss the social
and cultural complexities of the economic world. Moreover, this perspective
neglects the historical contingency of economic practices and the historical
efforts by interested groups to impose economic norms.
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Culture too, often, emerges as an autonomous sphere of human life, often
diametrically opposed to economic life. In this study, I consider the two
definitively interrelated: culture is an intrinsic element of economic life and
economic life is indelibly infused with culture. Works of cultural history have
pursued economic issues, but these often concentrate on outward expressions of
culture and perpetuate the notion that culture exists apart from the economic
sphere. This study operates from the premise that economic activity is cultural
activity. Engagement with natural resources through work requires cultural
intervention because the materiality of the natural world does not possess
intrinsic economic utility. Instead, this is the result of historical process and
cultural manipulation in order to see such materials as resources to be shaped,
molded, sold, and exchanged for another abstraction. Because economics is
bound with politics, culture is also an intrinsic element of political economy. In
capitalist societies, culture in the form of myth becomes necessary because the
economic relationships revolve around exploitation, inequality, and hierarchy in
the determination of who produces and who acquires the product of labor.
In this dissertation, I pursue these assumptions related to economic life in
Mexico by analyzing the concept of national sovereignty. In contrast to a typical
cultural history, the study examined sources that might be traditionally regarded
as more appropriate for labor, political, or even economic history. This effort
stems from a significant problem in trying to analyze the fundamental structures
of economic life: the mineworkers of Cananea did not spend their spare time
producing documents about their working lives. Based on the available
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resources, I focused on national sovereignty as a concept to gain insight into
economic life. By analyzing national sovereignty from a cultural vantage point, I
was able to examine the long-term structures of political economy, particularly,
the relationships among key factors of production: land and labor.
I examined national sovereignty as a cultural matrix of modern industrial
society in 20th century Mexico. This cultural matrix arranges and legitimizes the
arrangement of the factors of production, labor and land, thus providing a
framework for capital accumulation. In the schema offered by revolutionary
nationalism, work and the exploitation of natural resources occurs for the benefit
of the Mexican people, with the nation acting as the dominant reference. The
state, representing the will of the people, asserts national sovereignty to advance
the social well-being of the Mexican people. This arrangement provided a means
for the state to assert control over natural resources, incorporate the working
class into the national makeup, and provide a legitimate authority in the form of
the nation.
National sovereignty embodied cultural ideals related to work and natural
resources that originally represented a paradigm of economic life different from
capitalism. National sovereignty indicated the possession and control of natural
resources by the Mexican nation to be exploited for the benefit of the Mexican
people. As national patrimony, the natural resources belonged to the Mexican
people and were theoretically inalienable from them. Mineworkers in Cananea
expected national control of the CMC to give them greater control over their
labor. While work in the mines became a source of livelihood, it was also
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regarded as an activity with intrinsic value. Work was more than a means to get
a paycheck and the source of the company’s financial well-being, it was a means
of self-realization for workers and a way to achieve the social goals of a nation
forged by the Mexican Revolution.
At the same time, Mexican national sovereignty was defined and
articulated within the context of global market capitalism. With mature capitalism,
the social aspects of natural resources and work tend to disappear. In this
context, the natural world possesses no intrinsic value other than as an economic
resource to be exploited. Work bears no intrinsic value and becomes merely a
commodity. The value of work is centered on production, efficiency, and profits –
economic indicators. Social issues and social consequences of work become an
afterthought. Work is performed solely for the paycheck; social enrichment
emerges as a coincidence or an afterthought. Mexican national sovereignty
provided an alternate paradigm of economic life with respect to natural resources
and work but its position within the larger global economy meant that copper
mining at the Compañía Minera de Cananea had to adapt accordingly. The
company's privatization and the state’s attack against labor in Cananea in the
late 1980s, demonstrate the victory of capitalism and market discourses, the
elimination of social considerations, and the elimination of any alternate modes of
economic life.
After the sale of the Compañía Minera de Cananea to Grupo Mexico in
1990, the equilibrium between the working class and the nation was never
repaired. There were notable strikes from November 1998 to February 1999. An
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explosion killing 65 miners at the Pastas de Conchas coalmine in the state of
Coahuila, also owned by Grupo Mexico, led to a three-year strike in Cananea
from 2007 to 2010.1 As in 1989, these strikes were ended by threats of armed
intervention and actual violence through the intervention of federal and state
police.2 In 2012, the passage of a new federal Labor Law solidified the Mexican
state's position against labor, taking away many labor victories and weakening
the remainder including the right to form unions and the right to strike.3 In
Cananea, history remains an ongoing and dynamic process and there is always
the possibility labor can strike back. For the time being, though, at least in the
mineral sector labor is not a driving force.

1

David Bacon, "Mexican Miners' Strike for Life," The American Prospect (October 1, 2007),
http://prospect.org/article/mexican-miners-strike-life (accessed June 7, 2016).

2

Anne Fischel and Lin Nelson, "The Assault on Labor in Cananea, Mexico," Dollars and Sense,
no. 290 (September/October 2010),
http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/2010/0910fischelnelson.html (accessed June 7, 2016).

3

Juan Luis Sariego, "La interminable huelga de los mineros mexicanos de Cananea: ¿El final de
un régimen laboral?" Amérique Latine Histoire et Mémoire 26 (December 2013): 2.
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